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indictment charging her with theft by taking; 1. “if it appears on face of indictment that statute of limitation has run, indictment is fatally defective and subject to demurrer, unless it alleges exception removing bar of statute,” citing State v. Barker, 277 Ga.App. 84, 87(3), 625 S.E.2d 500 (2005). Here, “the State did not allege in the [first] indictment that the statute of limitations was tolled for any reason.” 2. Trial court properly granted defendant’s plea in bar to second indictment based on statute of limitation; statute of limitation wasn’t tolled by first indictment which was fatally defective. Trial court had granted demurrer to first indictment alleging that defendant committed theft by taking “between the 1 st day of August, 1999, and the 1 st day of February, 2002.” Indictment was filed in June 14, 2005. Trial court granted the demurrer on grounds that some of the dates in question fell outside the four year statute of limitation for felony theft by taking. State then re-indicted, alleging 31 separate counts of theft by taking, and alleging that the new indictment was timely because the crimes were previously unknown. Second indictment was issued on June 10, 2008, well outside statute of limitation but within six months of the dismissal of the first indictment. Trial court found that that second indictment was barred by the statute of limitation, holding that the State couldn’t “renew” the first prosecution under OCGA § 17-3-3 because it was void. Court of Appeals agrees: “Because of the second indictment, we now know that, without question, the first indictment did not inform Bair of all the charges she must defend against at trial and was not specific enough to protect her from multiple prosecutions. The indictment apparently was intended to include 31 separate acts and to allege all events that occurred on 31 different dates, not one crime on one date. Moreover, the indictment did not inform Bair of the manner in which she was alleged to have committed the crimes. As in D'Auria [ v. State, 270 Ga. 499, 512 S.E.2d 266 (1999)] , we find that the first indictment was not sufficient to enable Bair to prepare for trial and respond to the charges against her, or to protect her against multiple prosecutions. The State cannot allege a single defective charge of theft by taking that may have been barred by the statute of limitation, and upon its dismissal, inflate that single, defective one count indictment to one alleging 31-counts. Therefore, no valid indictment was filed within four years of the date the alleged victim learned of Bair's actions, and the trial court did not err by granting Bair's plea in bar based on the statute of limitation. See Newsome v. State, [296 Ga.App. 490, 492-493(1), 675 S.E.2d 229 (2009)]. Moreover, this second indictment would impermissibly broaden and substantially amend the first indictment. See Wooten v. State, 240 Ga.App. 725, 726(2)(a), 524 S.E.2d 776 (1999).” Desalvo v. State, 299 Ga.App. 688, 683 S.E.2d 652 (August 13, 2009). Trial court erred by denying defendant’s plea in bar based on statute of limitations. State pled that four-year limitation for aggravated assault was tolled because perpetrator’s identity was unknown, but at hearing on defendant’s plea in bar, State failed to present any evidence supporting its contention. “See Jenkins v. State, 278 Ga. 598, 604(1)(B) (604 S.E.2d 789) (2004) (proper procedure for litigating plea in bar based upon statute of limitations analogous to a pretrial Jackson v. Denno [cit.] hearing); State v. Robins, 296 Ga.App. 437, 439 (674 S.E.2d 615) (2009) (burden unquestionably upon State to prove case properly falls within exception to statute of limitations). … [W]e agree with Desalvo that the State simply failed to carry its burden of proving the exception to the statute of limitations, and as a result, the charges against him should have been dismissed.” Duke v. State, 298 Ga.App. 719, 681 S.E.2d 174 (June 17, 2009). Prosecution of defendant’s rape charges was not barred by statute of limitations; where statute of limitation was changed after commission of offense but before previous limitation expired, application of the new limitation to defendant’s offense was not barred by Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S. or Georgia Constitutions. “A penal statute ‘enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution.’ Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544) (2003); 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law[,] § 224, p. 410 (a statute extending the period of limitations ‘applies to offenses not barred at the time of the passage of the act, so that a prosecution may be commenced at any time within the newly established period[ ] ... but cannot revive offenses that were barred at the time of its enactment’).” Here, “the evidence shows that on January 8, 2008, an indictment was returned charging Duke with the rape of his daughter, K.E., between January 1, 1992 and April 30, 1994. The victim was then between 13 and 15 years of age.” At that time the statute of limitation for forcible rape was seven years, but was changed to 15 years by statute enacted in 1996. Further, the trial court here “invoked the tolling provision set forth in OCGA § 17- 3-2.1: the limitations period within which a prosecution of the rape of a victim under 16 years of age must be commenced ‘shall not begin to run until the victim has reached the age of 16 or the violation is reported to a law enforcement agency ... whichever occurs earlier.’ OCGA § 17-3-2.1(a)(2) (tolling statute applies to any offense of forcible rape occurring on or after July 1, 1992). Given the foregoing, the trial court correctly concluded that the State had 15 years from the victim's 16th birthday on January 12, 1995, or until January 12, 2010 to prosecute the case. OCGA § 17-3-2.1. Since the indictment in this case was filed on January 8, 2008, the prosecution of Duke's case was within the statute of limitations and does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the Federal and Georgia Constitutions. See Stogner, supra, 539 U.S. at 608; Frazier [ v. State, 284 Ga. 638, 639(1) (668 S.E.2d 646) (2008)]; [ State v. Barker, 277 Ga.App. 84, 86(2) (625 S.E.2d 500) (2005)].” Accord, Flournoy v. State , 299 Ga.App. 377, 682 S.E.2d 632 (July 9, 2009) (similar