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fund DNA testing procedures and a State data base, to test his blood for DNA immediately after the rape, and to add his DNA profile to CODIS immediately thereafter, constituted ‘wrongful conduct’ which should, as a matter of equity, prevent the State from using OCGA § 17–3–2(2) to toll any statute of limitation in this case. This argument lacks merit. As the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, ‘an inordinate delay between the time a crime is committed and the time a defendant is arrested or indicted may violate due process guarantees under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. To find a due process violation where a delay precedes arrest and indictment, courts must find 1) that the delay caused actual prejudice to the defense, and 2) that the delay was the product of deliberate action by the prosecution designed to gain a tactical advantage.’ (Citations and emphasis omitted.) Wooten v. State, 262 Ga. 876, 878(2) (426 S.E.2d 852) (1993). There is no evidence in the record of this case that the State's alleged failure to implement DNA testing and CODIS participation as soon as scientifically or financially feasible was either instigated by the prosecution or deliberately done to gain a tactical advantage over Scales or any other defendant. The record shows that as soon as the GBI was informed of a CODIS match, it conveyed that information to the proper law enforcement agency, and the Fulton County District Attorney presented the indictment to the grand jury less than two months later.” Lee v. State, 289 Ga. 95, 709 S.E.2d 762 (April 18, 2011). Conviction for keeping a place of prostitution reversed; Court of Appeals erred at 304 Ga.App. 681, 697 S.E.2d 221 (May 11, 2010) in affirming conviction because there was no evidence before the jury that would have allowed it to find that the defendant’s acts occurred within two years of filing the original accusation. Original accusation, filed January 31, 2008, charged defendant with keeping a place of prostitution on or about June 30, 2006. Amended accusation, filed July 14, 2008, charged defendant with keeping a place of prostitution and pimping “on or about June 30, 2006 through on or about July 11, 2006.” 1. The Court of Appeals properly found that the pimping charge was barred by the statute of limitation, “because that charge was included only by a substantial amendment to the original accusation.” 2. The evidence didn’t allow the jury to find that the charge of keeping a place of prostitution occurred within the statute of limitation, because the jury was never informed when the original accusation was filed. “In this case, the State offered evidence of when the crimes occurred, but wholly failed either to offer any proof of when the prosecution was commenced or to request the trial court to give the jury any guidance in that regard. As a result, the jury had before it only the date on which the amended accusations were filed, and not the date of the original accusations. Furthermore, the undisputed evidence showed that the alleged offenses occurred more than two years before the date of the amended accusations. Therefore, the jury was not authorized to find that the crimes occurred within the applicable statute of limitations as set out in OCGA § 17–3–1(d), nor was the trial court authorized to prohibit Appellant from arguing to the jury the only dates which were before it.” Notes that “the usual practice is to provide the jury with the relevant accusations or indictments. See Salem v. State, 228 Ga. 186, 188(5), 184 S.E.2d 650 (1971). In this case, however, neither the trial court nor the State ever provided the jury with the original accusations or informed the jury of their date.” Martinez v. State, 306 Ga.App. 512, 702 S.E.2d 747 (October 19, 2010). Several of defendants’ home invasion offenses were barred by statute of limitation. Offenses occurred in 2004; original indictment was issued same year, amended to add counts in 2009. 1. “The State argues that because the new charges arose out of the same incidents that gave rise to the charges in the 2004 indictment, the 2009 indictment should be viewed only as a superseding indictment. In other words, the State takes the position that the new charges in the 2009 indictment should ‘relate back’ to the date of the 2004 indictment, and therefore be viewed as having been indicted within the four-year statute of limitations. This argument, however, finds no support in Georgia law, which holds that ‘a superseding indictment brought after the statute of limitation has run is valid as long as (i) the original indictment is still pending; (ii) the original indictment was timely; and (iii) the superseding indictment does not broaden or substantially amend the original charges. ’ (Emphasis supplied.) Wooten v. State, 240 Ga.App. 725, 726(2)(a), 524 S.E.2d 776 (1999). See also Lee v. State, 304 Ga.App. 681, 682(1), 697 S.E.2d 221 (2010) ( reversed on other grounds , Lee v. State , 289 Ga. 95, 709 S.E.2d 762 (April 18, 2011)). Whether an amended indictment broadens or substantially amends the charges contained in the original indictment depends upon whether the new charges ‘contain elements that are separate and distinct’ from the original charges. Lee, supra, 304 Ga.App. at 682(1), 697 S.E.2d 221. In other words, we must examine whether the evidence used to prove the crimes charged in the original indictment would be adequate to prove the new crimes charged in the amended indictment. Id. at 683(1), 697 S.E.2d 221.” Here, adding charges of kidnapping and false imprisonment to burglary, robbery, assault and battery charges “substantially amended the original charges.” 2. Amendment as to minor victims was timely, however. 3. Adding charge of criminal attempt to commit burglary didn’t substantially amend original burglary charge. State v. Bair, 303 Ga.App. 183, 692 S.E.2d 806 (March 26, 2010). Trial court properly granted defendant’s plea in bar to