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merely that when there is evidence that someone other than the driver of the automobile had equal access to the contraband, the presumption that contraband found in an automobile is in the exclusive possession of the driver may be overcome. Lombardo v. State, 187 Ga.App. 440, 442(5), 370 S.E.2d 503 (1988). The equal access defense, however, requires affirmative evidence that someone other than the defendant had an equal opportunity to commit the crime, and mere speculation that another may have had equal access to the automobile is not sufficient. Cochran v. State, 190 Ga.App. 884(1), 380 S.E.2d 319 (1989). Further, this presumption applies particularly when, as in this case, the driver is also the owner of the automobile. Williams v. State, 129 Ga.App. 103, 106(1), 198 S.E.2d 683 (1973). In any event, whether the equal access evidence is sufficient to rebut the inference of possession is a question for the jury. Cannon v. State, 211 Ga.App. 835, 836, 440 S.E.2d 723 (1994). In this appeal, Visser was alone in his automobile when arrested, and the box containing the marijuana was in plain view on the floor behind the bucket seat right next to where Visser was sitting. The evidence that someone else might have put the marijuana in the car was mere conjecture.” Wells v. State, 237 Ga.App. 109, 514 S.E.2d 245 (March 18, 1999). No equal access defense where charge was based, not on mere presumption from control of hotel room and car, but on other evidence “including his inculpatory statement that the marijuana was for his personal use and that he was taking the cocaine to someone else.” Accord, Hunter v. State , 241 Ga.App. 242, 525 S.E.2d 766 (November 19, 1999) (“The equal access rule applies only where the sole evidence of possession of contraband found in a vehicle is the defendant's ownership or possession of the vehicle,” not to defendant’s pot stashed in backseat of officer’s patrol car). Q. IMMUNITY New case! Anthony v. State, S16A0059, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1290786 (April 4, 2016). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion for pretrial immunity where defendant relied mostly on counsel’s statement-in-place as to witnesses’ likely testimony. “‘Attorneys are officers of the court and a statement to the court in their place is prima facie true and needs no further verification unless the same is required by the court or the opposite party. ’ Sherman v. City of Atlanta, 293 Ga. 169, 173–174(4), 744 S.E.2d 689 (2013) (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). The statements-in-place by the appellant’s lawyer were not a proper substitute for evidence at the hearing on the motion for immunity because the State did not accept those proffers but rather insisted that the appellant prove his immunity with traditional evidence. Id. at 173(4), 744 S.E.2d 689. Cf. State v. Cooper, 324 Ga.App. 32, 749 S.E.2d 35 (2013) (affirming the grant of a motion for immunity from prosecution and denying the State’s motion to reopen the evidence, where the State never presented any evidence, made any proffer as to the omitted evidence, or cross-examined any of the defendant’s witnesses at the hearing).” Amos v. State, S15A1580, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 856588 (March 7, 2016). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s pretrial motion for immunity. “[A]t the time of the trial court’s immunity ruling, immunity was not available if ‘in the use of deadly force, such person utilizes a weapon the carrying or possession of which is unlawful by such person under Part 2 or 3 of Article 4 of Chapter 11 of [Title 16 of the Georgia Code].’ OCGA § 16–3–24.2 (2011). [FN2: In 2014, the immunity statute was amended as part of the Safe Carry Protection Act to delete the ‘or 3’ from the phrase ‘Part 2 or 3’ within the exception for unlawful carrying or possession of a weapon. See Ga. L.2014, p. 599, 602–603, § 1–3. ] ... The trial court ultimately concluded that Amos was not entitled to immunity because, inter alia, he was carrying a weapon without a license in violation of OCGA § 16–11– 126 (prohibiting, with limited exceptions, the carrying of a weapon outside one’s own property, motor vehicle, or place of business without a valid license) and OCGA § 16–11–129 (establishing requirements for the issuance of weapons carry licenses).” Moran v. State, 334 Ga.App. 765, 780 S.E.2d 529 (November 20, 2015). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed (but no evidence of stalking). No ineffective assistance based on failure to seek pretrial hearing on immunity from prosecution based on self-defense. “Here, trial counsel testified that he did not request an immunity hearing because he did not want to subject Moran to cross-examination before trial and ‘there were some questions [he] wanted to ask [the victim] ... for the first time in front of a jury.’ Additionally, he did not believe a motion for immunity based upon self-defense would have been successful. As counsel did not employ an objectively unreasonable trial strategy, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Moran’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Boddie v. State, 327 Ga.App. 667, 670(1) (760 S.E.2d 668) (2014) (no ineffective assistance where trial counsel did not make unreasonable strategic decision against filing a pre-trial motion).” State v. Pickens, 330 Ga.App. 862, 769 S.E.2d 594 (March 3, 2015). In prosecution of special ed teacher for cruelty to children and false imprisonment involving her students, trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss