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thereof, the State has the burden of disproving that defense beyond a reasonable doubt’). ” Applied, State v. Yapo , 296 Ga.App. 158, 674 S.E.2d 44 (February 17, 2009) (trial court properly found defendant to be immune pre-trial); Mullins v. State , 287 Ga. 302, 695 S.E.2d 621 (June 7, 2010) (defendant failed to carry burden of proof); Cotton v. State , 297 Ga. 257, 773 S.E.2d 242 (June 1, 2015) (defendant failed to carry burden of proof); Lowe v. State , S15A1691, ___ Ga. ___, 783 S.E.2d 111, 2016 WL 687315 (February 22, 2016) (defendant failed to carry burden of proof); Amos v. State , S15A1580, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 856588 (March 7, 2016). Same case, September 20, 2010, above. Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 664 S.E.2d 2f27 (July 14, 2008). Defendants are entitled to a pre-trial ruling on whether they can avail themselves of a defense of habitation defense under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. Citing with approval Boggs (May 2, 2003), below: “‘[A]s the plain meaning of [immune from prosecution] and the other language in the statute, the statute must be construed to bar criminal proceedings against persons who use force under the circumstances set forth in OCGA § 16-3-23 or § 16-3-24. Further, as the statute provides that such person ‘ shall be immune from criminal prosecution,’ the decision as to whether a person is immune under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 must be determined by the trial court [as a matter of law] before the trial of that person commences.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Boggs, supra at 106, 581 S.E.2d 722.” Accord, State v. Sutton , 297 Ga. 222, 773 S.E.2d 222 (June 1, 2015). Boggs v. State, 261 Ga.App. 104, 581 S.E.2d 722 (May 2, 2003). Since OCGA § 16-3-24.2 provides that one acting in defense of habitation (16-3-23) or other real or personal property (16-3-24) is generally immune from prosecution, “the decision as to whether a person is immune under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 must be determined by the trial court before the trial of that person commences. We find that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge OCGA § 16-3-24.2 since it had determined the question of immunity as a matter of law before the commencement of trial.” Accord, Fair (July 14, 2008), above. But appears to conflict with Bunn (October 6, 2008), above. R. IMPOSSIBILITY Rana v. State, 304 Ga.App. 750, 697 S.E.2d 867 (July 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for attempted murder and solicitation of murder affirmed; conviction was not barred by defense of impossibility. “With respect to impossibility, Rana claims that by the time he met with Lee outside his home, his uncle was already through security at the Jacksonville airport, rendering a murder at that point impossible. He further argues that because the bank account on which the checks were written contained no funds, he ultimately could not pay for a hit. The defense of impossibility, however, is limited. Pursuant to OCGA § 16-4-4, ‘[i]t is no defense to a charge of criminal attempt that the crime the accused is charged with attempting was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the accused believed them to be.’ The evidence shows that when Rana met with Lee, the uncle was in a secure portion of the Jacksonville airport. Nothing indicates, however, that Rana knew his uncle was out of a hit man's reach. On the contrary, Rana urged Lee to ‘get’ his uncle, and when Rana thought that Lee's associates had the uncle cornered at the airport, he told Lee to have him killed. Although the uncle's actual location may have precluded a hit, the evidence shows that Rana believed the hit was possible. Similarly, even if Rana's bank account was empty, the “hit man” accepted a check for his work, and Rana offered no evidence that he believed his financial situation would derail the hit. Given these circumstances, impossibility was not a defense. See Gordon v. State, 252 Ga.App. 133, 134(1) (555 S.E.2d 793) (2001); compare Guzman v. State, 206 Ga.App. 170, 172(2) (424 S.E.2d 849) (1992) (impossibility defense raised where defendant could not have completed drug purchase because she had no money) (physical precedent only).” Gordon v. State, 252 Ga.App. 133, 555 S.E.2d 793 (October 23, 2001). Gordon attempted to rape a 16 year-old male that he believed was a female. “Under Georgia law, a defendant who ‘attempts’ to commit a crime cannot use impossibility as a defense when the act would have been possible if ‘the attendant circumstances [had] been as the accused believed them to be.’” Even though it was impossible for Gordon to commit the offense all elements of attempt are met and impossibility does not negate the intent. S. INFANCY Adams v. State, 288 Ga. 695, 707 S.E.2d 359 (February 7, 2011). Child molestation and aggravated child molestation convictions affirmed; indictment was not void because “the time period for which he was convicted includes a period in which, because of his age, he could not be found criminally responsible. “OCGA § 16-3-1 ‘does not provide that a person under 13 years of age is incapable of performing an act which is designated a crime under the laws of Georgia....’ (Emphasis in original.) K.M.S. v. State, 129 Ga.App. 683, 685 (200 S.E.2d 916) (1973) (citing the Committee