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the stabbing occurred.” For more cases on retreat, see JURIES AND JURORS – CHARGE – RETREAT, below. Richards v. State, 288 Ga.App. 814, 655 S.E.2d 690 (December 10, 2007). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault; jury could find that defendant used excessive force in defending himself with a knife against his weaponless son. “Because stabbing is likely to cause ‘great bodily harm,’ Richards would have been justified in stabbing the victim only if he reasonably thought it was necessary to avert death or great bodily injury to himself. OCGA § 16-3- 21(a),” citing “ In re: Q.M.L., 257 Ga.App. 22, 23(2) (570 S.E.2d 92) (2002) ( stabbing with knife to repel weaponless attack was excessive force and did not qualify as self-defense ); see also Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 423(1) (554 S.E.2d 458) (2001).” Thomas v. State, 285 Ga.App. 290, 645 S.E.2d 713 (May 8, 2007). In defendant’s murder prosecution, trial court properly declined to charge on aggravated battery as a “forcible felony” which would justify using deadly force in self- defense; evidence was insufficient to show that defendant reasonably feared that victim would inflict aggravated battery on her. “At trial, Wicker admitted stabbing her husband, explaining that she had done so because he had pushed her down onto their bed while drunk and threatened to ‘f-- her up.’ In other testimony, Wicker testified that her husband had bruised her shoulder in pushing her down.” This was insufficient to show apprehension of an aggravated battery. “The offense of aggravated battery requires evidence showing a maliciously caused bodily injury to another by depriving the same of a member of his or her body, rendering a member of his or her body useless, or by seriously disfiguring his or her body or a member thereof. OCGA § 16-5-24(a).” Adams v. State, 282 Ga.App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (November 27, 2006). Charged with aggravated assault by waving a gun at another motorist, defendant sought to testify “regarding the fact that he had been the victim of a robbery in the past” and “had defended himself using his pistol.” Held, trial court properly granted State’s motion in limine prohibiting this testimony. “Adams argues that the court erred because such testimony was relevant to show his state of mind as it related to whether it was reasonable for him to believe that he needed to defend himself against a perceived threat. This argument is misplaced. Because Adams was asserting self-defense, he could show other specific acts of violence committed against him and others by Mrs. Hunt, if any such acts existed. See Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 407(3)(b), 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991). ‘He could not, however, support that defense by the proffer of any evidence based upon the commission of extraneous acts of [violence] upon him by anyone other than [victim here]. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the State to rebut, refute or test as to credibility, evidence of [violence] by third parties.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Bryant v. State, 271 Ga. 99, 101(3), 515 S.E.2d 836 (1999). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the State’s motion in limine.” Lott v. State, 281 Ga.App. 373, 636 S.E.2d 102 (August 30, 2006). Trial court properly excluded proffered psychological testimony as irrelevant to defendant’s defense of self-defense . “According to the proffer of Dr. Shaffer’s testimony, Lott suffered from a condition that impeded his ability to change a course of action once an action had been instituted. Dr. Shaffer also believed, however, that Lott was competent to stand trial, that Lott knew the difference between right and wrong, and that Lott did not suffer from a delusional compulsion. After hearing a proffer of Dr. Shaffer’s testimony, the trial court excluded the testimony as irrelevant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony. Lott contended that he shot Johnson in self defense. The defense of justification is based on a ‘reasonable man’ standard of behavior, and Lott did not raise an insanity or mental incompetency defense that would have made his mental condition relevant to his guilt or innocence. Weems v. State, 268 Ga. 142, 143(3) (485 S.E.2d 767) (1997) (other than legal insanity, the defendant’s mental state at the time of the shootings was irrelevant to guilt or innocence); Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198, 201(3) (475 S.E.2d 892) (1996) (‘in homicides where justification is raised as a defense ... that justification is based upon the fears of a reasonable person, not upon the reasonable fears of the defendant’) (citation and punctuation omitted). It follows that the trial court was entitled to conclude that expert testimony pertaining to Lott’s psychological condition was irrelevant.” Stinchcomb v. State, 280 Ga. 170, 626 S.E.2d 88 (January 30, 2006). “Stinchcomb … argues that his conviction was unwarranted because he was justified in shooting Young. At the time that she was fatally shot, however, Young was already in her car attempting to leave the scene. Therefore, by the time that [co-defendant] Woolfolk and Stinchcomb began shooting, there was no longer an imminent threat to them justifying the use of deadly force, and the jury did not err by rejecting Stinchcomb’s arguments that his actions were justified pursuant to the doctrine of self-defense. Broussard v. State, 276 Ga. 216(2), 576 S.E.2d 883 (2003).”