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consenting to physical contact with her intimate body parts,” which “could include contacts commonly occurring on an athletic field or school playground, contacts attendant to a physician’s breast examination on a 15–year–old patient, and even the act of changing a baby’s diaper. … Instead, we construe the statute to require actual proof of the victim’s lack of consent, regardless of the victim’s age. Those cases that have held to the contrary are hereby overruled. See, e.g., Haynes v. State, 302 Ga.App. 296, 302, n. 4, 690 S.E.2d 925 (2010); Carson v. State, 259 Ga.App. 21(1), 576 S.E.2d 12 (2002); Strickland v. State, 223 Ga.App. 772(1)(b), 479 S.E.2d 125 (1996).” Also overrules cases approving a charge like the one given here – “e.g., Engle v. State, 290 Ga.App. 396(2), 659 S.E.2d 795 (2008); Hendrix v. State, 230 Ga.App. 604(3), 497 S.E.2d 236 (1997).” Redding v. State, 318 Ga.App. 84, 733 S.E.2d 383 (October 18, 2012). Convictions for simple battery affirmed; trial court wasn’t required to charge jury “that lack of consent is an element” of simple battery. “It is true that consent or lack thereof is relevant in a case involving simple battery under OCGA § 16–5–23(a)(1) to the extent that it pertains to the “insulting or provoking nature” element of the offense. See OCGA § 16–5–23(a)(1). … Lack of consent is implicit in the definition and the application of the simple battery statute. Contrary to Redding's claim, however, lack of consent is not a specified element of the simple battery offense. See OCGA § 16–5–23(a)(1). Rather, the effect of a consent defense is simply to traverse the State's proof regarding the ‘insulting or provoking nature’ element. See Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 363(1)(c), 314 S.E.2d 621 (1984). Redding was allowed to present his consent defense to the jury as a challenge to the ‘insulting or provoking nature’ element. The trial court correctly charged the jury on simple battery by quoting the statutory language of OCGA § 16–5–23(a). See Brinkworth v. State, 222 Ga.App. 288, 288–289(2), 474 S.E.2d 9 (1996). ‘The trial court was not obligated to instruct the jury in the exact language [that Redding] requested; it was sufficient that the same principle of law was fairly covered in the instructions actually given the jury.’ (Citation omitted.) Id.” Defendant here contended that victims consented to him writing on their foreheads as retribution for them drawing graffiti on his pool tables. Chase v. State, 285 Ga. 693, 681 S.E.2d 116 (June 15, 2009). Reversing 293 Ga.App. 415, 667 S.E.2d 195 (2008), majority finds that trial court erred in refusing to permit defendant to present evidence of consent where charged with sexual assault against a person enrolled in school, as the victim was over the age of consent. Defendant here was a high school teacher, victim a 16-year old student at the defendant’s school, although not under teacher’s direct supervision. Majority notes that nothing in the applicable subsection, OCGA § 16-6-5.1(b), takes away the defense of consent which is generally available to any sexual offense involving a person over the age of 16; by contrast, OCGA § 16- 6-5.1(c) specifically does eliminate the consent defense as to persons in legal custody, confined in a hospital, or under treatment of a psychotherapist. Two (Carley, writing for Thompson) dissent, finding it unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended for consent to be an available defense where it’s not mentioned, given that the statute was written to protect those in custody and under authority of another. Accord, Whitehead v. State , 300 Ga.App. 504, 685 S.E.2d 770 (October 16, 2009) (conviction for sexual assault against a student reversed where student was over age of consent and testified that she did consent). K. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE See EVIDENCE – CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, below L. DEFENSE OF HABITATION/PROPERTY Fleming v. State, 324 Ga.App. 481, 749 S.E.2d 54 (October 2, 2013). Convictions for battery and criminal damage to property affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge jury on defense of habitation as a defense to the criminal damage to property charge. Defendant here threw a brick and damaged victim’s truck, which was blocking defendant’s driveway. 1. “The clear language of the statute states that the authorized use of force is to be directed against another person, not against property. Since there is no authority that the defense of habitation applies to the use of force against another person's property, Fleming cannot show that the trial court's failure to include an instruction on defense of habitation was a clear and obvious error.” 2. Nor did victim’s actions justify charge on defense of habitation. “In this case, at the time Fleming threw the brick at the victim's truck, the victim was moving from his trailer towards his truck that was parked in front of Fleming's driveway in an attempt to move it. There was no evidence that the victim was attempting to enter or attack Fleming's habitation at the time Fleming threw a brick at the victim's truck. Indeed, Fleming testified at trial that the reason he threw the brick was to get the victim to move his truck. Therefore, the charge on defense of habitation was not warranted.” Barrett v. State, 292 Ga. 160, 733 S.E.2d 304 (October 15, 2012). Convictions for malice murder and related offenses, and associated death penalty, affirmed. 1. Dicta: defense of habitation under OCGA § 16–3–23(2) isn’t available as against a victim who is a guest in the home. “Under Georgia law, ‘defense of habitation is not a defense available to a