☢ test - Í

undue persuasion, incitement, or deceit, and (3) the defendant must not be predisposed to commit the crime. Here, the first element was satisfied because the idea for the crime originated with the officer; however, the state produced no evidence of the latter two elements. Therefore, because the jury could not reasonably infer entrapment, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to give the charge. Accord, Maldonado v. State , 284 Ga.App. 26, 643 S.E.2d 316 (March 7, 2007); Davis v. State , 285 Ga.App. 460, 646 S.E.2d 342 (May 21, 2007). White v. State, 244 Ga.App. 475, 536 S.E.2d 180 (June 13, 2000). Convictions for cocaine trafficking and related offenses affirmed; jury could find that defendant wasn’t entrapped. 1. “White testified that (1) the informant asked him for drugs and (2) he would get them for her because he loved her. Even if this were true, White himself testified that he purchased the cocaine to sell to the undercover agent on his own initiative, that he sold cocaine for about six months prior to his arrest, and that he sold it to three or four close friends in addition to providing it to the informant. ‘The predisposition of the defendant against committing the crime is a key element of the defense.’ (Citation omitted.) Rutledge v. State, 218 Ga.App. 130, 132(1), 460 S.E.2d 551 (1995). This testimony clearly shows that White had a predisposition to commit the offenses charged.” 2. Contrary to defendant’s argument, “we find no authority that the use of a defendant's common law spouse [fn] as an informant is ‘entrapment per se.’” Heath v. State, 240 Ga.App. 492, 522 S.E.2d 761 (September 28, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for attempting to possess cocaine affirmed; trial court properly declined defendant’s request to charge the jury on entrapment. “Heath's testimony that the officer initiated the contact and offered to sell him drugs failed to raise the defense of entrapment because there was no evidence that the officer employed undue persuasion, incitement or deceit to induce him to buy drugs nor any evidence that Heath was not predisposed to buy drugs. Wyatt v. State, 194 Ga.App. 159, 160(2), 390 S.E.2d 85 (1990); cf. Hattaway v. State, 185 Ga.App. 607, 608-609, 365 S.E.2d 480 (1988) (evidence of repeated and persistent requests to purchase drugs was sufficient to raise entrapment defense for jury's consideration). Because the evidence showed that the officer in this case merely provided Heath with the opportunity to commit the crime he specifically set out to commit, the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on entrapment. Oswell v. State, 208 Ga.App. 883, 884(1), 432 S.E.2d 586 (1993).” Hinton v. State, 236 Ga.App. 140, 511 S.E.2d 547 (January 28, 1999). 1. Defendant’s contentions did not raise the defense of entrapment where he claimed he approached the plain-clothes officers to buy scrap metal, not drugs. “Hinton’s defense is to deny committing the crime with which he had been charged. As a general rule, to warrant a jury charge on the defense of entrapment, a defendant must admit the commission of the crime, but argue that the commission was the result of the unlawful solicitation or inducement of a law enforcement agent. Griffin v. State, 154 Ga.App. 261, 263(3), 267 S.E.2d 867 (1980). Thus, Hinton’s denial of the offense precludes an entrapment defense.” 2. Officers offering an opportunity to purchase contraband does not constitute entrapment. “‘Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises and it is not entrapment merely to furnish an opportunity to commit an offense if the individual is predisposed to undertake such commission.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Clayton v. State, 197 Ga.App. 616, 617, 398 S.E.2d 723 (1990).” P. EQUAL ACCESS Maddox v. State, 322 Ga.App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280 (July 11, 2013). Whole court opinion affirming convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana. Overruling line of cases holding that “[w]hen more than one occupant has equal access to hidden contraband, but only one occupant is prosecuted for possession of the contraband, the State has the burden of proving that the prosecuted occupant ‘was in sole constructive possession’ of the contraband,” quoting and overruling Reid v. State, 212 Ga.App. 787 (442 S.E.2d 852) (1994). “Circumstantial evidence that multiple occupants of a car had equal access to hidden contraband may support the theory that all the occupants were guilty as parties to the crime and had joint constructive possession of the contraband. Castillo v. State, 166 Ga.App. 817, 822 (305 S.E.2d 629) (1983). [fn] Under these circumstances, the State may elect to prosecute the occupants jointly or separately ( Kennemore v. State, 222 Ga. 252 (149 S.E.2d 471) (1966)), or may elect to prosecute only one of the occupants for directly committing the crime, but nevertheless prove the sole prosecuted occupant was guilty as a party to the crime. Trumpler v. State, 261 Ga.App. 499, 500–501 (583 S.E.2d 184) (2003); Brinson v. State, 261 Ga. 884 (413 S.E.2d 443) (1992).” “‘[T]he settled rule [is] that the failure of the State to prosecute one party to a crime ordinarily offers no defense to other parties to the crime. See OCGA § 16–2–21 (party to a crime can be convicted even if the principal has not been prosecuted); Davis v. State, 163 Ga. 247, 248 (135 S.E. 916) (1926) (“Failure to prosecute the principal will in no wise relieve the accessory.”); see also Grimes v. State, 245 Ga.App. 277, 278(2) (537 S.E.2d 720) (2000) (“A party to a crime may be prosecuted and convicted for the commission of the offense regardless of whether anyone else was prosecuted.”),’” quoting Holiman v. State, 313 Ga.App. 76, 79 (720 S.E.2d 363) (2011).