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are not prohibited. A trap may be set. [Cits.]’” “At the motion for new trial hearing, Manders presented testimony from a linguistics expert who testified that the charge had intellectual inconsistences and contradictions. However, ‘[i]t is not necessary, in considering a charge, to strain its reasonable intendment by problematical adverse constructions, but if it is sufficiently clear to be understood by jurors of ordinary capacity and understanding, this is all that is required.’ Rucker v. State, 135 Ga.App. 468, 472(4) (218 S.E.2d 146) (1975), overruled on other grounds, Keaton v. State, 253 Ga. 70, 72 (316 S.E.2d 452) (1984).” Nettles v. State, 276 Ga.App. 259, 623 S.E.2d 140 (November 4, 2005). Defendant’s conviction for drug trafficking affirmed despite court’s error in admitting similar transaction evidence. “Following the presentation of the State’s case, Nettles presented no evidence but did request a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment. The court agreed to give the instruction. The court also reopened the evidence and allowed the State to present in rebuttal Nettles’ prior drug conviction and testimony of his involvement in other drug deals.” After admitting the evidence, trial court concluded that the evidence should not have been admitted, and instructed the jury to disregard it. “Generally, ‘ similar transaction evidence may be admitted to rebut the defense of entrapment, insofar as the evidence proves the falsity of specific testimony of the defendant regarding his lack of predisposition to commit the crime .’ (Emphasis supplied; footnote omitted.) Gober v. State, 249 Ga.App. 168, 175(9), 547 S.E.2d 656 (2001); see White v. State, 244 Ga.App. 475, 476(1), 536 S.E.2d 180 (2000) (when a defendant raises the defense of entrapment and testifies to it a trial, it is the State’s burden to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt). Here, because Nettles presented no testimony in support of an entrapment defense, the State had no basis on which to admit his prior conviction and evidence of his prior drug deals in rebuttal. Thus the court erred in allowing the admission of this evidence.” Conviction affirmed, however, because of curative instruction and overwhelming evidence of guilt. Fennell v. State, 271 Ga.App. 797, 611 S.E.2d 96 (February 25, 2005). A mere “request to purchase contraband” is not enough to show entrapment. “Furthermore, it is not improper to employ artifice and stratagem to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises and furnishing an opportunity to commit an offense if the individual is predisposed to undertake such commission does not constitute entrapment. Hinton v. State, 236 Ga.App. 140, 142, 511 S.E.2d 547 (1999). The trial court did not err by denying Fennell’s request for a charge on entrapment.” Urapo-Sanchez v. State, 267 Ga.App. 113, 598 S.E.2d 850 (April 15, 2004). Jury could conclude that defendant was not entrapped. “The record shows without dispute that the idea for the crime originated with state actors. The evidence does not clearly show, however, that the crime was induced by undue persuasion on the part of those actors. Although Urapo- Sanchez claims that his testimony that the CI threatened him went unchallenged because the CI did not testify at trial, ‘there is no per se rule that a defendant is entitled to a directed verdict where the informant is not called to rebut the defendant’s testimony of entrapment.’ [Cit.] … In addition, despite Urapo-Sanchez’s claim to the contrary, there was circumstantial evidence that he was predisposed to commit the crime. He met with Weaver and the CI repeatedly and without protest; he appeared at ease during these meetings; he initiated two telephone conversations with Weaver; and he had both an out-of-town and a local supplier for obtaining a large quantity of illegal drugs. ‘Ready commission of a criminal act may show the element of predisposition.’ [Cit.]” Accord, Robinson v. State , 296 Ga.App. 561, 675 S.E.2d 298 (March 11, 2009) (facts similar to Urapo-Sanchez ). Baggs v. State, 265 Ga.App. 282, 593 S.E.2d 734 (January 26, 2004). Mere use of a confidential informant by State did not mean defendant was entrapped where evidence showed defendant voluntarily participated in offense. (In this case, defendant “had no contact with the confidential informant.”) St. Jean v. State, 255 Ga.App. 129, 564 S.E.2d 534 (April 18, 2002). Defendant, found guilty of cocaine trafficking, argued that he had been induced by an informant into setting up a meeting between the informant and a friend of Defendant who, unbeknownst to Defendant, brought cocaine with him to the meeting. Denying knowledge of the cocaine, Defendant therefore denied having trafficked in cocaine; however, Defendant nevertheless requested a jury charge on the defense of entrapment. Generally, a defendant must first admit the commission of a crime and then show that he committed it because he was unlawfully solicited or induced by a government officer or employee. However, if a rational jury may draw a reasonable inference of entrapment from the State’s evidence, the defendant is entitled to a jury charge on entrapment unless he has presented evidence of entrapment inconsistent with his denial of the commission of the crime. In this case, because Defendant presented evidence of entrapment that arguably was not inconsistent with his denial of the commission of the crime, the court must look to the evidence presented by the State to determine whether Defendant was entitled to an entrapment charge. The entrapment defense consists of three elements: (1) the idea for the commission of the crime must originate with the State agent; (2) the crime must be induced by the agent’s