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explanations [they] gave to the [officer] before he conducted the search.’ Allen , supra at 625. Moreover, some evidence was presented that Warren and Collins were cousins, and ‘where transactions involving relatives are under review, slight circumstances are often sufficient to induce a belief that there was collusion between the parties.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Shropshire v. State , 201 Ga.App. 421, 422 (411 S.E.2d 339) (1991). This evidence was sufficient to show joint constructive possession and met the standard of Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).” Court distinguishes this fact situation from cases where: (a) “only a passenger in a vehicle was charged with possession of the contraband while the driver was not charged, as in Mitchell v. State , 268 Ga. 592 (492 S.E.2d 204) (1997), relied upon by [defendants]. In such cases, the State is required to prove sole constructive possession by fewer than all the occupants of the vehicle. See Reid v. State , 212 Ga.App. 787, 788 n.1 (442 S.E.2d 852) (1994),” and (b) “Nor is this a case in which one occupant has actual possession of the contraband, and the State must prove constructive possession by the other occupant or occupants of the car. See, e.g., Shirley v. State , 166 Ga.App. 456(1) (304 S.E.2d 468) (1983).” Overruled to the extent that it holds that defendant must be shown to be in exclusive possession as against unindicted co-occupants, Maddox v. State , 322 Ga.App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280 (July 11, 2013). Meadows v. State, 247 Ga.App. 634, 545 S.E.2d 76 (January 23, 2001). Defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana reversed. Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana found in baggies thrown under porch of his residence, which he shared with his mother. “Although Meadows admitted that he had smoked marijuana and admitted that he, along with others, had thrown bags down which ended up under the porch, there was no evidence directly linking the marijuana which was found under the porch to Meadows. This situation differs from that in Cronan v. State, 236 Ga.App. 374(1)(b), 511 S.E.2d 899 (1999), where the defendant admitted having smoked marijuana on the morning of the date set out in the indictment. In contrast, in this case, Meadows made a general statement that he ‘had smoked’ marijuana. He did not specify a date on which he had smoked the substance. The evidence showed that the house was inhabited by several residents, including Meadows’ mother. The evidence showed that various people, including Meadows, smoked marijuana on the porch and threw the bags under the porch. Nevertheless, there was absolutely no evidence that Meadows had ever controlled or possessed the marijuana which the officers found under the porch. ‘Merely finding contraband on premises occupied by a defendant is not sufficient to support a conviction if it affirmatively appears from the evidence that persons other than the defendant had equal opportunity to commit the crime….’ (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Mathis v. State, 204 Ga.App. 896, 897-898(1), 420 S.E.2d 788 (1992). ” Render v. State, 240 Ga.App. 762, 525 S.E.2d 134 (November 10, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine possession affirmed; defendant wasn’t entitled to equal access charge. “There was a passenger in the car Render was driving and in which the drugs were found. Thus, Render claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an ‘equal access’ jury charge. However: ‘In the absence of a charge to the jury as to the presumption of possession or its equivalent, it is not error to fail to charge on equal access where the charge as a whole substantially and adequately covers the principles contained in an equal access instruction.’ (Citations omitted.) Mitchell v. State, 222 Ga.App. 453, 454(1)(b), 474 S.E.2d 306 (1996). See also Jackson v. State, 216 Ga.App. 842, 845, 456 S.E.2d 229 (1995) (the equal access rule is simply a defense to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows). Here, the trial court did not charge the jury on any presumption of possession arising because Render was the driver of the car in which the drugs were found. In addition, the trial court charged the jury that Render was presumed innocent until proven guilty; that the State had the burden of proof; that there was no burden of proof whatsoever on Render; that the burden of proof never shifted to Render to prove his innocence; and that it was the duty of the jury to acquit, if the State failed to prove Render's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jones v. State, 200 Ga.App. 519, 521, 408 S.E.2d 823 (1991). Under these circumstances, the charge as a whole adequately covered the principles contained in an ‘equal access’ charge. Id. Accordingly, Render was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to request such charge. White v. State, [216 Ga.App. 583, 455 S.E.2d 117 (1995)].” Accord, Young v. State , 242 Ga.App. 681, 530 S.E.2d 758 (March 9, 2000) (“‘ when [, as here,] the trial judge elects not to charge the jury on the presumption of possession, an equal access instruction is not required.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Thompson v. State, 234 Ga.App. 74, 77(3), 506 S.E.2d 201 (1998).). Cooper v. State, 237 Ga.App. 837, 517 S.E.2d 85 (April 29, 1999). “Cooper argues that because he and the other defendants had equal access to the drugs, the jury could not convict him of having exclusive possession of the drugs. But exclusive possession was not required for a conviction; joint constructive possession sufficed. Rather than disproving the crime, equal access to the drugs proved joint constructive possession of the contraband. Lowe [ v. State, 223 Ga.App. 172, 173, 477 S.E.2d 341 (1996)] (affirming trafficking conviction); Love v. State, 227 Ga.App. 772, 773, 490 S.E.2d 527 (1997) (affirming possession conviction).” Visser v. State, 237 Ga.App. 798, 516 S.E.2d 840 (April 28, 1999). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute despite equal access defense. “In this context, the equal access rule is