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described.’ Nelson v. State, 213 Ga.App. 641, 642(2) (445 S.E.2d 543) (1994).” “Earlier this court held that to ‘stand upon the same footing of reason and justice,’ a defense of justification under OCGA § 16-3-20(6) would still have to be premised upon the asserted prevention of ‘imminent use of unlawful force.’ Hoover v. State, 198 Ga.App. 481, 482(4) (402 S.E.2d 92) (1991). Later, our Supreme Court held that a charge on the defense of justification was required in a case in which the defendant was convicted of being a habitual violator, see OCGA § 40-5-58, for driving without a license because the defendant testified that he drove without a license because his wife was experiencing labor pains, the doctor said he needed to see her, and she could not drive herself to the doctor's office. Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 (409 S.E.2d 513) (1991).” “A premise underlying all the defenses specified in OCGA § 16-3-20 is that the defendant faced circumstances created by external events that demanded prompt, if not immediate, action. See Gravitt v. State, 279 Ga. 33, 34(2) (608 S.E.2d 202) (2005) (no imminent threat) Porter v. State, 272 Ga. 533, 535(3) (531 S.E.2d 97) (2000) (any imminent threat of harm had ended); Odum v. State, 220 Ga.App. 263, 264 (469 S.E.2d 394) (1996) (no emergency); Nelson v. State, supra, 213 Ga.App. 642(2) (prevent further and possibly more violent attack).” Distinguishing Moore v. State, 234 Ga.App. 332 (506 S.E.2d 685) (1998): “Moore's actions were apparently based upon his belief that he was in eminent danger of suffocating and that his only recourse was to kick out the window of the police car.” Accord, Isenhower v. State , 324 Ga.App. 380, 750 S.E.2d 703 (October 28, 2013) (criminal trespass conviction affirmed; no evidence that defendant’s “need to advocate for her son's welfare was so immediate that she was prevented from double-checking with school authorities to ensure that she had permission to be on campus, particularly after receiving written notice not to come onto school grounds.”). Burrowes v. State, 296 Ga.App. 629, 675 S.E.2d 518 (March 13, 2009). Conviction for simple battery affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge on justification. “Here, although Burrowes admitted struggling with [victim] over the telephone, he denied grabbing or striking her on the head or body, as alleged in the accusation. Thus, a justification charge was not warranted.” Branton v. State, 292 Ga.App. 104, 663 S.E.2d 414 (June 19, 2008). “Justification is a defense to the prosecution ‘for any crime,’ (emphasis supplied) OCGA § 16-3-20, including possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See Stanford v. State, 259 Ga.App. 188, 189 (576 S.E.2d 594) (2003).” No error in refusing to charge on justification here, however, despite defendant’s contentions about prior attacks on his person: “Where, as here, there is no evidence of an imminent threat or other present threat of death or serious bodily injury to Branton or a third party – or any of the specific circumstances set forth in OCGA § 16-3-21 – the trial court did not err in refusing Branton’s request to charge on justification as a defense to the charge of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.” London v. State, 289 Ga.App. 17, 656 S.E.2d 180 (December 14, 2007). In defendant’s DUI prosecution, defendant was not entitled to charge on justification where he didn’t admit the offense, instead contesting the State’s claim that he was impaired. Ojemuyiwa v. State, 285 Ga.App. 617, 647 S.E.2d 598 (May 31, 2007). In defendant’s prosecution for obstruction of officers, trial court properly refused to allow defendant to offer justification evidence – “a prior act of sexual violence committed against her to explain why she resisted [Officer] Owen when he initially made contact with her” – where she did not admit the act alleged. “Ojemuyiwa testified that she did not strike or kick Owen or otherwise resist arrest, but was attacked by the officers. Because Ojemuyiwa did not admit to the crimes charged, the defense of justification was inapplicable .” See also Harris (May 9, 2005) and Cadle (February 11, 2005), both below. Accord, Strapp v. State , 326 Ga.App. 264, 756 S.E.2d 333 (March 14, 2014) (no justification charge where defendant denied using violence against officer as alleged, admitting only that he “tried to ‘restrain’ the officer, and that he ‘grabbed’ the officer only to prevent himself from falling.”). Crane v. State, 281 Ga. 635, 641 S.E.2d 795 (February 26, 2007). “After Steven Bradley Crane was indicted for offenses arising from his conduct in fatally shooting Patrick DeCesaro, he filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground he was immune from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 [relating to immunity from prosecution based on defense of self, defense of others, defense of property or habitation]. The trial court denied the motion and denied Crane’s request for a certificate of immediate review. This is a direct appeal from the denial of the motion.” Held, denial of a motion to dismiss on this basis is not directly appealable. Distinguished from cases dealing with speedy trial and double jeopardy : “‘the very nature of a double jeopardy claim is such that it is collateral to, and separable from the principal issue at the accused’s impending criminal trial, i.e., whether or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged,’” quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651) (1977). Here, however, “the ultimate issue in Crane’s motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-24.2 is the same as the ultimate issue at trial, whether he was