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running.’ Thus, any imminent threat of harm which may have occurred in the back seat of the vehicle had ended when both men emerged. See generally Strong v. State, 263 Ga. 587(2), 436 S.E.2d 213 (1993). Even if Porter believed the victim owned another weapon, he clearly posed no threat at the time of the shooting. As for Porter's statement that he emptied the weapon into the victim because he was ‘scared,’ he later explained that he ‘got scared’ when it became apparent that he had seriously wounded the unarmed victim. Without any evidence that Porter's actions were justified, the trial court's obligation under Tarvestad to instruct the jury on the defendant's sole defense dissolved.” Stiles v. State, 242 Ga.App. 484, 529 S.E.2d 913 (February 22, 2000). Second degree child cruelty conviction reversed; trial court should have charged on self-defense, even absent a request, as defendant’s sole defense. Lewis v. State, 270 Ga. 891, 515 S.E.2d 382 (April 12, 1999). Charged with murder, defendant was not entitled to support his justification (self-defense) defense with evidence that he had previously been attacked by an unknown assailant in a drive-by shooting. Defendant contends that, because of the prior attack, “he reasonably believed that a real and present danger threatened his life and the lives of his companions, necessitating his use of deadly force” after a heated argument with victim at a nightclub. Held, trial court properly excluded this evidence as irrelevant to the question: whether the defendant was faced with “circumstances that would excite the fears of a reasonable person. OCGA § 24-2-1. Because evidence of violent acts committed by the victim against either a defendant (or against third parties) is relevant to this inquiry, such evidence may be introduced by a criminal defendant claiming justification. Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 407, 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991); Milton v. State, 245 Ga. 20, 22, 262 S.E.2d 789 (1980). However, it does not follow that violent acts allegedly committed by unknown third persons against a defendant should be admitted in support of a justification defense. When assessing claims of justification, the subjective fears of a particular defendant are irrelevant. See Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662, 666, 187 S.E.2d 277 (1972); Kurtz, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Georgia, p. 523 (3 rd ed., 1991). … Such evidence [of third-party attacks] is simply not relevant to whether the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime for which [defendant] was being tried would have excited the fears of an objective reasonable person to the point where the use of self-defense was justified. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence in this case.” Accord, Sedlak (October 15, 2002), above; O’Connell v. State , 294 Ga. 379, 754 S.E.2d 29 (January 21, 2014); Watson v. State , 328 Ga.App. 832, 763 S.E.2d 122 (August 15, 2014). Brown v. State, 236 Ga.App. 166, 513 S.E.2d 276 (February 1, 1999). Defendant was not entitled to a charge on self- defense where he contended that the gun “went off” as he and the victim were struggling for it. “Brown testified that after he told the victim that it was not a good thing to sell cocaine to children, the victim grabbed him from behind, slammed him into a wall, and put his hands around Brown’s neck. Brown backed up and the victim came at him again. Brown then fired a warning shot near the victim’s feet but the victim jumped on Brown and the two wrestled for control of the gun. During a prolonged struggle, the gun “went off again.” … Because Brown did not testify that he fired the fatal shot to prevent the commission of a forcible felony against him, this legal concept was not reasonably raised by the evidence.” KK. SLEEPWALKING Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 33, 663 S.E.2d 155 (June 30, 2008). Murder conviction reversed; trial court erred in treating defendant’s sleepwalking defense as an insanity defense. “‘A defense related to but different from the defense of insanity is that of unconsciousness, often referred to as automatism: one who engages in what would otherwise be criminal conduct is not guilty of a crime if he does so in a state of unconsciousness or semi-consciousness. Although this is sometimes explained on the ground that such a person could not have the requisite mental state for commission of the crime, the better rationale is that the individual has not engaged in a voluntary act.’ 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, p. 33 (2nd ed., 2003). In this vein, the Model Penal Code provides that a person who commits an act during unconsciousness or sleep has not committed a voluntary act and is not criminally responsible for the act. Model Penal Code § 2.01(2)(b). Moreover, LaFave notes that sleepwalking qualifies as such a defense. Id. at 33-34. In addition, it appears that the majority of courts that have considered the question have held that unconsciousness disorders, including sleep disorders, constitute a separate defense from insanity, and that people who commit potentially criminal acts because of such disorders should not be criminally responsible because they are not acting voluntarily and with criminal intent. [Cits.] This Court has also stated in dicta that, if a defendant commits an act that would otherwise be a crime while sleepwalking, he would not be criminally responsible because he would not satisfy this State’s requirement that ‘there be a joint operation of act and intent to constitute [a] crime.’ Lewis v. State, 196 Ga. 755, 763 (27 S.E.2d 659) (1943). See OCGA § 16-2-1(a) (a crime occurs when there is a ‘joint operation of an act or omission to act and intention or criminal negligence’). Furthermore, in interpreting the mens rea requirement of a statute to contain only a general intent as opposed to a specific intent requirement, the Supreme Court stated that a general intent requirement would separate wrongful conduct from innocent conduct and would protect ‘the hypothetical person who engages in forceful taking of money while