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several years later.” “[Defendant] contends that the State should be charged with knowledge of his identity because it did not exercise reasonable diligence in analyzing the fingerprint. Had it used reasonable diligence, Beasley claims, it would have discovered his identity earlier.[fn] In making this argument, Beasley is urging that we interpret OCGA § 17-3-2(2) as applying a constructive knowledge or ‘should have known’ standard. [fn: See Borders v. Bd. of Trustees, &c., 231 Ga.App. 880, 881, 500 S.E.2d 362 (1998) (‘With constructive knowledge, the issue is not what [they] actually knew, but what they should have known.’). ] Beasley cites no cases holding that the statute applies such a constructive knowledge standard, nor are we aware of any. To the contrary, all the cases applying the statute have done so in the context of actual knowledge. [fn] Although Beasley cites cases from other states applying a constructive knowledge standard in determining whether a statute of limitation has expired, these cases generally apply statutes that expressly incorporate such a standard. [Cits.] The Georgia statute, by contrast, does not expressly incorporate such a standard. It states that the statute of limitation does not run while the person who committed the crime is ‘unknown’ – it does not say ‘and could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.’” Distinguished in Jenkins (November 8, 2004), above. Long v. State, 241 Ga.App. 370, 526 S.E.2d 875 (December 8, 1999). Convictions for child molestation and related offenses affirmed; evidence supported finding that prosecution was begun within statute of limitation. “Under OCGA § 17-3-1(c), prosecution for felonies committed against victims who are, at the time of the crime, under age fourteen, must commence within seven years after commission of the crime.” Hall v. State, 241 Ga.App. 454, 525 S.E.2d 759 (November 19, 1999). Defendant’s Medicaid fraud conviction affirmed; charges were not barred by statute of limitation, as the crime was “unknown” until discovered by a Medicaid investigator several months after improper bills were submitted by defendants. “OCGA § 17-3-2(2), … provides that the limitation period does not include time during which ‘the crime is unknown.’ The knowledge at issue is that of the State, including ‘that imputed to the State through the knowledge not only of the prosecution, but also includes the knowledge of someone interested in the prosecution, or injured by the offense. [Cits.]’ (Punctuation omitted.) Greenhill v. State, 199 Ga.App. 218, 221(6), 404 S.E.2d 577 (1991). Hall acknowledges that such an issue is appropriate for jury consideration, as he requested. State v. Tuzman, 145 Ga.App. 481, 482(2), 243 S.E.2d 675 (1978). Viewed under the standard set out above, the evidence showed that the victim was the Department of Medical Assistance. [Investigator] Pitts was investigating another psychologist for Medicaid fraud when he became aware that there were questions regarding Hall. While Hall contended that EDS [an electronic billing service] had all the information necessary to know about the crime, the EDS representative testified that EDS did not audit the claims, but merely processed them. EDS knew nothing about [defendant’s practice] or the types of services being rendered. It was only when Pitts interviewed Dr. Hall … that Pitts became aware that the number of client contacts necessary to have billed the amounts Hall billed was not possible and the investigation began in earnest.” Wooten v. State, 240 Ga.App. 725, 524 S.E.2d 776 (November 8, 1999). Indictment for misdemeanors was timely filed, though outside two year statute of limitation, where a timely accusation for same offenses was already pending. “[A] superseding indictment brought after the statute of limitation has run is valid as long as (i) the original indictment is still pending; (ii) the original indictment was timely; and (iii) the superseding indictment does not broaden or substantially amend the original charges.” “[T]he rule should apply to accusations as well since Georgia law allows misdemeanor charges to be brought by either accusation or indictment. See OCGA § 17-7-71(a). The original accusation was timely and still pending when the indictment was filed after the statute of limitation had expired. The indictment only duplicated the original misdemeanor charges and did not amend or broaden them. Although the indictment included a felony charge, such did not amend or broaden the misdemeanor charges. See United States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 644, 649 (11th Cir., 1985). The felony indictment was within the applicable statute of limitation period of four years. OCGA § 17-3-1(c). Accordingly, we hold that the misdemeanor charges are not barred by the statute of limitation.” Accord, Lee (May 11, 2010), above; Outen (October 20, 2014), above. Prindle v. State, 240 Ga.App. 461, 523 S.E.2d 44 (September 28, 1999). DUI conviction affirmed; filing of Uniform Traffic Citations with Atlanta City Court timely commenced prosecutions for statute of limitation purposes, regardless of the solicitor’s later filing of accusations arising out of the same conduct. Accord, Carroll (August 28, 2001), above. MM. VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION Aguirre v. State, 329 Ga.App. 53, 763 S.E.2d 511 (September 10, 2014). Evidence supported conviction for felony obstruction despite defendant’s claim that “he was too intoxicated from consuming alcohol to know that he was being engaged by a police officer when he charged and swung at Officer Stafford. … Aguirre's argument that he was too intoxicated to be convicted is unavailing, because ‘[v]oluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act or