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however, a defendant must present evidence ‘that a person other than the defendant had equal access to the premises where the contraband was found.’ And whether the defendant’s evidence of equal access sufficiently rebuts the inference is a question for the jury.” Language here seems burden-shifting. Dalton v. State, 261 Ga.App. 72, 581 S.E.2d 700 (April 29, 2003). “There is a presumption that drugs found within a vehicle actually belong to the driver of the vehicle, particularly when the driver is also the owner of the vehicle. This presumption can be overcome by evidence that someone other than the defendant had the opportunity to commit the crime. Here, the trial court properly charged the jury on the equal access rule, and the jury weighed the evidence and decided this question adversely to Dalton. Whether the evidence of equal access carried enough weight to rebut any inference of possession is a question properly left to the jury.” Phillips v. State, 259 Ga.App. 331, 577 S.E.2d 25 (January 29, 2003). Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of cocaine where his live-in girlfriend testified that the drugs found in their apartment weren’t hers and must therefore belong to defendant. Record didn’t support defendant’s assertion that she was an “unindicted co-conspirator” (meaning that her uncorroborated testimony would be insufficient to convict). Bevis v. State, 259 Ga.App. 269, 576 S.E.2d 652 (January 22, 2003). “‘The equal access rule, entitling a defendant to acquittal where evidence is presented that others had equal access to a vehicle or that the vehicle had been recently used by others, applies only where the sole evidence of possession of contraband found in the vehicle is the defendant’s ownership or possession of the vehicle.’ Bevis’s ownership or possession of the truck is not the sole evidence that he possessed the crack pipe found there; he admitted to the police officer that he had driven his passenger to buy crack and the officer saw him bending over and moving around as if he were hiding something.” Accord, Rochefort v. State , 279 Ga. 738, 620 S.E.2d 803 (October 11, 2005) (“[Defendant’s] inculpatory admissions were additional evidence authorizing a finding that he possessed the substances.”); Jones v. State , 318 Ga.App. 614, 734 S.E.2d 450 (November 16, 2012 ) (“Jones' statement that everything found in the house belonged to him was additional evidence that he possessed the methamphetamine.”). Wiggins v. State, 258 Ga.App. 703, 574 S.E.2d 896 (December 4, 2002). Three occupants of vehicle were all charged with and convicted of, possession of drugs found therein. Two appeal, citing trial court’s failure to charge the jury on equal access doctrine. Held, “ the equal access defense does not apply in this case of joint possession by co- defendants. Equal access is a defense available when there is a presumption that the accused possessed contraband. In the automobile context, this means that the presumption that contraband found in a car was in the exclusive possession of the car’s owner or driver may be overcome by evidence showing that someone other than the owner or driver had equal access to the contraband. But if the state does not rely on such a presumption of possession, there is no triggering of the equal access defense. Likewise, if the judge does not charge the jury on the presumption of possession, then an equal access instruction is not required. In the instant case, the trial judge did not charge the jury on any presumptions of possession and the state did not rely on the presumption that Davis, as the car’s owner, and Wiggins, as the driver, were in exclusive possession of the cocaine found in the car. Instead, the state indicted Wiggins, Davis and Moody together and prosecuted them as co-defendants who jointly possessed the drugs. The equal access defense is not applicable to co- indicted conspirators who are charged with joint possession of contraband.” Accord, Heller (September 28, 2005), above; Thomas v. State , 291 Ga.App. 795, 662 S.E.2d 849 (June 4, 2008); Smoot v. State , 316 Ga.App. 102, 729 S.E.2d 416 (June 5, 2012). Jones v. State, 254 Ga.App. 863, 564 S.E.2d 220 (April 11, 2002). “The equal access rule entitles a defendant to acquittal where the only evidence of possession is the defendant’s ownership or control over the premises, and the defendant can show that others recently had access to the premises. ...In this case, however, the State did not show who leased the house or had exclusive control over it. Accordingly, no presumption of ownership arose and the equal access defense was not available to [defendant].” Warren v. State, 254 Ga.App. 52, 561 S.E.2d 190 (February 26, 2002). A good discussion of the equal access rule vs. joint constructive possession. Defendants contend “that the State failed to prove that either of them possessed the cocaine found in the locked glove compartment of the car.” However, “the evidence shows that Warren exercised control over the car not only by possession of the keys but by acknowledging that he had performed transmission work on the car approximately one month earlier; Collins for his part acted in an extremely nervous fashion when asked to provide the vehicle registration. Both Warren and Collins gave unusual responses to the questions put to them by the officer. Warren’s and Collins’s ‘intent to exercise control over the contraband can be inferred by the suspicious and inconsistent