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evidence rebutted it beyond a reasonable doubt.” Accord, Quarterman v. State , 305 Ga.App. 686, 700 S.E.2d 674 (August 26, 2010) (undercover officer’s request to purchase cocaine insufficient to justify charge on entrapment). Martinez v. State, 303 Ga.App. 166, 692 S.E.2d 766 (March 26, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine affirmed; defendant’s entrapment defense created “the rare situation where what would otherwise be hearsay testimony was properly elicited by the state to explain the investigator's conduct and ascertain his motives, since [defendant] was challenging the motives of the narcotics investigator and arguing that he was not acting in good faith as part of his entrapment defense. See Teague, 252 Ga. at 534(1), 314 S.E.2d 910 (noting that ‘where the question is, whether the party acted prudently, wisely, or in good faith, the information, on which he acted, whether true or false, is original and material evidence’) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). See also Bennett v. State, 158 Ga.App. 421, 421-422(1), 424(3), 280 S.E.2d 429 (1981) (testimony concerning statements made by informant to investigator was admissible to explain the investigator's conduct in case where defendant raised an entrapment defense); George v. State, 242 Ga.App. 580, 582-583(3), 530 S.E.2d 479 (2000) (statement was admissible to explain the officer's conduct in case where defendant asserted that the officer had fabricated the criminal charge against him).” Harvill v. State, 296 Ga.App. 453, 674 S.E.2d 659 (March 5, 2009). Evidence didn’t raise defense of entrapment where officers took a recorded statement from defendant, believing he might make a false statement. Officers later charged defendant with making false statements. “Here, there is no evidence that [Officer] Hale originated the idea for making a false statement.” Lightsey v. State, 289 Ga.App. 181, 656 S.E.2d 852 (January 14, 2008). Defendant wasn’t entrapped: “While driving around in the targeted area, the informant saw Lightsey on a bicycle. Lightsey called out for the informant to approach him. The informant did so and asked Lightsey where she could purchase $20 worth of cocaine. In response, Lightsey handed the informant a packet of a substance later identified as cocaine, and the informant handed him $20 in return.” “Lightsey’s argument notwithstanding, there is no attractive nuisance doctrine embedded in the law of entrapment. The fact that the informant was ‘an attractive female’ does not show that Lightsey was induced to sell drugs to her as a result of undue persuasion, incitement or deceit. And this is true, even if the informant was a modern day Helen of Troy.” Campbell v. State, 281 Ga.App. 503, 636 S.E.2d 687 (September 7, 2006). No evidence to support defendant’s requested charge on entrapment: “Here, Campbell testified that he had never trafficked in cocaine. The evidence also showed, however, that Campbell was referred to the informant as someone who could provide a large quantity of drugs. In any case, Campbell has failed to satisfy the second prong of the test to show entrapment as no evidence was presented to show that the informant employed undue persuasion, incitement or deceit to induce Campbell into selling the drugs. See Heath v. State, 240 Ga.App. 492, 493-494(2) (522 S.E.2d 761) (1999). Rather, the evidence showed that Campbell acted to ‘pick up some extra money.’ The informant merely furnished an opportunity to Campbell who was ready to commit the offense. See Byrd [ v. State, 211 Ga.App. 881(1), 440 S.E.2d 764 (1994)]. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment. See Heath, supra, 240 Ga.App. at 494(2).” Manders v. State, 280 Ga.App. 742, 634 S.E.2d 773 (June 16, 2006). Approves this charge on entrapment: “A person is not guilty of a crime if by entrapment that person’s conduct is induced or solicited by a government officer, or employee or agent of either for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in prosecuting the person for the commission of the crime. Entrapment exists when the idea and intention of the commission of the crime originated with the government officer or employee or with an agent of either and that officer or employee by undue persuasion, incitement or deceitful means induced the accused to commit the act for which the accused would not have committed except for the conduct of such officer or employee. To constitute entrapment, the accused must have been induced to commit the criminal act that he would not have otherwise committed except by undue persuasion, incitement or deceitful means practiced upon an accused by a government officer, employee or agent of either.... I further charge you that repeated requests by an officer or agent for contraband goods does not constitute undue persuasion.... Entrapment is seduction or improper inducement to commit a crime and is not merely testing by trap, trickiness or deceit of one who is suspected.” The bold language, from Finley v. State , 214 Ga.App. 452, 448 S.E.2d 78 (1994), “is generally accepted as an accurate statement of the law of entrapment. In McDonald v. State, 156 Ga.App. 143, 147(4) (273 S.E.2d 881) (1980), we held ‘[t]he phrase “undue persuasion” as used in [OCGA § 16-3-25] means something more than repeated requests on the part of an officer or agent for contraband goods. [Cit.]’ Likewise, in Thomas v. State, 134 Ga.App. 18, 22 (213 S.E.2d 129) (2) (1975), we held ‘“[e]ntrapment is the seduction or improper inducement to commit a crime and not the testing by trap, trickiness, or deceit of one suspected.” [Cit.] The discovery of crime and the procurement of evidence by deception