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the entry of nolle prosequi, regardless of the intervening expiration of the initial limitation period. Carlisle v. State, 277 Ga. 99, 100–101 (586 S.E.2d 240) (2003); Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 513–514(12) (578 S.E.2d 444) (2003). See OCGA § 17–3–3 (‘If an indictment is found within the time [allowed by law], and is quashed or a nolle prosequi entered, the limitation shall be extended six months from the time the first indictment is quashed or the nolle prosequi entered.’). Because the State re-indicted Hicks within six months of the entry of the nolle prosequi, the trial court did not err in denying his plea in bar. Alexander v. State, 192 Ga.App. 211, 212 (384 S.E.2d 436) (1989).” Zabain v. State, 315 Ga.App. 749, 728 S.E.2d 273 (May 2, 2012). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; on appeal, defendant couldn’t challenge conviction based on statute of limitation where he never raised the issue either by attack on the sufficiency of the indictment or the evidence. “When a count of the indictment is ‘absolutely void in that it fails to charge the accused with any act made a crime by the law and, upon the trial, no demurrer to the indictment is interposed and the accused is convicted under the indictment and judgment is entered on the verdict, the accused's proper remedy is a motion in arrest of judgment or habeas corpus.’ McKay [ v. State, 234 Ga.App. 556, 559(2) (507 S.E.2d 484) (1998)] We find nothing in the record that can be construed as a motion in arrest of judgment or as a petition for habeas corpus, and Zabain makes no assertion that he appeals a ruling from either proceeding.” Distinguishing Lee v. State , 289 Ga. 95 (709 S.E.2d 762) (2011): “unlike Zabain, the appellant in Lee had properly raised before the trial court the defense of the statute of limitation. [fn] And although Zabain moved for a directed verdict, he did so only on general grounds and not on the ground that any count of the indictment was barred by the statute of limitation.” Defendant’s remedy, then, is limited to habeas corpus. Accord, Jackson v. State , 334 Ga.App. 368, 779 S.E.2d 427 (November 10, 2015) (“Because Jackson did not raise an objection to the indictment in any manner before or during trial and did not move to arrest the judgment after his conviction, it can be reviewed on appeal only through a habeas corpus proceeding.”). Royal v. State, 314 Ga.App. 20, 723 S.E.2d 118 (February 7, 2012). In prosecution for insurance fraud, trial court properly denied motion to dismiss and plea in bar based on statute of limitation; trial court properly found that victim/insurance company first had knowledge of the crime within four years of the indictment despite receiving a report some months earlier. Insurance company received a tip about defendant’s fraudulent receipt of disability benefits in May, 2006, but was unable to corroborate it until meeting with the tipster in July, 2006; indictment was issued in July, 2010. “Under [the tolling provision, OCGA § 17–3–2(2)], ‘[t]he crime victim's knowledge of the crime is imputed to the State.’ [ State v. Campbell, 295 Ga.App. 856, 857 (673 S.E.2d 336) (2009)]. See also Womack v. State, 260 Ga. 21, 22(3) (389 S.E.2d 240) (1990). But, the victim must have ‘actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge, of the crime. [Cit.]’ State v. Robins, 296 Ga.App. 437, 439(1) (674 S.E.2d 615) (2009). ‘The tolling period is not extinguished when the injured party should have known; rather, it ends when the injured party has actual knowledge of the crime.’ (Emphasis in original.) Campbell, supra, 295 Ga.App. at 858. In other words, there must be ‘knowledge of the act itself. [Cit.]’ Id. In this case, the record shows that the employee calling the fraud hotline may have had actual knowledge of the crime on May 3, 2006, but the defrauded insurance company, the victim, did not acquire actual knowledge of the specific acts constituting the crime until July 5, 2010.” Distinguishing Jenkins v. State, 278 Ga. 598 (604 S.E.2d 789) (2004), where statute wasn’t tolled where DA had evidence of both crime and perpetrator, but chose not to indict “until an additional review of existing evidence more firmly identified the defendant before indicting him more than seven years later. [Cit.] The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, reasoning that ‘[t]he tolling exception to the statute of limitations cannot be based upon the subjective opinion of the district attorney as to whether there was enough evidence to file charges against a particular person. Otherwise, there would be tolling of the statute of limitations for routine investigation into a crime.’” Accord, Kenerly v. State , 325 Ga.App. 412, 750 S.E.2d 822 (November 22, 2013) (Physical precedent only; statute of limitation on county commissioner’s charges of bribery and failure to disclose financial interest began when State had actual knowledge of offenses, not when it “should have known” and not based on mere allegations of corruption.). Scales v. State, 310 Ga.App. 48, 712 S.E.2d 555 (June 15, 2011). Rape and related convictions affirmed; prosecution for 1993 rape wasn’t barred by statute of limitation in 2007 where “Scales' identity as the perpetrator was not known either to the victim or to the State until January 2007, when the State received information of the CODIS match. See Beasley v. State, 244 Ga.App. 836, 840 (536 S.E.2d 825) (2000) (‘[U]nless and until [a] fingerprint [found at a crime scene] is matched to an actual person, it cannot be said that the police know who committed the crime.’); see also Jenkins v. State, 278 Ga. 598, 603(1)(A) (604 S.E.2d 789) (2004) (‘We conclude that the General Assembly intended for the “person unknown” tolling exception to apply to a situation ... where there is no identified suspect among the universe of all potential suspects.’ ) Therefore, the limitation period applicable to each offense was tolled from the date the crimes were committed through January 2007. McKeehan v. State, 274 Ga.App. at 16(2). The State indicted Scales within two months of learning of his identity, well within the applicable limitation periods.” 2. “ Scales also argues that the State's failure to