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Dowdy v. State, 267 Ga.App. 598, 600 S.E.2d 684 (May 26, 2004). Convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and related offenses, affirmed. Evidence was sufficient to authorize jury to convict notwithstanding defendant’s equal access argument. Defendant was owner and driver of vehicle; passengers all denied ownership of drugs in question. “Dowdy testified that he did not see any of his passengers with any drugs or scales. … [O]ne of the scales was in plain view – right next to the driver’s seat – from which the jury could have concluded that Dowdy had to be aware of its presence, and Dowdy was seen reaching in this area just before he fled.” “[Equal access] is not an affirmative defense for which the burden to disprove falls on the State.” Accord, Marion v. State , 268 Ga.App. 699, 603 S.E.2d 321 (July 23, 2004); In re: C.M. , 290 Ga.App. 788, 661 S.E.2d 598 (April 7, 2008); Maldonado v. State , 313 Ga.App. 511, 722 S.E.2d 123 (January 11, 2012). In re: D.J.E., 266 Ga.App. 807, 598 S.E.2d 108 (April 7, 2004). “[Minor defendant] contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for possession of tools for the commission of a crime and possession of a pistol by a minor. [Cit.] [Minor] argues that his brother and sister had equal access to the bedroom where the items were found. ‘Possession of contraband may be joint or exclusive, and actual or constructive.’ [Cit.] It is uncontroverted that [minor] resided in the bedroom where the pistol and other contraband was found. Because the State presented evidence [minor] was an occupant of the bedroom in which the contraband was found, this raised a rebuttable presumption that [minor] possessed the contraband. [Cit.] ‘[T]here is no requirement that the State must in every case prove that contraband was in the exclusive possession of one who is shown to be the owner or lessee of the premises. While evidence that the defendant-owner or lessee shared the premises with another does not demand a conviction, it may nevertheless authorize [the trier of fact] to find that the defendant was in at least joint possession of the contraband.’ [Cit.] There was sufficient evidence to show that [minor] was in joint, constructive possession of the pistol and other contraband.” Walker v. State, 266 Ga.App. 788, 598 S.E.2d 84 (April 6, 2004). “Here, there was more than Walker’s mere possession of the vehicle tying him to the possession of the cocaine. Not only was the cocaine found in Walker’s car, but it was stashed inside his stereo. And Day, the only other person in the car, denied that the drugs were his.” This evidence was sufficient to overcome defendant’s equal access defense. Nichols v. State, 263 Ga.App. 254, 587 S.E.2d 322 (September 17, 2003). “In the instant case, there is circumstantial evidence that Nichols and Sanders had joint constructive possession of methamphetamine and marijuana. Nichols’ attempt to elude the deputy by speeding up and turning down several roads before stopping is evidence of his guilt. In addition, there is a presumption that the set of scales with methamphetamine residue belongs to Nichols because it was found in a car that he owns and was driving.” Taylor v. State, 263 Ga.App. 420, 587 S.E.2d 791 (September 12, 2003). “The evidence adduced was sufficient to show that Taylor and Dodson were in joint constructive possession of the cocaine. At the time of the traffic stop, Taylor was driving the car. This fact gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that he possessed the cocaine in the car, Crenshaw v. State, 248 Ga.App. 505, 507(1) (546 S.E.2d 890) (2001), and the evidence adduced supported that presumption. Taylor and Dodson traveled together from Mississippi and both men claimed to have had possession of the car for at least a week, yet they had no luggage. The only person who had equal access to the car was Dodson, who pled guilty to the charges. See Wells v. State, 237 Ga.App. 109, 111(1) (514 S.E.2d 245) (1999) (two or more people may be convicted of possessing the same contraband). Both men were unusually nervous about the traffic stop. Deputies testified about their demeanor and the worried glances they exchanged during the search, which authorized the jury to infer shared guilty knowledge. Taylor and Dodson gave conflicting stories about the purpose of their travels, which authorized the jury to infer that either or both were lying. In fact, Dodson lied about the presence of a weapon in the car, a very large handgun the jury was authorized to believe was there to protect their illegal cargo, 532 grams of cocaine. Because this evidence is sufficient to support Taylor’s convictions beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court correctly denied Taylor’s motion for a directed verdict.” Accord, Pincherli v. State , 295 Ga.App. 408, 671 S.E.2d 891 (December 31, 2008). Morgan v. State, 263 Ga.App. 32, 587 S.E.2d 177 (September 2, 2003). Evidence was sufficient for jury to infer that defendant/passenger was in constructive possession of marijuana found in trunk of car where driver/owner testified that “he had allowed Morgan to place a number of personal items in the trunk of his car” and that his “car was new, and … that, prior to that time, nothing had been placed in the trunk of the car.” Bussey v. State, 263 Ga.App. 56, 587 S.E.2d 134 (August 12, 2003). Though in conflict, evidence authorized jury to find that defendant resided where drugs were found and that no one else had equal access. “Control may be inferred if the defendant owns or resides in the premises, but not if he is merely an occupant..... To rebut the inference of possession,