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destroyed, and the parties' stipulation of facts indicates that no portion of that evidence was retained for further testing. Accordingly, the state concedes that it cannot rely on the provisions of OCGA § 17–3–1(c.1) to avoid the expiration of the applicable statutes of limitation.” Harper v. State, 292 Ga. 557, 738 S.E.2d 584 (February 18, 2013). In prosecution for theft and RICO violations, trial court erred in application of statute of limitation exception for offenses against victims over age 65. Indictment alleged thefts against Glock, individually, and two corporations controlled by Glock. Defendants contend that the alleged acts were outside the statute of limitation, but trial court ruled that the statute was tolled, pursuant to OCGA § 17-3-2.2, “if the victim is a person who is 65 years of age or older, ... until the violation is reported to or discovered by a law enforcement agency, prosecuting attorney, or other governmental agency.” “We believe that the trial court erred in its analysis. Rather, to apply the tolling provision of OCGA § 17–3–2.2, it must be shown that the victim of the crime is a person over the age of 65. As noted above, the protection of such persons is the purpose of the statute. … OCGA § 17–3–2.2 offers no protection to the interest of any corporation or other entity which is not ‘a person who is 65 years of age or older.’ OCGA § 17–3–2.2. This is in keeping with the principle that, generally, corporations are separate legal entities from their shareholders. See Miller v. Harco Nat'l Ins. Co., 274 Ga. 387, 391–392(3) (552 S.E.2d 848) (2001). Accordingly, in order to apply the statute of limitation tolling provision found in OCGA § 17–3–2.2, it must be shown that there was a theft directly from Mr. Glock; i.e., that the property taken was his, and not that of a corporation or other entity with a separate legal identity from Mr. Glock.” Melton dissents, pointing to allegations that at least some of the funds in question were transferred from Mr. Glock to a corporate account at Harper’s direction. Mosby v. State, 319 Ga.App. 642, 738 S.E.2d 98 (February 4, 2013). 1. In prosecution for incest and related offenses, counts alleging “that Mosby committed the offenses against a child under the age of 16, … sufficiently invoked the statute of limitation tolling provision set forth in OCGA § 17–3–2.1. State v. Godfrey, 309 Ga.App. 234, 238(2) (709 S.E.2d 572) (2011).” But allegation that the victim was “a child under the age of thirteen years” was not sufficient to “allege that the victim was under the age of 16” such as to invoke the tolling provision of OCGA § 17-3-2.1. Godfrey at 239(2). 2. Aggravated sexual battery is not one of the crimes enumerated in OCGA § 17-3-2.1(a), for which the statute is tolled prior to the victim’s sixteenth birthday. State v. Armendariz, 316 Ga.App. 394, 729 S.E.2d 538 (June 26, 2012). In prosecution on drug and weapon charges (not specified in opinion), trial court properly granted plea in bar based on statute of limitation. Defendant, age 15, was originally charged as a juvenile, then transferred to superior court. A 15-count indictment was returned, whereupon defendant’s bond was revoked, but 12 of the charges were quashed because they weren’t first presented in juvenile court. A new juvenile court petition and transfer order were obtained on nine charges, followed by a new indictment on those charges. “Because the second indictment was returned … more than 250 days after Armendariz's detention, the trial court found that the second indictment was not timely returned and granted the plea in bar-statute of limitations.” 1. Contrary to State’s argument, OCGA § 17–7–50.1's 180–day time requirement applied to all charges upon which defendant was originally detained, including those later quashed. “Armendariz was detained prior to any challenge to the validity of the charges, indicating that he was detained for violating bond related to all charges. Nothing in the statute indicates that the clock stopped running when some charges against him were deemed invalid, an event that preceded the expiration of the 180–day period.” 2. OCGA § 17–7–50.1's 180–day time requirement not affected by six-month extension of statute of limitation for quashed indictments found in OCGA § 17-3-3. “OCGA § 17–3–3 provides that ‘[i]f an indictment is found within the time provided for in Code Section 17–3–1 or 17–3–2, or other applicable statute, and is quashed ... the limitation shall be extended six months from the time the first indictment is quashed.’ [fn] The State clings to the phrase ‘or other applicable statute,’ but presents no case law showing that OCGA § 17–7–50.1 qualifies as an ‘applicable statute,’ nor do we find any case law construing these statutes together. Further, OCGA § 17–3–3's six-month extension is in direct conflict with OCGA § 17–7–50.1(a), which allows an extension ‘not to exceed 90 additional days.’ Additionally, OCGA § 17–7–50.1 deals specifically with juvenile dispositions; OCGA § 17–3–3 does not. We have held that ‘a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent, to resolve any inconsistency between them.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Singletary v. State, 310 Ga.App. 570, 571 n. 9, 713 S.E.2d 698 (2011), citing Berry v. City of East Point, 277 Ga.App. 649, 654(6)(c), 627 S.E.2d 391 (2006). The State's argument fails.” Hicks v. State, 315 Ga.App. 779, 728 S.E.2d 294 (May 3, 2012). RICO conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s plea in bar, based on statute of limitation. Re-indictment within six months of nolle pros of timely first indictment was timely. “Under Georgia law, if the State obtains an indictment within the time allowed, and a nolle prosequi is later entered as to the first indictment, the State may re-indict the defendant within six months after