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finding of entrapment, and thus the trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury on this defense.” Cosmo v. State, 320 Ga.App. 397, 739 S.E.2d 828 (March 14, 2013). Reversed in part on other grounds, 295 Ga. 76, 757 S.E.2d 819 (April 22, 2014). Convictions for pandering and solicitation reversed; trial court erred by failing to charge jury on entrapment although defendant didn’t admit all elements of the crime. “‘As a general rule, in order to raise the defense of entrapment, the defendant must first admit the commission of the crime and then show that he did so because of the unlawful solicitation or inducement of a law enforcement officer. Gregoroff v. State, 248 Ga. 667, 669– 670, 285 S.E.2d 537 (1982).’ St. Jean v. State, 255 Ga.App. 129, 130, 564 S.E.2d 534 (2002). The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, has also recognized the following exception to the general rule: ‘when the State's case shows evidence of entrapment and the defendant offers no evidence of entrapment inconsistent with his defense that he did not commit the crime, the defendant is not required to admit the commission of the crime in order to be entitled to a charge on entrapment.’ Gregoroff, supra, 248 Ga. at 672, 285 S.E.2d 537. In this case, Cosmo ‘presented evidence of entrapment that arguably was not inconsistent with his denial of the commission of the crime; therefore we must look to the evidence presented by the State to determine whether appellant was entitled to a charge on entrapment.’ St. Jean, supra, 255 Ga.App. at 130, 564 S.E.2d 534.” Evidence here, while in conflict, would have allowed jury to find that the idea for the crime (here, sex with a minor) originated with the police officer; that it was induced by the agent’s undue persuasion; and that defendant wasn’t predisposed to commit the crime. Bolton v. State, 310 Ga.App. 801, 714 S.E.2d 377 (July 13, 2011). Conviction for online child solicitation affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failure to request charge on entrapment, as evidence didn’t support that defense. “Bolton did not admit to his commission of the crime. Nor do we find that the State's case shows any evidence of entrapment. Specifically, the evidence shows: (i) that the notion of meeting for sexual activity originated with Bolton; (ii) that even after Shelby identified herself as fifteen years old, Bolton was asking Shelby sexually explicit questions; and (iii) that Bolton was predisposed to commit the crime because he pursued the illicit activity he sought while contemporaneously expressing fear of the potential criminal sanctions he faced.” Millsaps v. State, 310 Ga.App. 769, 714 S.E.2d 661 (July 13, 2011). Convictions for enticing a child and related offenses affirmed; trial court wasn’t required to define “incitement” as part of jury charge on entrapment. “The term ‘incitement’ as used in the statute to define entrapment is a term of common knowledge, and therefore, the trial court's determination that trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial court's denial of Millsaps's request to charge the jury as to the definition of ‘incitement’ was not clearly erroneous. Robinson [ v. State, 308 Ga.App. 45, 46(2) (706 S.E.2d 577) (2011)].” Logan v. State, 309 Ga.App. 95, 709 S.E.2d 302 (March 17, 2011). Convictions for child solicitation, attempted child molestation, and related offenses affirmed; no entrapment where defendant responded to Craig’s List ad posted by police posing as 14-year old girl. “Logan did not testify or otherwise present evidence admitting that he committed the alleged crimes. … [T]he jury's conclusion that entrapment did not occur is supported by the record evidence, including the facts that (1) Logan continued communicating with and did not report Tiffany Bankston to Craig's List [fn: The website requires users to verify that they are 18 years old in order to post advertisements in the section in question. ] when he learned that she was 14 years old; (2) Logan initiated the explicit nature of the online conversations between the two; (3) Logan initiated the conversation during which the meeting was arranged and described in detail the sex acts he wished to perform on Tiffany Bankston at the park; and (4) Logan arrived at the park with a condom on his person. See St. Jean [ v. State, 255 Ga.App. 129, 130-131 (564 S.E.2d 534) (2002)] (although the idea for the crime originated with the State, if the defendant offered no evidence of undue persuasion, incitement, or deceit, or that defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime, then there is no entrapment).” Jackson v. State, 305 Ga.App. 591, 699 S.E.2d 884 (August 18, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for sale of cocaine affirmed; jury could find that defendant wasn’t entrapped by State’s informant when asked to act as intermediary in drug purchase. “[T]hat a defendant procures contraband after a request or even repeated requests by a state agent, without more, is insufficient to prove entrapment. See Bell v. State, 208 Ga.App. 337, 339(4) (430 S.E.2d 777) (1993); Gooch v. State, 188 Ga.App. 196, 197 (372 S.E.2d 473) (1988); Roden v. State, 181 Ga.App. 287, 291(1) (351 S.E.2d 713) (1986). ‘Absent other circumstances, it is generally held that where an [informant] simply makes a request, as to purchase contraband, and there is ready compliance, the defense of entrapment is not available.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Flores v. State, 277 Ga.App. 211, 214(4) (626 S.E.2d 181) (2006). Mindful of these principles, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Jackson's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. We question whether Jackson established a prima facie case of entrapment, but to the extent that he did so, the jury was authorized to find that the state's