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determine the amount of alcohol in a person’s blood, id., and it is impermissible to testify to the results of an alco- sensor test giving a numeric reading as to the amount of alcohol in the person’s blood .” “After describing the field sobriety evaluations, [Officer] Bowman testified that a second alco-sensor test was done, ‘trying to give the driver every benefit of the doubt.’ He testified that ‘[t]he results on the alcosensor were positive, which indicated possible impairment to the extent that he was a less than safe- .’ At that point, Heller objected and requested a mistrial, interrupting Bowman’s testimony. The trial court disagreed with Heller’s statement that Bowman had testified impermissibly and stated, ‘I heard him say that he had a positive alcosensor result, which again indicated to him that the driver might possibly be impaired. I see nothing wrong with that testimony.’ We agree with the trial court. The jury was never told that the alco-sensor measured the amount of alcohol in Heller’s blood, or even that a numeric reading could be obtained from an alco-sensor. Bowman’s testimony did not violate Turrentine . ” Accord, Hopkins v. State , 283 Ga.App. 654, 642 S.E.2d 356 (February 21, 2007); Trull v. State , 286 Ga.App. 441, 649 S.E.2d 571 (July 9, 2007) (trial court properly prevented defense from offering evidence of alco-sensor numeric reading). Knapp v. State, 229 Ga.App. 175, 493 S.E.2d 583 (November 5, 1997). “[W]here the testimony offered by the State is that the alcosensor showed evidence of alcohol on the defendant’s breath, the cases are consistent in that, at a minimum, the officer administering the test must testify that he used ‘a device of a design approved by the Director of the Division of Forensic Sciences’ of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation. Rule 92-3-.06(3), Rules of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation; Aman v. State, 223 Ga.App. 309, 310(1), 477 S.E.2d 431 (1996); Ronskowsky v. State, 190 Ga.App. 147, 148(2), 378 S.E.2d 185 (1989); Gray [v. State, 222 Ga.App. 630, 476 S.E.2d 12 (1996)]; Turrentine [ v. State, 176 Ga.App. 145, 146, 335 S.E.2d 630 (1985)].” B. CHILD ENDANGERMENT Monahan v. State, 292 Ga.App. 655, 665 S.E.2d 387 (July 10, 2008). Rule of lenity doesn’t require merger of convictions for less-safe DUI and DUI-child endangerment. ““The rule of lenity applies where two or more statutes prohibit the same conduct while only differing with respect to their prescribed punishments. According to the rule, where any uncertainty develops as to which penal clause is applicable, the accused is entitled to have the lesser of the two penalties administered.” Henry v. State, 284 Ga.App. 893, 894 n. 2 (645 S.E.2d 32) (2007) (citations and punctuation omitted). In the instant case, however, the two Code provisions at issue do not prohibit the ‘same conduct’ because endangering a child by DUI requires an additional element of ‘transporting in a motor vehicle a child under the age of 14 years.’ OCGA § 40-6-391(1); compare Dixon v. State, 278 Ga. 4 (596 S.E.2d 147) (2004). Moreover, there is no uncertainty as to which penal clause is applicable. The Code provision proscribing child endangerment by DUI expressly sets forth the applicable penal clause. OCGA § 40-6-391(l) (pertinently stating, ‘An offender who is convicted of a violation of [this offense] shall be punished in accordance with the provision of subsection (d) of Code Section 16-21-1, relating to the offense of contributing to the delinquency, unruliness, or deprivation of a child’).” Slayton v. State, 281 Ga.App. 650, 637 S.E.2d 67 (September 22, 2006). Express language of OCGA § 40-6-391(l) prohibits merger of DUI and child endangerment convictions. C. CITATION, ISSUANCE OF State v. Cooper, 271 Ga.App. 771, 611 S.E.2d 90 (February 24, 2005). Where there was no accident and no officer observed defendant driving, trial court properly concluded that OCGA § 17-4-23(a) prohibits officer from charging defendant with DUI (or any other traffic offense) by citation without custodial arrest. Trial court thus properly dismissed citation for DUI where record did not affirmatively show that defendant was arrested at time citation was issued. “To issue a citation under OCGA § 17-4-23(a), either the arresting officer must witness the act constituting the offense, or another officer who observed the offense must convey the information to the arresting officer, ‘except that, where the offense results in an accident, an investigating officer may issue citations regardless of whether the offense occurred in the presence of a law enforcement officer.’ In the case at bar, the offense did not result in an accident, and the information regarding Cooper’s erratic driving came from another motorist, not another officer. It appears, therefore, that the trial court correctly determined that his arrest was invalid under OCGA § 17-4-23(a).” Court of Appeals notes that officer could have effected custodial arrest of defendant pursuant to OCGA § 17-4-20, as probable cause for DUI arrest clearly existed; but record does not show that such an arrest took place, so trial court’s ruling must be presumed to be correct. Court of Appeals suggests that State can cure this defect by re-arresting defendant, since jeopardy hasn’t attached. D. DEFENSES