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defendant must show that the intoxication altered his brain functioning so as to negate intent and that the alteration was more than temporary. Peters v. State, 224 Ga.App. 837, 838(1), 481 S.E.2d 898 (1997). Although Rattansay testified that he consumed large amounts of alcohol and drugs the night before the incident, he failed to show that the consumption affected his ability to distinguish right from wrong and that his brain function was more than temporarily altered. See Couch v. State, 229 Ga.App. 151(1), 493 S.E.2d 577 (1997).” 2. “Rattansay complains that the trial court's charge was not clear on the issue of whether voluntary intoxication can be considered a defense to a crime. Rattansay contends the trial court's instruction that voluntary intoxication is not an excuse for any criminal act conflicted with its instruction that voluntary intoxication can be a defense if it negates intent. This enumeration presents no grounds for reversal. The trial court's instruction that voluntary intoxication is not an excuse for any criminal act is a correct statement of the law. OCGA § 16-3-4(c); Sydenstricker v. State, 209 Ga.App. 418, 420(2), 433 S.E.2d 644 (1993). The second part of the instruction, that voluntary intoxication can be a defense, is also correct although … voluntary intoxication is a defense only when such intoxication has caused an alteration of brain function so as to negate intent and that alteration is more than temporary. Jones v. State, 234 Ga.App. 571, 572(2), 507 S.E.2d 804 (1998). The trial court's instruction would have been more clear had it included this limitation in its charge. But because there was no evidence of brain alteration in this case, the language which would have clarified the rule would not have been favorable to Rattansay. Indeed, the court's failure to include the limitation in its charge was favorable to Rattansay. Because Rattansay has failed to show how he was harmed by the charge, reversal is not required. Sheriff v. State, 197 Ga.App. 143, 145(5)(b), 397 S.E.2d 732 (1990).” NN. WAIVER Walker v. State, 330 Ga.App. 872, 769 S.E.2d 602 (March 3, 2015). Superior court had jurisdiction to accept defendant’s guilty plea to felony obstruction; prosecution was properly transferred from juvenile court. Walker could still appeal issue despite guilty plea, however . “If the superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter its judgment on Walker's guilty plea, his claim under OCGA § 17–7–50.1 was not waived and the judgment of conviction on his plea could be vacated. See Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 533 (710 S.E.2d 667) (2011).” Record supported finding that transfer was proper and extension of time to indict properly granted. State v. Cusack, 296 Ga. 534, 769 S.E.2d 370 (February 16, 2015). Following guilty plea to aggravated stalking and related offenses, habeas court erred in granting defendant’s second petition for relief. “Cusack filed a second habeas petition on April 12, 2013, citing State v. Burke, 287 Ga. 377, 379 (795 S.E.2d 649) (2010), for the proposition that ‘a single violation of a protective order, alone, simply does not establish “a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior,”[Cit.],’ id., and claiming that his aggravated stalking conviction was based solely on a single violation of a protective order, and therefore is void. The habeas court granted Cusack relief, finding that the aggravated stalking charge was, in fact, based solely on a single act of sending a letter contrary to a court order, and that the misdemeanors of criminal damage to property in the second degree were treated as crimes separate from the aggravated stalking charge.” Generally, “under OCGA § 9–14–51, ‘[a]ll grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus shall be raised by a petitioner in his original or amended petition. Any grounds not so raised are waived unless the Constitution of the United States or of this state otherwise requires or unless any judge to whom the petition is assigned, on considering a subsequent petition, finds grounds for relief asserted therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition.’” Habeas court here found that Cusack couldn’t have raised Burke in his previous petition because Burke was decided after the first petition was filed. However, Burke didn’t represent a substantive change in the law relating to aggravated stalking: “not only after, but also before this Court's opinion in Burke issued, Cusack could not have been convicted of aggravated stalking based solely upon a single violation of a protective order; the authority on that point was clear. … Indeed, before Cusack pled guilty in 2006, this Court noted that to establish the crime of aggravated stalking, the State must ‘prove a “knowing and willful course of conduct.” [And,] [a] “course of conduct” refers to a series of successive actions, and, as such, is equivalent to a “pattern of behavior.”’ Daker v. Williams, 279 Ga. 782, 785 (621 S.E.2d 449) (2005).” Furthermore, even if Burke represented a change in the law, it was decided when Cusack’s first habeas petition was still pending, and “he certainly could have amended the petition to timely include such an argument. This Court has stated that a habeas petitioner has an ‘unfettered right to amend’ his petition at any time before the hearing on the issues presented therein. Nelson v. Zant, 261 Ga. 358, 359(2) (405 S.E.2d 250) (1991). See also Jarrell v. Zant, 248 Ga. 492(n.1) (284 S.E.2d 17) (1981).” Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 710 S.E.2d 667 (May 6, 2011). Vacating defendant’s guilty plea to aggravated assault. “In this case of first impression, we are called upon to interpret the provisions of OCGA § 17–7–50.1(a), establishing a time limit for the presentment of a juvenile's case to a grand jury in superior court. Because the State failed to meet the time limit for presenting the case to the grand jury, the case should have been returned to the juvenile court. The