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issue before trial, the defendant may still require the State to prove at trial that the charge is not barred by the statute of limitations. [Cit.]” Zellars v. State, 278 Ga. 481, 604 S.E.2d 147 (October 12, 2004). Murder and related convictions affirmed; statute of limitation is waived if not raised at trial. Accord, Gordon v. State , 327 Ga.App. 774, 761 S.E.2d 169 (June 26, 2014). McMillan v. State, 266 Ga.App. 729, 598 S.E.2d 17 (March 11, 2004). 1. Defendant was indicted for felony theft by taking, but convicted of misdemeanor theft by taking. Because the last act of theft proven was more than two years prior to the return of the indictment, the prosecution was barred by the two-year statute of limitation for misdemeanors. Overruled by full-court opinion in Glidewell v. State (April 27, 2006) see above . 2. OCGA § 17-3-2(2) provides that the period within which prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which: … [t]he person committing the crime is unknown or the crime is unknown.” “The knowledge at issue … is the knowledge of the State, including that imputed to the State through the knowledge of the prosecution, the knowledge of someone interested in the prosecution, or the knowledge of one injured by the offense. [Cits.]’ Lowman v. State , 204 Ga.App. 655-656 (420 S.E.2d 94) (1992).” In defendant’s prosecution for practicing dentistry without a license, this included the patient; an investor who lent defendant money for his practice; the office of the Attorney General of Georgia; and the Georgia Board of Dentistry, all of whom were aware that defendant was practicing without a license more than two years prior to indictment. As all of the acts alleged occurred more than two years prior to indictment, the misdemeanor prosecution was barred by the statute of limitation. Tompkins v. State, 265 Ga.App. 760, 595 S.E.2d 599 (February 23, 2004). Seven-year statute of limitations for non- capital felonies committed against persons under age 14 years (OCGA § 17-3-1(c)) is a general limitation, not an exception to the general four-year limitation for other non-capital felonies; hence, it need not be expressly stated in the indictment to be applicable. Disapproves contrary language in Grizzard v. State , 258 Ga.App. 124, 572 S.E.2d 760 (2002). Affirmed, Tompkins v. State, 278 Ga. 857, 607 S.E.2d 891 (January 10, 2005). Bishop v. State, 261 Ga.App. 445, 582 S.E.2d 571 (June 2, 2003). “A prosecution ‘commences’ when a charging instrument, such as an accusation, indictment, or Uniform Traffic Citation (‘UTC’) is issued, and ‘continues until there has been a final disposition of the case.’” Since UTC was issued on date of offense, prosecution of defendant for DUI “commenced” at that time; subsequent indictment was not “commencement” of a new prosecution. Accord, Chism v. State , 295 Ga.App. 776, 674 S.E.2d 328 (January 28, 2009). State v. Thompson, 261 Ga.App. 828, 584 S.E.2d 7 (May 21, 2003). Accusation/citation was filed within two-year statute of limitation even if stamp was applied by solicitor, not clerk. “To file is to deliver the document to the clerk for the law to take its course thereafter.... [W]hether the accusations were stamped by the solicitor’s office or the clerk’s office or entered in the computer system is not relevant.” Cochran v. State, 259 Ga.App. 130, 575 S.E.2d 901 (January 9, 2003). Misdemeanor accusation was filed a few days before two-year statute of limitation ran. A few days after statute ran, supporting affidavit was filed for purposes of issuing arrest warrant (OCGA § 17-7-71(a)). Held, prosecution commenced with filing of accusation, and thus statute of limitation was not violated. Carroll v. State, 252 Ga.App. 39, 554 S.E.2d 560 (August 28, 2001). On May 24, 1996, one day after police issued traffic citations to Defendant, the citations were filed in the Atlanta City Court. On July 10, 1998, the State filed accusations for the same offenses. Held, a uniform traffic citation serves as an accusation in any court having jurisdiction over the offense, except superior court; thus, because the July 1998 accusations were based on the same conduct as the original citations, of which there had been no final disposition, and were a continuation of the prosecution of those citations, the trial court correctly found that the state began prosecuting Defendant within the two-year limitation period. Although the better practice is to admit the uniform traffic citations into evidence, the arresting officer’s testimony that, on May 23, 1996, he arrested and charged Defendant with DUI is sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the crimes were prosecuted within the two-year limitation period. Accord, Prindle (September 28, 1999), below. Beasley v. State, 244 Ga.App. 836, 536 S.E.2d 825 (July 7, 2000). Burglary conviction affirmed; statute of limitation was properly tolled. “Under OCGA § 17-3-2(2), however, the statute is tolled during any period in which the ‘person committing the crime is unknown.’” Contrary to defendant’s argument, perpetrator isn’t known “simply because [State] lifts a fingerprint from the crime scene, even though the fingerprint is not matched to the defendant until