☢ test - Í

Pearson v. State, 277 Ga. 813, 596 S.E.2d 582 (May 3, 2004). “Pearson claimed that he acted in self defense, but, at the time of the shooting, he was not in imminent danger from [victim]. ‘“‘The doctrine of reasonable fear does not apply to any case of homicide where the danger apprehended is not urgent and pressing, or apparently so, at the time of the killing.’”[Cit.]’ Brown v. State, 270 Ga. 601, 603(2), 512 S.E.2d 260 (1999). … The jury was authorized to find that Pearson acted solely out of revenge for prior crimes and assaults allegedly committed against him by [victim]. ‘“[T]he law will not justify a killing for deliberate revenge however grievous the past wrong may have been [.]’” Teems v. State, 256 Ga. 675, 676(4), 352 S.E.2d 779 (1987). ‘[T]he defense of justification is not so broad as to permit a private citizen to mete out judgment as he sees fit. [Cit.]’ McPetrie v. State, 263 Ga.App. 85, 87(1), 587 S.E.2d 233 (2003).” Accord, Stanley v. State , 267 Ga.App. 656, 601 S.E.2d 141 (June 3, 2004); Slaughter v. State , 278 Ga. 896, 608 S.E.2d 227 (January 24, 2005). Bailey v. State, 263 Ga.App. 614, 588 S.E.2d 807 (October 14, 2003). As part of its charge on self-defense, trial court gave charge based on Spradlin v. State , 151 Ga.App. 585, 260 S.E.2d 517 (1979) (“Self defense … is invoked by necessity and without necessity being present, it is inapplicable…”). Defendant argues that “this charge … misstates the law of self-defense by imposing a requirement of absolute necessity rather than a reasonable belief requirement.” Held, while Spradlin was overruled in Pullin v. State , 257 Ga. 815, 364 S.E.2d 848 (1988), and better practice would be not to give this charge, it is not error where the court also charges “the statutory language of OCGA § 16-3-21(a) that ‘[a] person is justified in threatening or using force against another person when, and to the extent, that he reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or a third person against the imminent use of unlawful force. A person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or [great] bodily harm only if that person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or [great] bodily injury to himself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.’” Sedlak v. State, 275 Ga. 746, 571 S.E.2d 721 (October 15, 2002). “[E]vidence that the defendant suffered abuse at the hands of others [that is, other than the victim] may not be used in determining whether she acted with the fear of a reasonable person under the circumstances” and thus support a claim of self-defense. Specific acts of violence committed by the victim against the defendant or others, however, may be admitted. See also Bryant v. State , 271 Ga. 99, 101(3) 515 S.E.2d 836 (1999); Lewis (April 12, 1999), below. Accord, O’Connell v. State , 294 Ga. 379, 754 S.E.2d 29 (January 21, 2014). Code v. State, 255 Ga.App. 432, 565 S.E.2d 477 (April 3, 2002). Trial court properly refused defendant’s written request for a charge on self-defense. “The defendant must admit the crime before he can raise the defense. . . In order to be entitled to a charge on self-defense, [defendant] must show that he reasonably believed that the imminent use of unlawful force was to be perpetrated against him. ... A loss prevention employee’s attempted detention of a shoplifter would not constitute ‘imminent use of unlawful force.’. . . [S]ince [defendant] did not state that ‘he reasonably believed that the imminent use of unlawful force was to be perpetrated upon him’ when he struck the victim, the trial court correctly ruled that it was not required to charge on justification.” Sellers v. State, 245 Ga.App. 621, 538 S.E.2d 511 (August 21, 2000). Voluntary manslaughter conviction affirmed; no error in trial court’s charge to the jury that “the defense of accident and the defense of justification for self-defense are inconsistent defenses.” The Supreme Court noted in Turner v. State , 262 Ga. 359, 360(2)(b), 418 S.E.2d 52 (1992) “that there will occasionally be a case where ‘a party who is armed with a weapon contends that while he was defending himself from another party, his weapon accidentally discharged and killed that other party.’” “Under the facts of the case, the trial court's instruction that the two defenses were inconsistent was not erroneous. Sellers' accident defense was not based on a claim that she accidentally stabbed Mitchell while struggling with him in self-defense. Rather, it was based on her claim that she did not realize she was holding a knife, and that Mitchell accidentally impaled himself on the blade when she bumped into him while trying to run out of the room. She did not claim that she intended to use any force whatsoever on Mitchell in self-defense. Thus, if the jury accepted Sellers' accident defense, it could not have also determined that she stabbed him in self-defense. In any event, any error in instructing the jury that the two defenses were inconsistent was harmless, since the jury necessarily rejected both defenses in convicting Sellers of voluntary manslaughter.” Porter v. State , 272 Ga. 533, 531 S.E.2d 97 (May 30, 2000). Malice murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge jury on self-defense. “Porter admittedly knew that the victim was unarmed when he left the car. Porter also admitted that he ran around the back of the car chasing the retreating victim, while holding down the trigger of the semi-automatic revolver and firing the remaining shots at him from a distance of about two feet as the victim ‘kept