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superior court as a result lacked jurisdiction to entertain a guilty plea, and we therefore vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for transfer to the juvenile court.” “The plain language of the statute provides that a child within superior court jurisdiction ‘ shall within 180 days of the date of detention be entitled to have the charge against him or her presented to the grand jury.’ (Emphasis supplied.) The statute further provides that the case ‘ shall be transferred to the juvenile court’ if an indictment is not obtained within the specified time. (Emphasis supplied.)” Issue was not waived by defendant’s guilty plea: “As recognized in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628) (1974), an unconditional guilty plea does not preclude appeal of a claim of error grounded upon the right not to be haled into court at all, that is, jurisdictional and generally double jeopardy-type errors. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hooten v. State, 212 Ga.App. 770–771(1) (442 S.E.2d 836) (1994). Because the superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter its judgment on Hill's guilty plea, his claim under OCGA § 17–7–50.1 was not waived and the judgment of conviction on his plea should be vacated. Cf. State v. Sullivan, 237 Ga.App. 677 (516 S.E.2d 539) (1999) (indictment properly quashed when jurisdiction not in superior court due to delayed entry of transfer order.)” Contrary to State’s argument, “the statute plainly adopts the date of detention, not the date of transfer [of the case to superior court], as the point from which the time is calculated, and it explicitly applies whether the child is initially subject to the jurisdiction of the superior court through committing an enumerated offense, OCGA § 15–11–28, or via a transfer to superior court after a petition and hearing, 15–11–30.2. OCGA § 17–7–50.1(a).” Accord, Walker (March 3, 2015), above (guilty plea didn’t waive issue of proper transfer, which is jurisdictional). Regent v. State, 306 Ga.App. 616, 703 S.E.2d 81 (October 27, 2010). Convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery affirmed; defendant waived argument that the two offenses merged for sentencing by pleading guilty. Accord, Carson v. State , 314 Ga.App. 225, 723 S.E.2d 516 (February 17, 2012) (Physical precedent only); Osborne v. State , 318 Ga.App. 339, 734 S.E.2d 59 (November 5, 2012). This line of cases overruled, Nazario v. State , 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (July 11, 2013). Payne v. State, 276 Ga.App. 577, 623 S.E.2d 668 (October 27, 2005). Defendant waived claim of right to continuance (due to amendment of accusation) by entering guilty pleas to charges. Ramsey v. State, 267 Ga.App. 452, 600 S.E.2d 399 (May 17, 2004). “‘A knowing and voluntary plea of guilty acts as a waiver of all defenses, known and unknown,’ Brown v. State , 261 Ga.App. 448, 449, 582 S.E.2d 588 (2003),” including, here, venue. “See also OCGA § 17-2-4 (defendant wishing to plead guilty may waive venue).” New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 120 S. Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (January 11, 2000). Reversing New York Court of Appeals; trial court properly determined that defendant’s right, under Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), to trial within 180 days was waived when counsel agreed to later trial date. Hill was serving time in Ohio when produced for trial in New York on murder and related charges. After disposition of defense motions, counsel appeared in court to set a trial date; counsel on both sides agreed to a certain date, but prior to trial the defense moved for dismissal “arguing that the IAD's time limit had expired.” The trial court found that “the 180 day time period had indeed expired,” but “the trial court concluded that ‘[d]efense counsel's explicit agreement to the trial date set beyond the 180-day statutory period constituted a waiver or abandonment of defendant's rights under the IAD.’” U.S. Supreme Court agrees with trial court; contrary to defendant’s argument, right to timely trial under the IAD is waivable by counsel. “No provision of the IAD prescribes the effect of a defendant's assent to delay on the applicable time limits. We have, however, ‘in the context of a broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions,’ articulated a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-201, 115 S.Ct. 797, 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995), and we have recognized that ‘[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are ... subject to waiver,’ Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991).” “What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue. … For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (right to counsel); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) (right to plead not guilty). For other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action of counsel. ‘Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer has – and must have – full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.’ Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-418, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). As to many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the trial, the defendant is ‘deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have “notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.”’ Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326, 25 L.Ed. 955 (1880)). Thus, decisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what arguments to pursue, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983), what evidentiary objections to raise, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379