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304 Ga.App. 355, 363-364(6) (696 S.E.2d 381) (2010).” Brown v. State, 307 Ga.App. 99, 704 S.E.2d 227 (November 24, 2010). Convictions for cocaine trafficking and related offenses affirmed; evidence supported finding that defendant was “guilty of possessing the narcotics with the intent to distribute them and that he possessed the scale in furtherance of that crime based on his residing at the house in question for the last five years, the fact that the items were well hidden within the premises, the lack of evidence at the home of any other persons residing therein, Brown's possession of a substantial amount of cash on his person at the time of the search, and his use of the closed circuit surveillance system to monitor his home,” citing Turner v. State, 298 Ga.App. 107, 108 (679 S.E.2d 127) (2009). Equal access defense didn’t apply since “the State presented more evidence ‘than mere presence or equal access linking [Brown] to the contraband,’” quoting Wilson v. State, 256 Ga.App. 741, 743(1) (569 S.E.2d 640) (2002). Rogers v. State, 302 Ga.App. 65, 690 S.E.2d 437 (January 20, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for felony marijuana possession reversed, based on equal access defense. “[T]here was affirmative evidence that [defendant’s] passenger, Massenburg, had equal access to the marijuana found in the backseat of the car he was driving and that the State failed to offer any evidence proving that Rogers was in sole constructive possession of those drugs.” Note, “[i]n its appellate brief, the State contends that Massenberg was also charged with possession of the marijuana. However, there was no evidence adduced at the time of trial that formal charges had been brought against Massenberg.” Overruled, Maddox v. State , 322 Ga.App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280 (July 11, 2013). Xiong v. State, 295 Ga.App. 697, 673 S.E.2d 86 (January 27, 2009). Drug convictions reversed; evidence did not overcome defendant’s equal access defense. “Here, there is no evidence connecting Xiong to the methamphetamine or marijuana other than his own equal access. Xiong's cousin had the same access to the contraband, the baggies, scales, and the notebook as Xiong. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 154 Ga.App. 400, 401(1) (268 S.E.2d 378) (1980) (defendants affirmatively showed that adult brother had equal access to drugs found on chair in bedroom in which he slept). Although his cousin had left, there was affirmative evidence that his possessions were still in the home and that he still had a key. Id. (brother had key and full access.) None of the items were found in an area exclusively used by Xiong, rather most were in ‘open, notorious and easily accessible areas.’ Id. And the methamphetamine was in a closet in the bedroom most recently occupied by Vang. Finally, there was affirmative evidence that the handwriting in the notebook was not Xiong's. See, e.g., Diggs v. State, 234 Ga.App. 335, 337 (506 S.E.2d 683) (1998) (‘ State presented no evidence showing that [defendant] wrote, controlled or even handled the memo referring to ounces, pounds, names and currency found in his home.’) Thus the evidence was insufficient to show that Xiong possessed either the methamphetamine or the marijuana. Convictions on those counts must be overturned. See Turner v. State, 276 Ga.App. 381 (623 S.E.2d 216) (2005) (acquittal required where sole evidence of possession is constructive and others have equal access to the contraband).” Distinguished, Wheeler v. State , 307 Ga.App. 585, 705 S.E.2d 686 (January 20, 2011) (“Unlike the defendant in Xiong, Wheeler's possession of the contraband was not based solely on his possession of the residence. Rather, the State presented direct evidence of Wheeler's admission that the contraband belonged to him and that some marijuana was found in his bedroom.”). Overruled to the extent that it holds that defendant must be shown to be in exclusive possession as against unindicted co-occupants, Maddox v. State , 322 Ga.App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280 (July 11, 2013). Benitez v. State, 295 Ga.App. 658, 673 S.E.2d 46 (January 23, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine reversed; evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant was knowingly in joint possession of drugs carried by his companion. Defendant drove Garduno from Marietta to a hotel in Cartersville, where Garduno attempted to sell drugs to police informant. Defendant was present in room when Garduno showed drugs to informant. Defendant “could see the contents of the [drug] containers from where he was sitting” in the room. Defendant possessed $2485 in cash. “Officer Mayton testified that in his experience, which included more than 100 drug cases in the previous year, no person would be present in a small room with the amount of drugs found here unless they were “intricately involved” in a drug transaction. He also testified that Latinos often carry large amounts of cash because they do not use banks. “[T]he State referred to Garduno as a co-defendant at Benitez's sentencing, but did not show the jury that Garduno was charged as such.” “Even if a rational jury could conclude that Benitez knew that Garduno was carrying methamphetamine, this fact alone ‘would not authorize a finding that [Benitez] aided and abetted him in the offense of trafficking,’” quoting Crenshaw v. State, 183 Ga.App. 527, 528-529 (359 S.E.2d 419) (1987) (“defendant’s traveling on same flight itinerary with person carrying cocaine was insufficient to sustain his conviction for trafficking”). Despite driving to the scene? Overruled to the extent that it holds that defendant must be shown to be in exclusive possession as against unindicted co-occupants, Maddox v. State , 322 Ga.App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280 (July 11, 2013).