☢ test - Í

London v. State, 289 Ga.App. 17, 656 S.E.2d 180 (December 14, 2007). In defendant’s DUI prosecution, defendant was not entitled to charge on justification where he didn’t admit the offense, instead contesting the State’s claim that he was impaired. “See Smith v. State, 250 Ga.App. 532, 535(1) (552 S.E.2d 499) (2001) (defendant’s DUI violation not justified by alleged attack on defendant by another motorist, where defendant was DUI before alleged attack that caused him to strike utility pole); Buckalew [ v. State, 249 Ga.App. 134, 138(5) (547 S.E.2d 355) (2001)] (justification charge not warranted in boating under the influence prosecution where there was no evidence of imminent danger to anyone’s safety); Moon [ v. State, 244 Ga.App. 443, 446(3) (535 S.E.2d 771) (2000)] (justification charge not warranted where defendant’s decision to take truck to get to clinic for his methadone treatment, after suffering heroin withdrawal, was not only option available to him). But see Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605 (409 S.E.2d 513) (1991) (in prosecution for habitual violator based on driving without a license, justification charge warranted where evidence showed that defendant drove because his wife was experiencing labor pains and could not drive herself).” Crossley v. State, 261 Ga.App. 250, 582 S.E.2d 204 (May 13, 2003). DUI and reckless driving convictions affirmed. Trial court “correctly ruled Crossley’s involuntary intoxication defense irrelevant and inadmissible” at defendant’s DUI trial. “Crossley concedes that the defense of involuntary intoxication requires a showing that the perpetrator lacked the ability to distinguish right from wrong as to the criminal act in issue. Thus, on appeal, he acknowledges that the defense of involuntary intoxication is one involving issues of mental competence, in effect, temporary insanity,” citing “ Gibson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 773, 774-775(1)(b), 516 S.E.2d 816 (1999) (jury instruction on OCGA § 16-3-4 charges defense of insanity by involuntary intoxication); see also Rauschenberg v. State, 161 Ga.App. 331(1), 291 S.E.2d 58 (1982) (defendant relying upon involuntary intoxication defense bears burden of rebutting, by a preponderance of the evidence, presumption of sanity). While we have held that temporary insanity is a recognized defense in Georgia, Jackson v. State, 149 Ga.App. 253, 253 S.E.2d 874 (1979), ‘[e]vidence that the defendant does not remember, or was in a “blanked out” state of mind during the commission of the acts charged, is insufficient to raise the issue of insanity.’ (Citations omitted.) Id. at 256, 253 S.E.2d 874.” Directly conflicts with Colon (July 12, 2002), below. Mueller v. State, 257 Ga.App. 830, 572 S.E.2d 627 (August 30, 2002). On prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, defendant was not entitled to cross-examine officer on why he didn’t investigate the possibility that defendant was under the influence of drugs. “Impairment from both alcohol and drugs is not a defense to a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. Nor does proof that one was under the influence of drugs negate the fact that he was also impaired by alcohol. The court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Mueller's cross-examination of the officer.” Colon v. State, 256 Ga.App. 505, 568 S.E.2d 811 (July 12, 2002). DUI and related traffic convictions reversed. Trial court committed reversible error by charging jury that “[t]he defense of involuntary intoxication is not available to excuse driving under the influence.” “This charge contained the clearly erroneous statement that involuntary intoxication was not available as an affirmative defense to driving under the influence. See Larsen v. State, 253 Ga.App. 196, 198(1), 558 S.E.2d 418 (2002); Flanders v. State, 188 Ga.App. 98, 371 S.E.2d 918 (1988); accord Commonwealth v. Darch, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 713, 767 N.E.2d 1096 (2002). This declarative assertion by the trial judge was straightforward and unambiguous.” Error wasn’t cured by the court’s next statement, “[involuntary intoxication] absolves responsibility only if the intoxication renders the defendant incapable of distinguishing right from wrong.” Defendant here “raised the issue of involuntary intoxication in his testimony when he claimed that someone put an unknown drug in his drink, unbeknownst to him. See Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 409 S.E.2d 513 (1991).” E. DISCOVERY 1. DISCOVERY GENERALLY Massey v. State, 331 Ga.App. 430, 771 S.E.2d 122 (March 20, 2015). Interlocutory appeal in DUI prosecution. Trial court correctly ruled that defendant who refused implied consent testing wasn’t entitled to discovery pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(4) concerning blood test obtained by forced draw pursuant to search warrant. “The ‘full information’ provisions of OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(4) have been construed to grant discovery of the test results generated by a gas chromatography instrument used to test for blood alcohol concentration, including the right to obtain instrument printouts, memos, notes, graphs, and other data relied on by the State Crime Lab employee to generate the test results. Price [ v. State, 269 Ga. 222, 224, 498 S.E.2d 262 (1998)]; Townsend v. State, 236 Ga.App. 530, 532, 511 S.E.2d 587 (1999). The production of discovery granted under OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(4) may be obtained by subpoena or by a request directed to the State. Cottrell v. State, 287 Ga.App. 89, 90–91, 651 S.E.2d 444 (2007). But discovery pursuant to OCGA § 40–6– 392(a)(4) is expressly limited by the terms of subsection (a)(4) to ‘the person who shall submit to a chemical test or tests at the request of a law enforcement officer....’ … Because Massey refused to submit to the chemical testing requested by the arresting officer pursuant to OCGA § 40–5–55, he was excluded from the discovery provisions of OCGA § 40–6–