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she chose to drink an excessive amount of alcohol the evening of her arrest.” Defendant’s pharmacology expert “testified that sleepwalking is a recognized side effect of the medications Larsen had been taking, particularly when taken in combination with each other and with alcohol.” V. JUSTIFICATION See also subheadings PROVOCATION and SELF-DEFENSE, below Allen v. State, 296 Ga. 785, 770 S.E.2d 824 (March 27, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly didn’t charge jury on justification, based on defendant’s claim that “he feared for the lives of his family at the hands of [co-conspirator] Roberts if he did not do what Roberts wished, as well as his own life, and thus there was ‘evidence of “a threat of imminent death or great bodily injury to two or more people, which [he could] avoid only by killing one innocent person....” [Cit.]’ Gravitt, supra at 34, 608 S.E.2d 202. However, such a justification defense would not fall under the omnibus provision of OCGA § 16–3–20(6); under that provision, the asserted defense must ‘stand upon the same footing of reason and justice as those [defenses] enumerated’ in Title 16, Article 2, of the Code. And, to the extent that Allen claimed justification because of a threat to his family, such would not stand upon the same footing as the defenses so enumerated; the justification defenses enumerated in the Article that contemplate the use of force do so in the face of a current or imminent threat, see OCGA §§ 16–3–21; 16–323; 16–3–24; & 16–3–26, and there is no evidence that Roberts was in a position to harm Allen's family when Allen committed his acts.” Jackson v. State, 329 Ga.App. 240, 764 S.E.2d 569 (October 7, 2014). Convictions for criminal damage to property and simple assault affirmed; trial court properly charged jury on accident, but not justification. Defendant crashed his commercial truck into two cars at his truck terminal. Defendant claimed his truck’s throttle and accelerator became stuck, and he steered into the cars to avoid hitting people. Defendant requested charges on both justification and accident, but trial court properly charged only on accident. “According to Jackson, … his crashing of the truck was the unintentional result of unforeseen circumstances over which he had no control. Thus, under his version of the events, the damage to the parked cars resulted from an unavoidable accident. Moreover, Jackson's testimony as to the reasons for his decision to steer the truck towards the parked cars served to support his accident defense. If believed by the jury, that testimony would have shown when he decided to hit the cars Jackson ‘was acting with regard for the safety of others, i.e., without criminal negligence.’ Davis v. State, 269 Ga. 276, 280(3), 496 S.E.2d 699 (1998) (citations omitted). Additionally, Jackson's position that the damage to the property was the result of a malfunctioning truck is inconsistent with a justification defense. … [S]uch a defense requires that a defendant admit to otherwise criminal conduct. Here, however, Jackson claimed his conduct was the result of an accident, and he therefore has not admitted that the conduct was otherwise criminal.” Boutier v. State, 328 Ga.App. 869, 763 S.E.2d 255 (August 26, 2014). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to present evidence of victim’s alleged taunting of defendant prior to assault, as “verbal insults and taunts are insufficient, without more, to warrant a justification charge. See Glenn v. State, 253 Ga.App. 333, 334, 559 S.E.2d 86 (2002) (fact that victim ‘offered some words’ or ‘said some cuss words’ to the defendants before the assault was insufficient to support justification charge, where there was no evidence that the victim attempted to harm or made any ‘verbal threats to do physical harm’ to the defendants); Carter v. State, 150 Ga.App. 119, 120(4), 257 S.E.2d 11 (1979) (fact that victim and defendant ‘got into an argument’ and ‘insults were exchanged’ did not warrant charge on defense of justification).” Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 738 S.E.2d 74 (February 4, 2013). Murder conviction affirmed; jury could find that defendant’s actions went beyond discipline of child victim and thus showed malice. “It is true that a parent—or someone acting in loco parentis—may apply some force to a child as a disciplinary measure without violating the law. But the application of such force must be reasonable, and if it is not, it may go beyond mere discipline and instead amount to malicious infliction of ‘cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.’ Tabb v. State, 313 Ga.App. 852, 857(2), 723 S.E.2d 295 (2012) (‘[A]pplied force is legally justified [to discipline a child] only when a parent's conduct in disciplining a child is reasonable.’) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 16–3–20(3) (‘The defense of justification can be claimed ... [w]hen the person's conduct is the reasonable discipline of a minor by his parent or a person in loco parentis [.]’). Here, the evidence concerning the severity and scope of the injuries that Jamira sustained would permit an inference that whoever struck Jamira did so maliciously and that the injuries were not the result of reasonable disciplinary measures.” Adcock v. State, 317 Ga.App. 468, 731 S.E.2d 365 (August 23, 2012). Convictions for attempted murder and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge jury on defendant’s sole defense of justification. “Although Adcock indicated that he believed that [victims] Weathers and Capps were ‘stealing’ his vehicles, that belief was