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facts). State v. Robins, 296 Ga.App. 437, 674 S.E.2d 615 (February 16, 2009). Trial court properly granted defendants’ plea in bar to charges of conspiracy to defraud the State and related offenses, based on running of statute of limitation; evidence supported finding that state/victim had actual knowledge of defendants’ fraudulent acts more than four years prior to filing of indictment. “The State points out that the test is whether the State had actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge, of the crime. See Beasley v. State, 244 Ga.App. 836, 838-839 (536 S.E.2d 825) (2000) ( State is not held to a ‘should have known’ standard). We agree. But in Holloman v. State, 133 Ga.App. 275, 280 (211 S.E.2d 312) (1974), the court held that lack of knowledge of the illegality of the act was not sufficient to toll the limitation period, but rather there must be lack of knowledge of the act itself . Id. at 280.” Accord, Bragg (June 26, 2015), above (victim’s knowledge of act, not illegality, triggers running of statute of limitation). State v. Campbell, 295 Ga.App. 856, 673 S.E.2d 336 (February 9, 2009). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s plea in bar; statute of limitation in theft cases runs from time of victim’s subjective knowledge of theft, regardless of whether victim should have known of the theft earlier. “Under OCGA § 17-3-1(c), a prosecution for felony theft by taking must commence within four years after the commission of the crime. However, under OCGA § 17-3-2(2), this statutory limit is tolled during any period in which ‘[t]he person committing the crime is unknown or the crime is unknown.’ The crime victim's knowledge of the crime is imputed to the State.” Although trial court found “that [the alleged thefts] could have easily been noticed by anyone paying attention that the defendant was continuously ‘double billing’ the company for the same expenses,” “this speculation misconstrues the burden on the State. The tolling period is not extinguished when the injured party should have known; rather, it ends when the injured party has actual knowledge of the crime.” Accord, Royal (February 7, 2012), above (statute began to run when insurance company was able to corroborate fraud tip, not upon receipt of tip); Kenerly v. State , 325 Ga.App. 412, 750 S.E.2d 822 (November 22, 2013) (Physical precedent only; statute of limitation on county commissioner’s charges of bribery and failure to disclose financial interest began when State had actual knowledge of offenses and the perpetrator, not when it “should have known” and not based on mere allegations of corruption.). State v. Conzo, 293 Ga.App. 72, 666 S.E.2d 404 (July 8, 2008). “The statute of limitations for a RICO violation, as stated in OCGA § 16-14-8, is five years. Adams v. State, 231 Ga.App. 279, 282(3) (499 S.E.2d 105) (1998). It is well established that ‘[t]he statute of limitations, unless suspended, runs from the last overt act during the existence of the conspiracy.’ Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (67 S.Ct. 224; 91 L.Ed. 196) (1946); Young v. State, 205 Ga.App. 357, 363(5) (422 S.E.2d 244) (1992).” Trial court here was authorized to find that acts committed pursuant to agreement with State – the only acts committed within five years of filing the indictment – were not “in furtherance of the conspiracy.” English v State, 288 Ga.App. 436, 654 S.E.2d 150 (October 25, 2007). Prosecution for felony theft by receiving was not barred by four-year statute of limitation. Theft occurred in early 2001; prosecution began in March 2006. “OCGA § 17- 3-1(c) provides, in pertinent part, that prosecution for felony theft must be commenced within four years after the crime is committed. This four-year requirement does not include any period in which the person committing the crime is unknown or the crime is unknown. OCGA § 17-3-2(2). In this case, deputies did not know until 2005 that English received the stolen washer, dryer or all-terrain vehicle. Because the statute was tolled during the period in which the person committing the crimes was unknown, the prosecution commenced in 2006 was not time-barred. See id.” Leachman v. State, 286 Ga.App. 708, 649 S.E.2d 886 (July 20, 2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s plea in bar; defendant could be prosecuted for felony vehicular homicide although statute of limitation had run on the predicate offense of DUI. “Georgia’s vehicular homicide statute does not require, as an essential element of the offense, that a defendant be charged with or convicted of the predicate offense.” Based on State v. Jones, 274 Ga. 287 (553 S.E.2d 612) (2001) ( felony murder prosecution not barred by running of statute of limitation on underlying felony ). Accord, Carder v. State , 327 Ga.App. 464, 759 S.E.2d 550 (June 4, 2014). Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (April 27, 2006). Full court opinion. Overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State , 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009). Indicted in 1998 for victim’s murder in 1990, defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant contends his conviction is barred by the four year statute of limitations for voluntary manslaughter. Held, defendant’s conviction does not violate the statute of limitations. “The flaw in Glidewell’s argument is that, in Georgia, ‘[t]he statute of limitations applicable in a criminal case is that which relates to the offense charged in the indictment, and not to any minor offense included therein of which the accused might be found guilty. The provisions of the statute of limitations applicable to an indictment for voluntary manslaughter