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will not bar a conviction of that offense under an indictment for murder; there being no statutory limitation as to indictments for murder.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Jones, 274 Ga. 287, 289(2) (553 S.E.2d 612) (2001). Accord Manning v. State, 123 Ga.App. 844(1)(b) (182 S.E.2d 690) (1971).” Overrules contrary ruling in McMillan v. State , 266 Ga.App. 729, 598 S.E.2d 17 (2004). State v. Barker, 277 Ga.App. 84, 625 S.E.2d 500 (December 20, 2005). When statute of limitation for rape was extended by legislative act in 1996, it applied to all acts committed prior to that time except acts as to which the statute of limitation had already run as of the effective date of the statute. “The great weight of authority is consistent with the general rule set forth in 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 224, p. 410: ‘Where a statute extends the period of limitation, the extension applies to offenses not barred at the time of the passage of the act, so that a prosecution may be commenced at any time within the newly established period. Such a statute, however, cannot operate to revive offenses that were barred at the time of its enactment, since that would make the statute ex post facto.’ [Cits.]” Prior seven-year statute of limitation expired in June, 1996; new 15-year statute of limitation went into effect July 1, 1996. New statute of limitation thus did not apply to defendant’s case, and 2003 rape indictment was thus barred. McKeehan v. State, 274 Ga.App. 14, 616 S.E.2d 489 (June 23, 2005). “[P]ursuant to OCGA § 17- 3-1(c.1)(3) a prosecution for rape ‘may be commenced at any time when deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence is used to establish the identity of the accused.’ ‘However, unless and until the [DNA] is matched to an actual person, it cannot be said that the police know who committed the crime.’ Beasley v. State, 244 Ga.App. 836, 840 (536 S.E.2d 825) (2000). Under OCGA § 17-3-2(2), the period of limitation is tolled during any period in which ‘[t]he person committing the crime is unknown or the crime is unknown.’ The key to determining when the statute of limitation begins to run is to find when the offender or offense became known. In so determining, ‘the knowledge of the victim of the crime is imputed to the State, and thus the crime becomes known to the State and the statute of limitation begins to run after it is known to the prosecutor or to the one injured by the offense. [Cits.]’ (Punctuation omitted.) Lee v. State, 211 Ga.App. 112 (438 S.E.2d 108) (1993). In a criminal case, where an exception is relied upon to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations, it must be alleged and proved. Moss v. State, 220 Ga.App. 150 (469 S.E.2d 325) (1996). Thus, the State was required to prove that the identity of the assailant was unknown during the tolled period, and ‘statute of limitation questions may properly be submitted to the jury for resolution.’ State v. Tuzman, 145 Ga.App. 481, 483(2) (243 S.E.2d 675) (1978).” Here, the investigating police officer testified that they could not identify the suspect, and the trial court properly submitted the limitations issue to the jury. Although Green argued that the victim knew him and that they had a consensual sexual relationship, the jury believed otherwise, as was their privilege.” The exception to the statute of limitation was properly pled where it was set out as a separate court of the accusation and incorporated by reference into each other count. Stack-Thorpe v. State, 270 Ga.App. 796, 608 S.E.2d 289 (December 8, 2004). “‘The key to determining when the statute of limitation begins to run is to find when the offender or offense became known,’ because the statute of limitation is tolled until the offense is discovered. (Citation omitted.) State v. Brannon, 154 Ga.App. 285, 286-287(2) (267 S.E.2d 888) (1980). In this case, it is undisputed that the embezzlement was not discovered until mid-July 2000, after Stack-Thorpe resigned. Because the State indicted Stack-Thorpe within four years of this date, the prosecution on the indictment was not time-barred.” Jenkins v. State, 278 Ga. 598, 604 S.E.2d 789 (November 8, 2004). 1. “We agree with the trial court’s ruling that the statute of limitations had run and was not tolled as to all the offenses but murder and felony murder. We conclude that the General Assembly intended for the ‘person unknown’ tolling exception to apply to a situation, as in Beasley [(July 7, 2000), below], where there is no identified suspect among the universe of all potential suspects. The tolling exception to the statute of limitations cannot be based upon the subjective opinion of the district attorney as to whether there was enough evidence to file charges against a particular person. Otherwise, there would be tolling of the statute of limitations for routine investigation into a crime; the State could build a case against a non-murder suspect for five or ten years and then file charges when it believes that it has obtained sufficient evidence by claiming that the statute of limitations was tolled until that moment. Such a broad interpretation of the tolling period would permit the exception to swallow the rule. The evidence shows that the State had actual knowledge of Jenkins’s identity as a suspect for the crimes shortly after they were committed, but it did not indict him until more than seven years had elapsed. [Cit.] Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on the dismissal of the non-murder charges due to the expiration of the statute of limitations.” Accord, State v. Boykin , 320 Ga.App. 9, 739 S.E.2d 16 (February 26, 2013) (indictment for rape and related offenses barred by statute of limitation; defendant was a suspect from night of offenses, but not indicted until DNA evidence obtained 17 years later). 2. Analogizing to a pre-trial Jackson-Denno hearing, Court concludes that, where trial court makes pre-trial determination that certain charge is barred by statute of limitations, “the charge should be dismissed; [cit.] if the State prevails on this