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justified in killing [victim] or is guilty of the offense charged.” Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 612 S.E.2d 789 (May 9, 2005). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. “A defendant is not permitted to support a justification defense with an explanation that he or she had been the victim of an earlier attack committed by an unknown person; such evidence is not relevant to the critical question of whether the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes on trial would have excited the fears of an objective reasonable person to the point where the defendant’s actions were justified. Lewis v. State, 270 Ga. 891, 893(2), 515 S.E.2d 382 (1999).” Cadle v. State, 271 Ga.App. 595, 610 S.E.2d 574 (February 11, 2005). “[J]ustification is not a defense to an obstruction charge. Green v. State, 240 Ga.App. 774(1) (525 S.E.2d 154) (1999).” Gravitt v. State, 279 Ga. 33, 608 S.E.2d 202 (January 24, 2005). Drug dealer’s threat to kill defendant and his family in two weeks if defendant didn’t kill victim was not “imminent” threat as contemplated for justification defense. Fowler v. State, 267 Ga.App. 699, 600 S.E.2d 756 (June 4, 2004). Defendant not entitled to charge on justification where he claimed victim owed him six dollars, but defendant then took from victim his “wallet, keys, lighter, and transit card.” Byrd v. State, 277 Ga. 554, 592 S.E.2d 421 (February 2, 2004). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. Trial court did not err in refusing to charge jury on both self-defense and accident. Cites one rare case where this was found to be error, Koritta v. State , 263 Ga. 703, 438 S.E.2d 68 (1994). Trial court here properly charged on accident, but not justification, in accordance with the defense presented at trial Arsenault v. State, 257 Ga.App. 456, 571 S.E.2d 456 (September 18, 2002). Obstruction and related convictions affirmed. A desire not to wake a sleeping child is not a justification, under OCGA § 16-3-20, for disobeying lawful orders of an officer. Code v. State, 255 Ga.App. 432, 565 S.E.2d 477 (April 3, 2002). Aggravated battery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly refused defendant’s written request for a charge on self-defense. “The defendant must admit the crime before he can raise the defense. ... In order to be entitled to a charge on self-defense, [defendant] must show that he reasonably believed that the imminent use of unlawful force was to be perpetrated against him. ... A loss prevention employee’s attempted detention of a shoplifter would not constitute ‘imminent use of unlawful force.’... [S]ince [defendant] did not state that ‘he reasonably believed that the imminent use of unlawful force was to be perpetrated upon him’ when he struck the victim, the trial court correctly ruled that it was not required to charge on justification.” Robinson v. State, 275 Ga. 143, 561 S.E.2d 823 (March 28, 2002). A defendant’s right to introduce evidence of prior acts by the victim against him is contingent upon the defendant making out a prima facie case of justification. To make a prima facie showing of justification in a murder prosecution, the defendant must show that the victim was the aggressor, that the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant was honestly seeking to defend himself. In this case, defendant's testimony that victim had made verbal threats and had pulled his hand out of his pants as if he was going to shoot, but that defendant never saw a weapon and that victim had not been advancing on him, did not establish a prima facie case of justification, in prosecution for malice murder. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 121 S. Ct. 1711, 149 L.Ed.2d 722 (May 14, 2001). Reversing Ninth Circuit. United States sought injunction against cooperative’s distribution of medical marijuana to its members, pursuant to state initiative but in violation of federal Controlled Substances Act. Ninth Circuit erred by holding that cooperative might state a medical necessity defense to enforcement. “A necessity defense ‘traditionally covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor's control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils.’ United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980). Even at common law, the defense of necessity was somewhat controversial. See, e.g., Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B. 273 (1884). And under our constitutional system, in which federal crimes are defined by statute rather than by common law, see United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812), it is especially so. As we have stated: ‘Whether, as a policy matter, an exemption should be created is a question for legislative judgment, not judicial inference.’ United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 559, 99 S.Ct. 2470, 61 L.Ed.2d 68 (1979). Nonetheless, we recognize that this Court has discussed the possibility of a necessity defense without altogether rejecting it. See, e.g., Bailey, supra, at 415, 100 S.Ct. 624.” Bailey “rejected the necessity defense of a prisoner who contended that adverse prison conditions justified his prison escape. The Court held that