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Jackson v. State, 295 Ga.App. 427, 671 S.E.2d 902 (January 5, 2009). Trial court properly charged jury on joint possession although other occupant of vehicle was not indicted, where defendant didn’t deny actual possession of drugs, only challenging his knowing possession. Compare Turner (November 15, 2005), below (ordinarily improper to charge on joint possession where other occupant not charged). Line of cases requiring both occupants be charged overruled, Maddox v. State , 322 Ga.App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280 (July 11, 2013). Bailey v. State, 294 Ga.App. 437, 669 S.E.2d 453 (November 7, 2008). Where trial court charged jury on presumption of possession of contraband by owner of premises, it erred by failing to charge on equal access where that was defendant’s sole defense, but not as to counts where defendant presented other defenses. Here, defendant presented other defenses as to drug charges, so court had no duty to charge on equal access as to those, but equal access was defendant’s sole defense as to sawed-off shotgun found on his premises, and he presented evidence of others with access to the premises. “Thus, it appears that a charge on equal access was warranted by the evidence as to the firearms charge and should have been given by the court, sua sponte, once it instructed the jury on presumption of possession based on ownership of the premises.” Conviction on that count only reversed and remanded for retrial. Maldonado v. State, 293 Ga.App. 356, 667 S.E.2d 156 (August 22, 2008). Quoting Castillo v. State, 288 Ga.App. 828 (655 S.E.2d 695) (2007): “The evidence presented at trial permitted the jury to find that, rather than proving Castillo's innocence, the evidence of equal access to the drugs proved that she and her co-defendants had joint constructive possession of the contraband.” Hight v. State, 293 Ga.App. 254, 666 S.E.2d 678 (July 10, 2008). Equal access defense did not apply where “the only evidence presented regarding ownership of the vehicle was Officer Howard's testimony that it belonged to a relative of Hight. Therefore, no presumption arose which would have required an equal access charge.” Thomas v. State, 291 Ga.App. 795, 662 S.E.2d 849 (June 4, 2008). Charge on constructive possession was not “tantamount to a charge on the presumption of ownership,” entitling defendant to charge on equal access. Arellano v. State, 289 Ga.App. 148, 656 S.E.2d 264 (January 9, 2008). Presumption of possession by driver was not the sole evidence against defendant: “ when the arresting officer first pulled behind the car, Arellano tried to avoid him. See Wilkerson v. State, 269 Ga.App. 190, 192-193(2) (603 S.E.2d 728) (2004) (speculation that others had equal access to car did not undermine conviction, particularly where defendant drove evasively when confronted by police). Furthermore, the methamphetamine was ‘fresh,’ indicating that it had not been in the car very long. And its significant street value undermined any claim that someone simply left it in the vehicle. See McGee [ v. State, 287 Ga.App. 460, 462 (651 S.E.2d 546) (2007)] (although defendant did not own car he was driving, other evidence – including that hidden cocaine had high street value and likely would not have been abandoned by someone else in car trunk – demonstrated connection between defendant and the contraband). Finally, Arellano was unusually nervous following the traffic stop. See Fernandez v. State, 275 Ga.App. 151, 155(2) (619 S.E.2d 821) (2005) (evidence that car occupants were extremely nervous following traffic stop supported inference of guilty knowledge regarding drugs hidden in car). Given this evidence, the jury was authorized to reject Arellano’s equal access claim and find that he knowingly possessed the methamphetamine.” McGee v. State, 287 Ga.App. 460, 651 S.E.2d 546 (September 10, 2007). “[T]he equal access rule only applies ‘“where the sole evidence of possession of contraband found in the vehicle is the defendant’s ownership or possession of the vehicle,”’” quoting Collins v. State, 273 Ga.App. 598 (615 S.E.2d 646) (2005). Equal access defense didn’t apply here: “ the link between McGee and the cocaine was not based solely on the presumption of possession. For example, Trooper Scott smelled marijuana when he first approached the vehicle, and he discovered suspected marijuana near McGee’s feet under the driver’s floor mat. Moreover, McGee admitted that he purchased and was wearing the shoes originally packaged in the box containing the cocaine. A search of his person further revealed a large sum of cash. Such evidence established a connection between McGee and the cocaine beyond the mere presumption of possession. See Townsend v. State, 253 Ga.App. 316, 317 (558 S.E.2d 849) (2002); see also Ryans v. State, 226 Ga.App. 595, 596-597(1) (487 S.E.2d 130) (1997) (evidence that defendant was carrying a large sum of cash helped support conclusion that defendant constructively possessed drugs at issue). Although the evidence tying him to the contraband was circumstantial, the trial court reasonably rejected McGee’s suggestion that the car owner or someone else with access to the vehicle left cocaine with a street value of at least $17,000 not only in the car trunk, but in a box the contents of which McGee purchased. [Cits.]” Accord , Evans v State , 288 Ga.App. 103, 653 S.E.2d 520 (October 26, 2007); Woodard v. State , 289 Ga.App. 643, 658 S.E.2d 129 (January 30, 2008) (Physical precedent only; “a rational factfinder