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with which she is prosecuted, the [s]tate is not required to prove that the defendant intended to drive under the influence of alcohol in violation of the law or on the wrong side of the road, rather, it is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that while intoxicated she drove and drove crossing over ... the right line, intending such acts.’ The charge given by the court is aligned with our holding in Crossley v. State, 261 Ga.App. 250, 582 S.E.2d 204 (2003), wherein we rejected the defendant's argument that he lacked the intent to drive under the influence or to drive recklessly because he ‘blacked out’ and did not remember the attendant circumstances of the blackout but nevertheless conducted himself normally when talking with police. Id. at 251-252, 582 S.E.2d 204. … Similarly, in Larsen v. State, 253 Ga.App. 196, 558 S.E.2d 418 (2001), we found the evidence sufficient to support the defendant's DUI conviction where she argued that she had no intent to drive and remembered nothing between the time she took her bedtime medication and realized she was handcuffed in the back of a police car. [fn] Here, as in the cases cited above, the evidence is undisputed that Myers intentionally ingested alcohol, Xanax, and Ambien, and then drove in an intoxicated state and failed to maintain her lane.” Stewart v. State, 291 Ga.App. 846, 663 S.E.2d 278 (June 5, 2008). “‘Every person is presumed to be of sound mind and discretion but the presumption may be rebutted.’ OCGA § 16-2-3. ‘And, a defendant [asserting involuntary intoxication] bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was not mentally responsible at the time of the alleged crime.’ Rauschenberg v. State, 161 Ga.App. 331 (291 S.E.2d 58) (1982). See also Foster v. State, 283 Ga. 47, 48 (656 S.E.2d 838) (2008) (‘A defendant claiming insanity has the burden of proving this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.’). If the defendant meets that burden, the State must present sufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not involuntarily intoxicated. See Carter v. State, 248 Ga.App. 139, 140(2) (546 S.E.2d 5) (2001); Strickland v. State, 258 Ga. 764, 765 (373 S.E.2d 736) (1988). The ultimate resolution of the issue is for the finder of fact. See, e.g., Carter, 248 Ga.App. at 140.” Based on conflicting testimony here, jury could reject defendant’s claim that victim injected him with a drug that made him involuntarily intoxicated and convict him of aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and related charges. Crossley v. State, 261 Ga.App. 250, 582 S.E.2d 204 (May 13, 2003). DUI and reckless driving convictions affirmed. Trial court “correctly ruled Crossley’s involuntary intoxication defense irrelevant and inadmissible” at defendant’s DUI trial. “Crossley concedes that the defense of involuntary intoxication requires a showing that the perpetrator lacked the ability to distinguish right from wrong as to the criminal act in issue. Thus, on appeal, he acknowledges that the defense of involuntary intoxication is one involving issues of mental competence, in effect, temporary insanity,” citing “ Gibson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 773, 774-775(1)(b), 516 S.E.2d 816 (1999) (jury instruction on OCGA § 16-3-4 charges defense of insanity by involuntary intoxication); see also Rauschenberg v. State, 161 Ga.App. 331(1), 291 S.E.2d 58 (1982) (defendant relying upon involuntary intoxication defense bears burden of rebutting, by a preponderance of the evidence, presumption of sanity). While we have held that temporary insanity is a recognized defense in Georgia, Jackson v. State, 149 Ga.App. 253, 253 S.E.2d 874 (1979), ‘[e]vidence that the defendant does not remember, or was in a “blanked out” state of mind during the commission of the acts charged, is insufficient to raise the issue of insanity.’ (Citations omitted.) Id. at 256, 253 S.E.2d 874.” Colon v. State, 256 Ga.App. 505, 568 S.E.2d 811 (July 12, 2002). DUI and related traffic convictions reversed. Trial court committed reversible error by charging jury that “[t]he defense of involuntary intoxication is not available to excuse driving under the influence.” “This charge contained the clearly erroneous statement that involuntary intoxication was not available as an affirmative defense to driving under the influence. See Larsen v. State, 253 Ga.App. 196, 198(1), 558 S.E.2d 418 (2002); Flanders v. State, 188 Ga.App. 98, 371 S.E.2d 918 (1988); accord Commonwealth v. Darch, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 713, 767 N.E.2d 1096 (2002). This declarative assertion by the trial judge was straightforward and unambiguous.” Error wasn’t cured by the court’s next statement, “[involuntary intoxication] absolves responsibility only if the intoxication renders the defendant incapable of distinguishing right from wrong.” Defendant here “raised the issue of involuntary intoxication in his testimony when he claimed that someone put an unknown drug in his drink, unbeknownst to him. See Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 409 S.E.2d 513 (1991).” Larsen v. State, 253 Ga.App. 196, 558 S.E.2d 418 (January 10, 2002). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court could disbelieve defendant’s “sleepwalking” defense. “In this case, the defendant testified that she had no intent to drive and that she remembered nothing from the time that she took her bedtime medication [“an antidepressant, a muscle relaxant, an antianxiety medication, and a fourth drug often used to treat Parkinson's disease,” taken after drinking three glasses of wine] and the time she ‘came to’ handcuffed in the back of a police car. However, the [trial judge, sitting as] trier of fact, after watching a videotape of the defendant's arrest, did not find her testimony about being in a sleep state credible. He further pointed out that the defendant was on notice from her own daughter that she had a problem with alcohol, but that