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sleepwalking (innocent, if aberrant activity).’ Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (120 S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203) (2000).” LL. STATUTE OF LIMITATION Barghi v. State, 334 Ga.App. 409, 779 S.E.2d 373 (October 14, 2015). DUI and related convictions affirmed; slight amendment to accusation didn’t “commence a new prosecution, but rather, constituted a continuation of the original prosecution. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Barghi’s plea in bar on the ground that the statute of limitation for the two amended DUI counts expired. See Prindle v. State, 240 Ga.App. 461, 461–62(1), 523 S.E.2d 44 (1999) (holding that defendant’s prosecution on DUI charges was not time-barred even though amended accusations were filed more than two years after offenses were committed, because original citations pertaining to the same offenses and conduct were filed prior to the statute of limitation’s expiration); Thomas v. State, 233 Ga.App. 224, 225(1), 504 S.E.2d 59 (1998) (same).” Change here: altering “drive or have physical control of a moving vehicle” to “drive a moving vehicle.” 2. Minor technical change in wording of accusation didn’t require that defendant be re-arraigned. “Barghi cites no authority for the argument that a minor amendment to an accusation, as occurred here, requires the State to arraign a defendant a second time. See Vanorsdall v. State, 241 Ga.App. 871, 874–75(2)(a), 528 S.E.2d 312 (2000) (holding that filing of amended accusation that did not set forth new or different charge did not require State to arraign defendant a second time before proceeding to trial). Cf. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 396, 399(3), 614 S.E.2d 79 (2005) (noting that because amendment of the accusation did not constitute the commencement of a new prosecution, the previous arraignment of defendant was sufficient). 3. In bench trial, trial court was entitled to rely on evidence presented at prior motion hearing in denying plea in bar based on statute of limitation. “Barghi presented no evidence disputing the trial court’s earlier ruling that the State’s prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitation but, rather, simply reiterated her earlier legal arguments. … And given that the statute of limitation is not an element of the crime per se, it was perfectly appropriate for the trial court, as the trier of fact, to rely on evidence that was already a part of the case record.” Distinguishing Jenkins v. State , 278 Ga. 598, 604 S.E.2d 789 (2004) (after pretrial denial of plea in bar, same issue was still properly presented to jury). State v. Bragg, 332 Ga.App. 608, 774 S.E.2d 182 (June 26, 2015). Physical precedent only. In prosecution for wrongfully taking unemployment benefits, trial court properly granted plea in bar based on statute of limitation. Benefits were paid in 2009; “Bragg may have been identified” in the Department of Labor’s computers as having received benefits while employed “as early as January 1, 2010;” this was confirmed by letter from her employer on February 2, 2010. Criminal accusation was filed on January 7, 2014. Held, statute of limitation began to run on January 1, 2010, when the victim (here, DOL) had actual knowledge of the act (though not necessarily that a crime had been committed), Harper v. State, 292 Ga. 557, 559, 738 S.E.2d 584 (2013). “The DOL admittedly had actual knowledge of Bragg's actions as early as January 1, 2010, when its system identified her as having collected unemployment benefits while she was employed.” “We … reject the State's argument that neither the DOL, nor the State, could confirm that a crime had been committed until the DOL received the response from Bragg's employer. … [T]he DOL's lack of knowledge that Bragg was illegally collecting unemployment benefits while employed is not sufficient to toll the limitation period,” citing State v. Robins, 296 Ga.App. 437, 439(1), 674 S.E.2d 615 (2009) (“the victim's ‘lack of knowledge of the illegality of the act [is] not sufficient to toll the limitation period, but rather there must be lack of knowledge of the act itself.’”). State v. Outen, 296 Ga. 40, 764 S.E.2d 848 (October 20, 2014). Affirming 324 Ga.App. 457, 751 S.E.2d 109 (2013); 1. trial court properly granted plea in bar finding that felony vehicular homicide charge was time-barred. “OCGA § 17–3–3, which extends the statute of limitations for six months after a timely filed indictment is quashed,” doesn’t provide extra time following ruling by an appellate court; rather the six months begins from the date of the trial court’s action quashing the indictment. “The text of the statute is clear. OCGA § 17–3–3 says that the six-month extension of the statute of limitations runs ‘from the time the first indictment is quashed or the nolle prosequi entered.’ The statute does not say, as the State would have it, ‘from the time the first indictment is quashed or the nolle prosequi entered or, in the event the State seeks an appeal, from the time the appellate court issues the remittitur. ’ See Duncan v. State, 193 Ga.App. 793, 794, 389 S.E.2d 365 (1989) (holding that an appeal does not toll the statute of limitations under OCGA § 17–3–2 because the pendency of an appeal is not among the exceptions listed in § 17–3–2 and ‘[i]n a criminal statute of limitation only an exception or condition contained within the statute will toll its operation’).” State’s argument that this is bad public policy is unavailing; “this Court has no authority to substitute its own notions of optimal public policy for the policy clearly delineated in OCGA § 17–3–3.” And if reindictment is followed by appellate reversal of the quashing of the first indictment, the State can simply move to nolle prose the “superfluous” indictment. 2. Second indictment didn’t “relate back” to the first, because the first charge of felony vehicular homicide had already been quashed before the second was filed. See Wooten (November 8, 1999), for three-pronged test regarding relation back . Court of Appeals