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However, ‘[p]remeditation is not an element of murder’ in Georgia. Doss v. State, 262 Ga. 499, 501(4) (422 S.E.2d 185) (1992). What is required is a showing of an intent to kill, which is an essential element of both murder and voluntary manslaughter. Nance v. State, 272 Ga. 217, 221(3) (526 S.E.2d 560) (2000). ‘To establish a voluntary intoxication defense, [Lewis] would have had to show that the intoxication had “resulted in the alteration of brain function so as to negate intent. Even then, the brain function alteration must be more than temporary.” [Cits.]’ Bright v. State, 265 Ga. 265, 273(2)(e) (455 S.E.2d 37) (1995). Lewis has entered no evidence in the habeas record that would support such a voluntary intoxication defense. To the extent that the habeas court concluded that evidence of Lewis' intoxication would have supported the theory of voluntary manslaughter, the habeas court erred as a matter of law. Showing that a defendant was intoxicated and ‘killed another in passion would not reduce the crime from murder to [voluntary] manslaughter.’ Bradberry v. State, 170 Ga. 859, 870(9) (154 SE 344) (1930). The provocation required to mitigate malice is that which would arouse a heat of passion in a reasonable person. If voluntary intoxication were to have the effect of rendering an individual unreasonably subject to provocation, the offense would not be reduced to voluntary manslaughter. See Partridge v. State, 256 Ga. 602, 604(4) (351 S.E.2d 635) (1987).” Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 690 S.E.2d 406 (March 1, 2010). Defendant’s voluntary intoxication presented no defense to his convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault. “[I]t has long been solidly established that ‘[v]oluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act or omission,’ OCGA § 16-3-4(c), except in the extreme situation where the intoxication ‘has resulted in the alteration of brain function so as to negate intent,’ and ‘[e]ven then, the brain function alteration must be more than temporary,’ Horton v. State, 258 Ga. 489, 491 (371 S.E.2d 384) (1988). See Bright v. State, 265 Ga. 265, 273-274 (455 S.E.2d 37) (1995) (viable voluntary intoxication defense requires evidence of ‘permanent brain function alteration’). In this case, there was no evidence of brain damage, temporary or permanent.” Accord, Dailey v. State , 313 Ga.App. 809, 723 S.E.2d 43 (January 31, 2012) (“[Defendant] has cited no evidence that his intoxicated state was involuntary; nor has he cited any evidence that his intoxication resulted in any permanent brain function alteration.”); Anderson (February 6, 2013), above; Ashley v. State , 331 Ga.App. 794, 771 S.E.2d 462 (March 30, 2015) ( cert. granted on a different issue, case no. S15G1207, September 8, 2015. ). Sermons v. State, 294 Ga.App. 293, 669 S.E.2d 210 (October 29, 2008). At Sermons’s burglary trial, his “voluntary intoxication did not excuse his criminal behavior. See OCGA § 16-3-4(c); Nash v. State, 166 Ga.App. 533, 535(1) (304 S.E.2d 727) (1983). Sermons failed to present a viable voluntary intoxication defense since there was no evidence that ‘the intoxication altered his brain functioning so as to negate intent and that the alteration was more than temporary.’ (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Smith v. State, 276 Ga.App. 41, 42 (622 S.E.2d 413) (2005).” Mathis v. State, 241 Ga.App. 869, 528 S.E.2d 293 (January 19, 2000). Aggravated assault and firearm convictions affirmed; jury instruction on voluntary intoxication defense was correct statement of law. “In Horton v. State, 258 Ga. 489, 491(8), 371 S.E.2d 384 (1988), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that voluntary intoxication was not a defense to a crime unless the intoxication resulted in altering brain function so as to negate intent, and even then the alteration must be more than temporary. Mathis offered no evidence at trial concerning such permanent alteration of his brain function. The trial court charged the jury carefully that intent was an essential element of the state's case and that the state was required to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt. When considered in conjunction with this charge on intent, the trial court's charge on voluntary intoxication was correct and sufficient. Sydenstricker v. State, 209 Ga.App. 418, 419-420(2), 433 S.E.2d 644 (1993).” Charge given here : “our law provides that voluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act. It provides further that if a person's mind when not affected by intoxicants is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong as well as reasoning and acting rationally and the person voluntarily deprives himself of reason by consuming intoxicants and while under the influence of such intoxicants the person commits a criminal act, the person is criminally responsible for such acts to the same extent as if the person were sober. Whether or not the defendant in this case was voluntarily intoxicated at or during the time alleged in the indictment is a matter solely for you, the jury, to determine.” “Although it is otherwise with regard to involuntary intoxication, the law in this state is that ‘voluntary intoxication does not excuse criminal responsibility. [Cit.]’ Massey v. State, 270 Ga. 76, 78(4), 508 S.E.2d 149 (1998).” Knight v. State, 271 Ga. 557, 521 S.E.2d 819 (October 18, 1999). Trial court properly charged jury on defense of voluntary intoxication where “Knight's own trial testimony was that he smoked crack cocaine,” along with other evidence. Rattansay v. State, 240 Ga.App. 165, 523 S.E.2d 36 (September 28, 1999). 1. Defendant’s rape conviction upheld, despite defendant’s voluntary intoxication defense. “Rattansay asserts that the state failed to prove intent, arguing that his voluntary intoxication precluded him from forming the requisite intent. For voluntary intoxication to negate intent, a