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could infer that a third party would have ‘ke[pt] up with’ drugs of such high value [$3100] and would not have simply left them in the van. See Townsend v. State, 253 Ga.App. 316, 317 (558 S.E.2d 849) (2002).”); Thomas v. State , 291 Ga.App. 795, 662 S.E.2d 849 (June 4, 2008) (presumption not relied on, defendant found in actual possession); Bailey (September 25, 2008), above ; Arroyo v. State , 309 Ga.App. 494, 711 S.E.2d 60 (May 5, 2011); Jefferson v. State , 309 Ga.App. 861, 711 S.E.2d 412 (June 13, 2011); Murphy v. State , 314 Ga.App. 753, 725 S.E.2d 866 (March 12, 2012). Davis v. State, 285 Ga.App. 315, 645 S.E.2d 753 (May 9, 2007). Equal access rule has no application against charged co-defendant. “[T]he equal access rule ‘has no application where ... all persons allegedly having equal access to the contraband are alleged to have been in joint constructive possession of that contraband.’ Brownlee v. State, 173 Ga.App. 138, 139(1) (325 S.E.2d 815) (1984); accord Davis v. State, 270 Ga.App. 777, 779(1) (607 S.E.2d 924) (2004). See also Coop v. State, 186 Ga.App. 578, 580(2) (367 S.E.2d 836) (1988) (appellate court upheld convictions of both occupants of rented car for possession of contraband found therein where occupants alternated driving). Cf. Turner v. State, 276 Ga.App. 381, 383-384 (623 S.E.2d 216) (2005) (driver’s conviction reversed where passenger had equal access and cocaine was found under passenger seat).” Accord, Woodard v. State , 289 Ga.App. 643, 658 S.E.2d 129 (January 30, 2008) (physical precedent only); Ramirez v. State , 290 Ga.App. 3, 658 S.E.2d 790 (March 4, 2008); White v. State , 295 Ga.App. 366, 671 S.E.2d 851 (December 19, 2008); Feliciano v. State , 302 Ga.App. 328, 690 S.E.2d 680 (February 11, 2010); Davenport v. State , 308 Ga.App. 140, 706 S.E.2d 757 (March 2, 2011); Warren v. State , 314 Ga.App. 477, 724 S.E.2d 404 (February 16, 2012); Sabb v. State , 317 Ga.App. 537, 731 S.E.2d 399 (August 30, 2012). Daugherty v. State, 283 Ga.App. 664, 642 S.E.2d 345 (February 21, 2007). “[W]here the trial court has not charged the jury ‘as to the presumption of possession or its equivalent, it is not error to fail to charge on equal access where the charge as a whole substantially and adequately covers the principles contained in an equal access instruction.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Render v. State, 240 Ga.App. 762, 763(b) (525 S.E.2d 134) (1999). In this case, the trial court did not instruct the jury as to any presumption of possession as a result of Daugherty’s control of the premises.” Gentry v. State, 281 Ga.App. 315, 635 S.E.2d 782 (July 27, 2006). Execution of a search warrant at defendant’s apartment revealed an extensive meth lab, and a small amount of marijuana found in a Royal Crown bag hidden under an end table in the living room. Defendant was not present when the search was conducted and the items seized. Defendant shared the apartment with a roommate, and evidence showed that many other persons visited the apartment. Held, evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine, but not for possession of the marijuana. As to the meth lab: “The evidence presented at trial … shows that it would have been impossible for one co-tenant to hide from the other a methamphetamine laboratory of this scope. [Cits.] Indeed, the evidence seems to show that no attempt at secrecy was made. [Defendant] paid the rent on this apartment; his car was parked in the apartment parking lot, close enough to this particular apartment that the investigators had to walk right past it in order to bring out the evidence presented at trial; and methamphetamine was found in [defendant’s] system when he was arrested. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that [defendant] was engaged in the manufacture of methamphetamine.” As to the marijuana: “Usually, the defense of ‘equal access’ is one for the jury; [Cit.] however, where the sole evidence that the defendant possessed contraband arises from the inference that the owner or tenant of the dwelling possesses its contents, positive evidence that another person had the access necessary to place the contraband will dissolve the inference. [Cit.] In the case at bar, there is evidence that Venable was a co-tenant and a signatory to the lease, and that she arrived on the premises during the search. In these circumstances, the evidence of possession of marijuana presented here is insufficient to show that [defendant] possessed the marijuana.” Distinguishing the two: “The marijuana found in [defendant’s] living room is a very different matter from the open and obvious methamphetamine manufacturing operation which filled every nook and cranny of apartment # 6. ‘ The equal access rule is inapplicable where the defendant must have had knowledge of the presence of the drug .’ [Cit.]” State v. Johnson, 280 Ga. 511, 630 S.E.2d 377 (May 17, 2006). Reversing Johnson v. State , 274 Ga.App. 282, 617 S.E.2d 252 (July 11, 2005), six justices (Benham dissents) hold that trial court properly refused defendant’s request for charge on equal access. “[A] charge on equal access is appropriate to counter a jury instruction on presumption of possession, and is not necessary otherwise. ‘Equal access is merely a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows. Where the State did not show the indicia giving rise to the presumption, that is, ownership or exclusive control of the vehicle, no presumption arose and therefore there was no triggering of the equal access defense. [Cit .]’ Thompson v. State, 234 Ga.App. 74, 77(3) (506 S.E.2d 201) (1998).” “As no presumption arising from the presence of cocaine in Johnson’s vehicle was placed before the jury, there was nothing to make the rebuttal of an ‘equal access’ charge material to Johnson’s trial.” In any event, ownership of the vehicle was not the sole evidence tying defendant to the drugs found in his car – he had a large sum of cash on his person, and he had just come from the home of