☢ test - Í

omission.’ OCGA § 16–3–4(c). Aguirre does not argue, nor is there evidence, that his intoxication was involuntary. See also Carter v. State, 248 Ga.App. 139, 140–141(2), 546 S.E.2d 5 (2001) (sufficient evidence to convict of obstruction despite intoxication).” Kansas v. Cheever, 12-609, ___ U.S. ____, 134 S.Ct. 596, 187 L.Ed.2d 519 (December 11, 2013). Reversing Kansas Supreme Court’s reversal of Cheever’s murder conviction. Following Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 423–424, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987). Under Buchanan , “a State may introduce the results of a court-ordered mental examination for the limited purpose of rebutting a mental-status defense” without violating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Cheever presented expert testimony in support of a voluntary intoxication defense ; trial court properly allowed State to present, in rebuttal, evidence of defendant’s court-ordered evaluation. 1. “ The rule of Buchanan, which we reaffirm today, is that where a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to commit an offense, the prosecution may present psychiatric evidence in rebuttal. [Cit.] Any other rule would undermine the adversarial process, allowing a defendant to provide the jury, through an expert operating as proxy, with a one-sided and potentially inaccurate view of his mental state at the time of the alleged crime.” 2. “[W]hile as Cheever notes, the mental evaluation in Buchanan was requested jointly by the defense and the government, our holding was not limited to that circumstance. Moreover, contrary to Cheever's suggestion, the case did not turn on whether state law referred to extreme emotional disturbance as an ‘affirmative defense.’ Buchanan, 483 U.S., at 408, 422, 107 S.Ct. 2906 (holding that the prosecution's use of rebuttal expert testimony is permissible where a defendant ‘presents psychiatric evidence’).” 3. “Mental-status defenses include those based on psychological expert evidence as to a defendant's mens rea, mental capacity to commit the crime, or ability to premeditate.” Thus, Kansas Supreme Court’s holding that Buchanan didn’t apply because voluntary intoxication isn’t a “mental disease or defect” (as defined in state law) is incorrect, as is its suggestion that Buchanan wouldn’t apply to a “temporary” condition. Buchanan applied the rule to extreme emotional disturbance. Dillard v. State, 323 Ga.App. 333, 744 S.E.2d 863 (June 19, 2013). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; contrary to defendant’s argument, jury could find criminal intent despite defendant’s extreme intoxication. “While voluntary intoxication does not excuse a criminal act, OCGA § 16–3–4(c), Dillard argues correctly that evidence of intoxication can disprove the hypothesis of specific intent based on circumstantial evidence. See Ely v. State, 159 Ga.App. 693, 285 S.E.2d 66 (1981) (evidence sufficient for jury to find defendant capable of forming specific intent to commit crimes despite conflicting evidence of intoxication). Whether the evidence disproves the hypothesis of specific intent or not, however, is a jury question, Connor v. State, 268 Ga. 656, 657(1), 492 S.E.2d 669 (1997), and this jury decided that in this case evidence of intoxication did not disprove intent.” Anderson v. State, 319 Ga.App. 701, 738 S.E.2d 285 (February 6, 2013). Criminal trespass conviction affirmed; jury charge on voluntary intoxication was correct statement of law, while defendant’s charge request on the subject wasn’t. Court’s correct charge: “Georgia law provides that voluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act. It further provides that if a person's mind when not affected by intoxicants is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong as well as of reasoning and acting rationally and the person voluntarily deprives herself of reason by consuming intoxicants and commits a criminal act while under the influence of such intoxicants, the person is criminally responsible for such acts to the same extent as if the person were sober. Whether or not the defendant in this case was voluntarily intoxicated at or during the time alleged in this accusation is a matter solely for you, the jury, to determine.” Defendant’s incorrect request: “If the influence of alcohol (drugs or narcotics) impairs a person's mind to the extent that the person is not able to form the intent to do the act charged, that person would not be criminally responsible for the act. Whether that is true is a question for you, the jury, to decide. Whether the defendant in this case was voluntarily intoxicated, at or during the times alleged in this indictment, is a matter solely for you, the jury, to decide.” “[I]t has been held that a charge similar to the one requested by Anderson is ‘misleading, to the extent that it implies that voluntary intoxication in and of itself may be a defense to a crime.’ Williams v. State, 180 Ga.App. 854, 855(2), 350 S.E.2d 837 (1986), citing Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 831, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981); see Foster [ v. State, 258 Ga. 736, 374 S.E.2d 188 (1988)]. The evidence showed that Anderson voluntarily consumed alcohol; and her ability after the night of the incident to recall events from that evening, as evidenced by her apology to the business owner two days later and by her testimony at trial, show that any alteration of Anderson's brain function that night was not more than temporary.” Hall v. Lewis, 286 Ga. 767, 692 S.E.2d 580 (March 22, 2010). Grant of habeas petition as to defendant’s malice murder conviction reversed; defendant’s claim of voluntary intoxication fails as a defense under these facts. “The habeas court found that evidence of intoxication ‘would have contradicted the State's claim that the killing was premeditated.’