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Garcia v. State, 319 Ga.App. 751, 738 S.E.2d 333 (February 14, 2013). Cocaine trafficking and related convictions affirmed; equal access defense didn’t apply where “the record is devoid of any evidence that someone other than Garcia had access to his truck.” Palencia-Barron v. State, 318 Ga.App. 301, 733 S.E.2d 824 (October 31, 2012). Conviction for methamphetamine trafficking confirmed; defendant/truck passenger wasn’t entitled to jury charge that driver was presumed to be in possession of drugs found therein. “‘[A] presumption arises from proof of ownership and control of an automobile or other property that the owner or driver is in possession of contraband found therein; however, this presumption does not apply when there is evidence that ... others had access to the vehicle. There is no reverse presumption with regard to a passenger's presence in an automobile in which contraband is found.’ Bell v. State, 198 Ga.App. 874, 874–875(1) (403 S.E.2d 864) (1991) (citation omitted).” See also Benson (August 18, 2005), below for similar cases as to residences. Warren v. State, 314 Ga.App. 477, 724 S.E.2d 404 (February 16, 2012). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed; evidence supported defendant’s conviction based on defendant’s ownership and possession of the vehicle where the drugs were found. Distinguishing Fears v. State , 169 Ga.App. 172 (312 S.E.2d 174) (1983), where “the defendant had been in possession of the car for only four hours before contraband was found therein, id. at 172–173(1), while there was evidence here that Warren had purchased his car a month before the discovery of the cocaine. Moreover, there was evidence here that the package containing the cocaine created a perceptible bulge under the back seat cushion. Whether evidence that the car's prior owner had equal access to the cocaine was sufficient to overcome the presumption of Warren's possession was a question for the factfinder. See Turner v. State, 277 Ga.App. 205, 207(1) (626 S.E.2d 176) (2006).” Holiman v. State, 313 Ga.App. 76, 720 S.E.2d 363 (November 30, 2011). Physical precedent only. Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed; defendant could be convicted of joint constructive possession with his brother where the brother was charged by the federal government, while defendant was charged by the State. Blackwell criticizes the rule requiring both persons to be charged, originating in Reid v. State, 212 Ga.App. 787, 788 n.1 (442 S.E.2d 852) (1994). “We have found no mention of this principle in any case that preceded Reid, and our opinion in Reid cites no authority for it and does not explain why it must be so. … Given the absence of an explanation for the principle, some reasonable people might question whether it is a sound one, especially considering the settled rule that the failure of the State to prosecute one party to a crime ordinarily offers no defense to other parties to the crime. See OCGA § 16–2–21 (party to a crime can be convicted even if the principal has not been prosecuted); Davis v. State, 163 Ga. 247, 248 (135 S.E. 916) (1926) (‘Failure to prosecute the principal will in no wise relieve the accessory.’); see also Grimes v. State, 245 Ga.App. 277, 278(2) (537 S.E.2d 720) (2000) (‘A party to a crime may be prosecuted and convicted for the commission of the offense regardless of whether anyone else was prosecuted.’).” Reid and its progeny overruled, Maddox v. State , 322 Ga.App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280 (July 11, 2013). Henry v. State, 311 Ga.App. 353, 716 S.E.2d 232 (August 3, 2011). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana. Defendant was driving vehicle owned by his girlfriend, who was a passenger. During traffic stop, officers “noticed a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle, which the officer believed would have been noticeable to the vehicle's occupants. A green, leafy material later determined to be marijuana was found in the glove compartment.” “In cases involving contraband found in vehicles, the state is generally entitled to an evidentiary presumption that the driver or owner of the vehicle is in constructive possession of the contraband. [Cit.] And … the evidence of the odor of marijuana in the vehicle also supported a finding that Henry and [girlfriend] Smith jointly possessed the marijuana.” “Because the evidence that Henry was the driver of the vehicle was not the sole evidence of his possession of the marijuana found therein, and because no evidence was presented that anyone other than Henry and Smith (the charged defendants) had equal access to the marijuana, the ‘equal access’ rule cited by Henry does not apply in this case. See State v. Johnson, 280 Ga. 511, 514, 630 S.E.2d 377 (2006) (‘equal access’ rule applies only where the sole evidence of possession of contraband found in the vehicle was the defendant's ownership or possession of the vehicle); Cabrera [ v. State, 303 Ga.App. 646, 651-652(1), 694 S.E.2d 720 (2010)] (defendant was not entitled to benefit of ‘equal access’ rule where state jointly charged both him and the only other occupant of a vehicle with possession of contraband found therein).” Dockery v. State, 308 Ga.App. 502, 707 S.E.2d 889 (March 17, 2011). Conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court declined to charge on equal access, given that the drugs were found in defendant’s left front shirt pocket. Defendant claimed that co-defendant put the drugs there when he ran out of the house. “The doctrine of equal access applies only to cases of constructive possession. See Davis v. State,