☢ test - Í

court properly ruled that defendant hadn’t made prima facie showing of justification, and thus excluded evidence of prior violent acts by victims against third parties. “The trial court specifically found that Cloud had not met his burden to show that he was honestly trying to defend himself. This was not error. Cloud asserts that he fired because he did not know why the victims were running to their vehicle and that they could have been returning to it to secure a weapon. However, there was no evidence that the victims had any sort of weapons upon their persons, or in their vehicle, and Cloud certainly had not seen any weapon. Compare Stobbart [ v. State, 272 Ga. 608 (533 S.E.2d 379) (2000)]. Justification cannot be based on an assault which has ended, Collier v. State, 288 Ga. 756, 757(2) (707 S.E.2d 102) (2011), and the mere fact that assailants are departing and could, theoretically, return and continue an assault does not mean that the person asserting justification is in imminent danger. Id. See also Carter v. State, 285 Ga. 565, 566(2) (678 S.E.2d 909) (2009); Quillian v. State, 279 Ga. 698, 700(2)(b) (620 S.E.2d 376) (2005). Cloud did not get his shotgun and hold it at the ready in case the men got weapons and returned, but shot at them as they fled.” State v. Green, 289 Ga. 802, 716 S.E.2d 194 (October 3, 2011). In defendant’s murder prosecution, evidence supported trial court’s finding that defendant was immune from prosecution based on justification. Evidence showed that Waldon attacked defendant while defendant was holding a butcher knife. When Waldon attacked, “the butcher knife in Green's hand entered Waldon's right thigh and punctured the femoral artery. The trial court found that Green never attempted to stab or injure Waldon with the knife.” Based on trial court’s finding that defendant didn’t use force against Waldon, State contends that trial court’s ruling amounts to a finding of accident, not self-defense, and that immunity isn’t available for accident under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. Supreme Court, however, finds the trial court’s findings of fact sufficient to raise self- defense. “Contrary to the State's contention, OCGA § 16–3–21 does not require that a person use actual force to support a claim for justification. Pursuant to OCGA § 16–3–21(a), ‘[a] person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that [he] reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend [himself] against such other's imminent use of unlawful force’ (emphasis supplied). See also OCGA § 16–3–24.2 (‘A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16–3–21 ... shall be immune from criminal prosecution.’) (emphasis supplied). Thus, a mere threat of force is all that is required when one reasonably believes that he must defend himself against another's imminent use of unlawful force. In this regard, a person is justified in going beyond merely threatening to use force and actually ‘using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm ... if he ... reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself.’ OCGA § 16–3–21(a). … [T]he record reveals that Waldon was totally irrational, that Green did not know what Waldon was going to do, and that Green held onto the knife for ‘protection’ and to ‘scare’ Waldon. Waldon knew that Green had the knife, and Waldon nevertheless violently attacked him. By holding onto the knife for his own protection and to scare Waldon, Green was, at the very least, showing a threat of force to Waldon in direct response to an imminent violent attack from Waldon.” Brinson v. State, 289 Ga. 551, 713 S.E.2d 862 (July 11, 2011). Malice murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly declined to give defendant’s “request to charge on involuntary manslaughter under OCGA § 16–5–3(b) (commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner). As best we can glean, appellant argues that the lawful act was his belief in the necessity of using deadly force, but that his belief was unreasonable and resulted in the unlawful stabbing of the victim. In this regard, appellant asks the Court to apply the doctrine of ‘imperfect self-defense.’ This theory has been adopted in a minority of other states, and is a form of the crime of voluntary manslaughter. Scott v. State, 261 Ga. 611(2), 409 S.E.2d 511 (1991). It does not, however, ‘fit within the definition of voluntary manslaughter in this State,’ id., and moreover ‘has ... no application to involuntary manslaughter.’ Lamon v. State, 260 Ga. 119, 120, fn. 2(2) (390 S.E.2d 582) (1990).” Jones v. State, 304 Ga.App. 21, 695 S.E.2d 359 (May 11, 2010). Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction affirmed; trial court properly refused to charge on self-defense where evidence failed to show that victim was aggressor. Buggle v. State, 299 Ga.App. 515, 683 S.E.2d 85 (August 4, 2009). In defendant’s trial for aggravated assault, no reversible error in failure to sua sponte charge on no duty to retreat . Distinguishing Jackson v. State , 237 Ga.App. 746, 746 (516 S.E.2d 792) (1999), which holds that a defendant may be entitled to a charge on the issue of lack of duty to retreat even though he did not request it. ‘In those circumstances where the omission is clearly harmful as a matter of law in that it fails to provide the jury with the proper guidelines for determining guilt or innocence, this Court will consider and review the charge even though there was no timely objection in the trial court. OCGA § 5-5-24; Spear v. State, 230 Ga. 74, 75 (195 S.E.2d 397) (1973).’ Jackson, supra at 747. In this case, unlike Jackson, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. The only evidence that Buggle acted in self-defense was his own testimony; this was belied, however, by his acknowledgment that the videotape shows that he was the one who approached [victim] Bradford and it was Bradford who was retreating. Moreover, the jury saw the videotape of the entire altercation and did not have to speculate on how