☢ test - Í

defendant when the victim is a guest in the home,’ even in cases where the guest-victim is unruly or even threatening. Stobbart v. State, 272 Ga. 608, 612(4) (533 S.E.2d 379) (2000) (holding that the habitation defense was not available where a guest-victim prevented the resident-defendant and his girlfriend from leaving the defendant's apartment, threatened the defendant that he would ‘“get what's coming to [him,]”’ and placed his hand on his pistol). Nor does the habitation defense become available by virtue of the resident-defendant's directing the guest-victim to leave the residence and the guest-victim's refusing to do so. See Stephens v. State, 71 Ga.App. 417, 422–423(2)(a) (31 S.E.2d 217) (1944) (holding that the habitation defense was not available where the resident-defendant directed the guest-victim to leave because of his unruly behavior before the guest-victim came at the defendant with a knife). This is so because the statute is concerned with ‘“homicides having their origin in a forcible attack and invasion of the property or habitation of another[.]”’ (Emphasis supplied.) (Citation omitted.) Id. See also Stobbart, 272 Ga. at 612(4).” Accord, Neverson v. State , 324 Ga.App. 322, 750 S.E.2d 397 (October 25, 2013) (defense of habitation not available where victim was on defendant’s porch by her permission). 2. No ineffective assistance in failing to seek jury charge on defense of habitation under OCGA § 16-3-23(2), as jury couldn’t have reasonably found the severely-injured victim to be attacking defendant’s habitation. Notes the continuing lack of a pattern charge on that subsection: “fn10: Moreover, we note that the pattern defense of habitation charge in the most recent edition of the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions remains substantially verbatim the same charge that appeared in the Third Edition. Most significantly, it does not contain a charge under subsection (2). See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal Cases § 3.12.10 (4th ed., July 2012 update). Nor does it alert counsel by way of a notation that one of the ways that a defendant may be justified in the use of deadly force in defense of habitation is not included in the suggested charge and may be found at OCGA § 16–3– 23(2).” Reese v. State, 289 Ga. 446, 711 S.E.2d 717 (June 27, 2011). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in refusing request to charge on defense of habitation. “There was no evidence presented at trial that the victim's act of opening the front door was in any way an unlawful entry into or attack upon his mother's house; that he opened the door in a violent and tumultuous manner; or that Reese could have reasonably believed that the victim intended to attack or offer personal violence toward anyone inside the house. Evidence that the victim was intoxicated and had cursed at Reese earlier that evening simply does not meet the statutory standard and it is not error to refuse a justification charge where there is no evidence to support it. See Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. 260(2) (695 S.E.2d 195) (2010).” Kendrick v. State, 287 Ga. 676, 699 S.E.2d 302 (July 5, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for malice murder and firearm possession affirmed; defendant wasn’t entitled to jury charge on defense of habitation (his car) where perpetrator stole defendant’s car, and defendant chased after him in another car, firing a gun. “‘Where a defendant does not use deadly force until the justification for the use of deadly force is over, there is no evidence to support a charge on defense of habitation. [Cit.] Where there is no evidence that the victim was attempting to enter or attack the habitation at the time he was injured by the defendant, the defense of habitation is not available. [Cits.]’ Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 298(6) (687 S.E.2d 427) (2009). Had Kendrick been justified in using deadly force to prevent Taylor's entry into his automobile for the purpose of committing the felony of motor vehicle theft, the theft was complete when Taylor drove away with the Cutlass, Holt v. State, 239 Ga. 606, 607 (238 S.E.2d 399) (1977), and the evidence showed that Kendrick did not use deadly force ‘until the justification for the use of deadly force [was] over ....’ Coleman, supra. Under the facts of this case, there could be no reasonable belief that firing a pistol at the driver of another car while driving on the road was ‘necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a motor vehicle,’ as that term is used in the pattern jury instructions.” Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (November 9, 2009). 1. Defendant couldn’t claim defense of habitation when defendant exited his car, then began firing at his perceived attacker. “Coleman's testimony placed him and victim Pernice outside the habitation when Coleman fired the shots that struck Pernice. While Pernice had entered the habitation to grab Coleman, upon his successful removal of Coleman from the habitation, Pernice was no longer in the habitation or attempting to enter the habitation, making OCGA § 16-3-23 unavailable to him as a defense.” Accord, Philpot v. State , 311 Ga.App. 486, 716 S.E.2d 551 (August 24, 2011) (no evidence “that the victim was attempting to enter or attack the [car] at the time [s]he was injured by the defendant .”); Andrade v. State , 319 Ga.App. 75, 733 S.E.2d 474 (October 24, 2012) (defense of habitation not applicable where “Andrade exited the van and began fighting after the van had stopped, at a time when no attack was even arguably being made on the van.”); Fleming (October 2, 2013), above. 2. Failure to request charge on defense of habitation was deficient, but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. “[Co-defendant] Jackson testified that he drove the Jeep Cherokee to the fueling station and removed the keys from the ignition. While sitting in the vehicle, Jackson saw Pernice attack Coleman and was himself struck on the