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Notes). It provides neither a constitutional nor an unwaivable proscription on the prosecution of persons under 13 years old. … There is no authority that OCGA § 16-3-1 provides immunity from criminal prosecution. To the contrary, that statute ‘“simply raises a defense for (children under 13) because of the social desirability of protecting those no more than 12 years of age from the consequences of criminal guilt.” [Cit.]’ Luke v. State, 222 Ga.App. 203, 205(1)(b) (474 S.E.2d 49) (1996), overruled on other grounds, Brewer v. State, 271 Ga. 605, 607 (523 S.E.2d 18) (1999). See also K.M.S. v. State, supra (taking this language from the Committee Notes). Indeed, OCGA § 16-3-1 sets forth an affirmative defense, because such a defense admits the doing of the act charged, but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate it. Chandle v. State, 230 Ga. 574, 576(3) (198 S.E.2d 289) (1973); Agnor's Ga. Evidence § 17:7, fn. 9 (4 th ed.). The definition of ‘affirmative defenses’ cannot be limited to those which preclude criminal intent, by relying on authority which deals only with those affirmative defenses which are specifically identified as such and listed in OCGA §§ 16-3-20 through 16-3-28. Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. 260, 261-262(2) (695 S.E.2d 195) (2010); Brower v. State, 298 Ga.App. 699, 702(1) (680 S.E.2d 859) (2009) (quoted in Hicks ). Other defenses, including age and the statute of limitations, do not preclude criminal intent, ‘are listed in other statutes and may be considered affirmative defenses as well. [Cits.]’ Agnor's, supra. See also Moss v. State, 220 Ga.App. 150 (469 S.E.2d 325) (1996) (limitations); Gregory C. Lisby, Resolving the Hazelwood Conundrum: The First Amendment Rights of College Students in Kincaid v. Gibson and Beyond, 7 Comm. L. & Pol'y 129, 131, fn. 13 (2002) (‘Infancy ... has long been a widely accepted affirmative defense in ... criminal law. [Cits.]’). With respect to any affirmative defense, ‘unless the state's evidence raises the issue invoking the alleged defense, the defendant must present evidence thereon to raise the issue.’ OCGA § 16-1-3(1). “‘The responsibility of producing evidence of an affirmative defense and the burden of persuasion by proof beyond a reasonable doubt are two distinct and separate concepts. The first is placed squarely on the defendant unless the state's evidence raised the issue.’ (Cits.)” [Cits.]’ Cheesman v. State, 230 Ga.App. 525, 528(6) (497 S.E.2d 40) (1998).” Here, “‘[t]here was no evidence at the trial showing the age of the accused....’ Broadnax v. State, 100 Ga. 62 (25 S.E. 844) (1896).” … Therefore, Adams ‘has not shown that either he or the State raised the issue as to [his age at the time] of the crimes.’ Cheesman v. State, supra at 529(6).” Hunstein, writing for Melton, concurs specially: “OCGA § 16-3-1 by its plain language establishes that children who commit criminal offenses at the time they are under the age of 13 are categorically ineligible to be prosecuted for or convicted of those offenses. The statute thus operates in the same manner as the United States Supreme Court's holding in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (125 S.Ct., 161 L.Ed.2d 1) (2005), which categorically prohibits the execution of an accused who was under the age of 18 when he committed a capital offense. I would hold that a child under the age of 13 who commits a criminal offense is no more able to ‘waive’ the legal bar to prosecution set forth in OCGA § 16-3-1 than a defendant who commits a capital offense when under the age of 18 can ‘waive’ the constitutional proscription against the execution of a death sentence.” Finds that evidence precludes possibility that defendant was under 13 at time of offenses, however. T. INSANITY See subheading INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION , below, and PLEAS – INSANITY, below U. INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION Koldewey v. State, 310 Ga.App. 788, 714 S.E.2d 371 (July 13, 2011). Convictions for terroristic threats affirmed as to one victim, reversed as to another on other grounds; trial court properly instructed jury that “[a] defendant asserting this defense bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally not responsible at the time of the crime.” Defendant points to State v. Moore , 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 241 (1976): “henceforth charges which place any burden of persuasion upon the defendant in criminal cases shall not be given and such charges will be deemed erroneous and subject to reversal, absent harmless error or invited error.” Context in Moore was defense of coercion; Court of Appeals analogizes defendant’s involuntary intoxication defense to an insanity defense. “Despite any apparent conflict with the bright-line rule in State v. Moore, the Georgia Supreme Court has approved of jury instructions placing the burden of proof on the defendant to prove that he lacked the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. See Durrence [ v. State, 287 Ga. 213, 218(2), 695 S.E.2d 227 (2010)]; Longshore [ v. State, 242 Ga. 689, 691(1), 251 S.E.2d 280 (1978)]. We decline to depart from this line of reasoning here. [fn: We note that unlike the pattern jury charge on insanity, the pattern jury charge on voluntary intoxication merely tracks the language of the Code section and omits language referring to a burden of proof. ] ” Myers v. State, 302 Ga.App. 753, 691 S.E.2d 650 (March 9, 2010). DUI conviction affirmed; jury charge on intent was correct: “‘I charge you, ladies and gentlemen, that driving under the influence and driving on the wrong side of the road are crimes malum prohibitum, the criminal intent element of which is simply the intent to do the act which results in the violation of the law, not the intent to commit the crime itself. Consequently, to the extent that the defendant here argues inability to form an intent to commit the crime for which she is charged, it is immaterial, which means it should not be considered. While proof of criminal intent is required to convict the defendant of the crimes