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with the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury sua sponte on the law of coercion. The trial court based its grant of a new trial to [defendant] on the charge of concealing a death on this omission. The only other offense for which [defendant] was convicted was felony murder. In a case such as the one before us, a felony murder case with aggravated assault as the underlying felony, there is no reversible error in failing to charge the jury on coercion as a defense to felony murder where the only evidence of coercion presented to the jury occurred after the victim was killed and the underlying felony completed. Kelly v. State, 266 Ga. 709(2) (469 S.E.2d 653) (1996).” Olarte v. State, 273 Ga.App. 96, 614 S.E.2d 213 (April 22, 2005). Defendant was not entitled to jury charge on coercion inasmuch as she never admitted involvement in the crime. Thus, she cannot complain that the court’s charge on coercion was incomplete; “any error in the instruction would constitute at most harmless error.” Maxey v. State, 272 Ga.App. 800, 613 S.E.2d 236 (April 13, 2005). Evidence did not require a coercion charge where defendant did not admit participation in crimes; rather, defendant “maintains that he did not participate in the armed robbery, aggravated assault and kidnapping.” “In order to assert a statutory affirmative defense, such as coercion, the defendant must admit all of the elements of the crime except intent; evidence of coercion is then presented to justify, excuse or mitigate the crime by showing no criminal intent. [Cit.] This affirmative defense requires that the defendant admit the crime before he can raise such a defense. [Cit.]” Blocker v. State, 265 Ga.App. 846, 595 S.E.2d 654 (February 25, 2004). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. “‘Coercion is an affirmative defense, and the burden rests with the State to disprove coercion beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Cit.] Whether the State has satisfied its burden to disprove the affirmative defense is a jury question. [Cit.] To disprove Blocker’s coercion defense, the state elicited testimony about Blocker’s demeanor. The victim testified that Blocker did not appear nervous; that the robbery occurred very quickly, with no ‘fumbling’ or ‘bumbling’ on Blocker’s part; and that Blocker commented that he was robbing [victim] because he needed a place to stay. The only evidence of coercion came from Blocker, and the trial judge noted that the jurors appeared to chuckle in disbelief when Blocker testified.” Evidence was sufficient for jury to reject coercion defense and find defendant guilty of armed robbery, aggravated assault and related offenses. Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 589 S.E.2d 108 (November 26, 2003). Coercion is not a defense to murder. See OCGA § 16-3-26. Also, “‘[t]he danger [faced by the defendant] must not be one of future violence, but of present and immediate violence, at the time of the commission of the forbidden act.’ Burns v. State, 89 Ga. 527, 528 (15 SE 748) (1892). See also Wilson v. State, 255 Ga.App. 497, 499 (565 S.E.2d 847) (2002).” Accord, Gravitt v. State , 279 Ga. 33, 608 S.E.2d 202 (January 24, 2005) (drug dealer’s threat to kill defendant and his family in two weeks if he didn’t kill victim was not “imminent” threat); Engrisch v. State , 293 Ga.App. 810, 668 S.E.2d 319 (October 3, 2008) (not clear that alleged threat to defendant’s children was one “of immediate violence, as opposed to some future danger”); Lambert v. State , 287 Ga. 774, 700 S.E.2d 354 (September 20, 2010) (“coercion is not a legal defense to murder.”); Bush v. State, 317 Ga.App. 439, 731 S.E.2d 121 (August 16, 2012). Bailey v. State, 245 Ga.App. 852, 539 S.E.2d 191 (September 11, 2000). Burglary conviction affirmed; evidence was sufficient to overcome defendant’s coercion defense. Defendant “claimed that he kicked in the victim’s door because another man he was with at the time, J.G., forced him to at knifepoint and threatened to kill him if he did not cooperate in the burglary.” However, “[t]he State’s evidence showed that only one set of muddy shoe tracks traversed through the victim’s home, thereby negating Bailey’s assertion that he and a second man entered the victim’s home to accomplish the taking. Further, even if a second man was involved in the burglary, in Bailey’s statement to the investigator it is clear that Bailey willingly-and with no coercion whatsoever-sold the victim’s weapon at a flea market and pocketed the $100, complaining that it was the only compensation he received. From such eager complicity in sharing the spoils of the burglary, the jury could easily conclude that Bailey’s professed reluctance to commit the crime was a sham.” J. CONSENT OF VICTIM Watson v. State, 297 Ga. 718, 777 S.E.2d 677 (September 14, 2015). Reversing 329 Ga.App. 334, 765 S.E.2d 24 (2014), and defendant’s conviction for sexual battery of minor victim; trial court erred by charging jury “that a victim under the age of 16 lacks the legal capacity to consent to sexual conduct. We now hold that this particular instruction is improper when given in relation to the offense of sexual battery.” “The offense at issue here … — despite its denomination as ‘sexual’ battery—does not require any sexual contact at all. Rather, as already noted, it involves non-consensual, intentional physical contact with a victim’s intimate body parts. That an individual younger than 16 is legally incapable of consenting to sexual contact does not necessarily mean that such individual is legally incapable of