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of other drugs.’ [fn]” State v. Rish, 295 Ga.App. 815, 673 S.E.2d 259 (January 14, 2009). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress; although trial court correctly ruled that officer lacked probable cause for DUI-less safe arrest, officer had probable cause to arrest for DUI-per se. “The record shows that Rish admitted having had three to four drinks prior to driving and that he had consumed the last of those approximately thirty minutes before the traffic stop. Additionally, two alco-sensor tests administered to Rish showed that he had a blood alcohol concentration of greater than 0.08 grams. These facts established a reasonable probability that Rish was in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(5) and gave Morgan probable cause to arrest him. See Lenhardt [ v. State, 271 Ga.App. 453, 454(1), 610 S.E.2d 86 (2005)] (police may use results of alco-sensor tests ‘in determining whether probable cause exists to arrest a motorist suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. [Cit.]’); Kellogg v. State, 288 Ga.App. 265, 270(2), 653 S.E.2d 841 (2007) (in determining probable cause in a DUI-per se case, factors to be considered may include the suspect's admission to drinking and the results of an alco-sensor test).” The suggestion here that the numerical result of an alco-sensor test may be used to support probable cause to arrest is a novel holding, not supported by the authorities cited or any others. State v. Norris, 281 Ga.App. 193, 635 S.E.2d 810 (August 18, 2006). Trial court properly suppressed results of alco- sensor tests given after defendant was under custodial arrest, where neither Miranda nor implied consent warnings were given, and officer knowingly misled defendant by telling him that he had to take the tests. “In Turrentine v. State, 176 Ga.App. 145 (335 S.E.2d 630) (1985), we found OCGA § 40-6-392 inapplicable to alco-sensor test results because they are not used ‘as evidence of the amount of alcohol or drug in a person’s blood,’ Id. at 146(1) (emphasis in original) as specified in OCGA § 40-6-392(a), but instead are used ‘as an initial screening device to aid the police officer in determining probable cause to arrest a motorist suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol.’ Id. In contrast, OCGA § 40-5-55 applies to chemical tests of the ‘blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or any other drug.’ OCGA § 40-5-55(a) (emphasis supplied). Thus, it does apply to an alco-sensor test.” Questions holdings of cases stating that post-arrest field sobriety evaluations require Miranda warnings, e.g., Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571(2), 436 S.E.2d 475 (1993); Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222, 224- 225(3), 498 S.E.2d 262 (1998); and State v. O'Donnell, 225 Ga.App. 502, 504(2), 484 S.E.2d 313 (1997). “Other decisions of both the Supreme Court and this court call into question the accuracy of that view. See Cooper v. State, [277 Ga. 282, 290, 587 S.E.2d 605 (2003)] (Georgia Constitution does not protect citizens from compelled blood or breath testing or from use of results of compelled testing at trial); Hughes v. State, 259 Ga. 227, 228(2)(b) (378 S.E.2d 853) (1989) (Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution has no application to results of field sobriety tests because they are not evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature); Keenan v. State, supra, 263 Ga. at 572 (OCGA § 24-9-20 inapplicable to alco-sensor field sobriety test because defendant was not charged in a criminal proceeding at the time he was asked to take test); Nawrocki v. State, 235 Ga.App. 416, 417(1) (510 S.E.2d 301) (1998) (use of a substance naturally excreted by human body does not violate defendant’s right against self-incrimination under Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI of the Ga. Const.). In any event, if Norris had not been placed under custodial arrest, it would appear that he would not have had a right to refuse to perform the alco-sensor test.” Capps v. State, 273 Ga.App. 696, 615 S.E.2d 821 (June 16, 2005). Trial court did not err in allowing officer to testify to numerical value of the alco-sensor test where, on cross, defendant testified to his belief as to that value. “During cross- examination, Capps testified that he believed he had passed the alco-sensor test and that after he blew in to the machine he saw the number and ‘it was below the legal limit.’ The State then asked Capps if he actually saw the number and Capps said ‘I saw .06.’” Trial court correctly held that this opened the door to the officer’s testimony, offered for impeachment, that the number was in fact .089. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga.App. 426, 602 S.E.2d 177 (July 9, 2004). Defendant’s refusal to submit to alco-sensor testing was admissible without laying foundation for admissibility of the alco-sensor itself. Hawkins v. State, 240 Ga.App. 144, 522 S.E.2d 704 (September 23, 1999). Trial court “erroneously allowed testimony of the alco-sensor results without first requiring the foundation described in Aman v. State, 223 Ga.App. 309, 310(1), 477 S.E.2d 431 (1997). But the totality of the evidence in the case sub judice renders it highly probable that this did not affect the probate court's findings. The error is therefore not reversible. [Cits.].” Heller v. State, 234 Ga.App. 630, 507 S.E.2d 518 (October 5, 1998). “ Turrentine v. State, 176 Ga.App. 145, 335 S.E.2d 630 (1985) … teaches that the alco-sensor ‘is used as an initial screening device to aid the police officer in determining probable cause to arrest a motorist suspected of” DUI. Id. at 146, 335 S.E.2d 630. It is not used to