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unfounded. And by their terms, the three defenses require that the defendant reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary. See Boyd v. State, 284 Ga. 46, 49(4) (663 S.E.2d 218) (2008) (in absence of evidence showing reasonable belief on defendant's part that wielding a knife in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm was necessary in order to prevent his own death or great bodily injury, court did not err in refusing to give requested charge on OCGA § 16–3–21(a) justification); Philpot v. State, 311 Ga.App. 486, 489(3) (716 S.E.2d 551) (2011) (under the facts, ‘there could be no reasonable belief that stabbing the victim was necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a motor vehicle, and thus no basis for an instruction on defense of habitation’ under OCGA § 16–3–23) (citation and punctuation omitted).” Jones v. State, 315 Ga.App. 688, 727 S.E.2d 512 (April 19, 2012). Reckless driving and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge on justification. “Contrary to Jones's assertions in his brief, at no time did Jones testify that he accelerated to 103 mph ‘because he had no safer option.’ … Jones testified that his alternative was to ‘pull over on the shoulder and just cry that I can't handle 285 traffic.’ At no time did he testify that it was unsafe to pull over; only that he did not want to. When asked why he did not just pull over, he testified that he did not know a police officer was stationed ahead of him; had he known this, he would have ‘gone a different way.’” Collier v. State, 288 Ga. 756, 707 S.E.2d 102 (March 7, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined to admit “evidence of the victim's propensity for violence when intoxicated and his reputation for carrying dangerous weapons.” “Collier relies upon his own testimony showing that the intoxicated victim started an argument and tried to hit Collier with the pipe before he took it away, that the victim then swung at Collier with his fist, that Collier then struck the victim in the head with the pipe, and that, while the victim was staggering and reaching towards his pocket, Collier struck him on the head a second time with the pipe even though there was nothing to indicate to Collier that the victim had a weapon in his pocket. Standing alone, this testimony fails to show that Collier was honestly seeking to defend himself either time that he struck the victim with the pipe. See Cooper v. State, [249 Ga. 58 (287 S.E.2d 212) (1982)]. Under that testimony, Collier had already disarmed the victim before striking him the first time and, after that first blow by Collier with the metal pipe, the victim neither committed nor demonstrated the ability to commit any further assault against Collier. ‘Justification can not be based on a deadly assault which has been completely ended, unless the assailant has some further apparent ability to continue it.’ Cochran v. State, 9 Ga.App. 824, 825(1) (72 SE 281) (1911). ‘Furthermore, “(t)he doctrine of reasonable fear does not apply to any case of homicide where the danger apprehended is not urgent and pressing, or apparently so, at the time of the killing.” [Cit.]’ Carter v. State, 285 Ga. 565, 566(2) (678 S.E.2d 909) (2009). Verbal threats and fisticuffs do not justify the use of deadly force. Felder v. State, 273 Ga. 844, 846(4) (545 S.E.2d 918) (2001); Lewis v. State, 268 Ga. 83, 84(2) (485 S.E.2d 212) (1997). Contrary to Collier's further argument, he is not ‘permitted to establish the prima facie case of justification by using the very evidence for which the prima facie case serves as foundation.’ Walden v. State, 267 Ga. 162, 164(2)(b) (476 S.E.2d 259) (1996).” Luke v. State, 306 Ga.App. 701, 703 S.E.2d 335 (November 3, 2010). Convictions for DUI, reckless driving, and related offenses affirmed; defendant wasn’t entitled to a charge on justification, based on his drug-fueled belief that he was being chased by drug dealers . “‘When assessing claims of justification, the subjective fears of a particular defendant are irrelevant.... No precedent exists that would allow appellant to support his justification defense with an explanation that he had been the victim of an earlier attack committed by an unknown person. Such evidence is simply not relevant to whether the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime for which appellant was being tried would have excited the fears of an objective reasonable person to the point where the use of self-defense was justified.’ Lewis v. State, 270 Ga. 891, 893-894(2), 515 S.E.2d 382 (1999) (holding that evidence of attack by third parties not admissible). Cf. Perry v. State, 104 Ga.App. 383, 384, 121 S.E.2d 692 (1961) (unreasonable or delusory fear not sufficient to constitute justification, although it ‘may negative the idea of malicious and intentional wrongdoing’) (decided under prior version of Georgia law on justification and self-defense). Similarly, the proper test under Luke's theory of defense is whether the existing situation would have excited the fears of an objective, reasonable person to the point that violating the law was justified. [fn] Luke's subjective beliefs about unknown men with Uzis from an earlier incident does not meet this test. Contrary to Luke's argument, there was no immediate threat of would-be assassins at the time of the crimes charged, only a pursuit by law enforcement vehicles, with lights flashing and sirens blaring. Under these circumstances, his fear based upon an earlier encounter with unidentified men could not provide justification for the crimes in the indictment; thus, the circumstances did not support a charge on justification.” Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 364, 703 S.E.2d 609 (November 1, 2010). Convictions for felony murder and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly ruled inadmissible “evidence of the victim's prior conviction for simple battery,” for lack of