☢ test - Í

manuals, service manuals and records, records of other tests run on the same machine, calibration records, service records, and numerous other items. 1. Test result is only discoverable information from intoxilyzer. “Unlike the gas chromatography test, which produces data that has to be interpreted by a chemist to determine blood alcohol level, an intoxilyzer does not produce raw data but rather prints out the actual test result showing the person's blood alcohol level. In other words, the machine computes the test result. Therefore the only discoverable information from an intoxilyzer test under OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(4) is the computer printout of the test result. [fn: We come to this conclusion with regard to OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(4) only and do not determine the scope of discoverable information sought by subpoena. ] ” Accord, Holowiak v. State , 308 Ga.App. 887, 709 S.E.2d 887 (March 29, 2011). 2. Defendant’s request was overbroad. “[W]e also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Stetz's discovery request because it was overbroad. Generally, the trial court has discretion to deny a request that is unreasonable. See Townsend v. State, 236 Ga.App. 530, 533(3), 511 S.E.2d 587 (1999) (under OCGA § 24-10-22(b)(1) court has right to quash or modify subpoena that is unreasonable and oppressive).” “Stetz's requests are oppressive and seek information far beyond the scope of information to which he was entitled under OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(4). See, e.g., Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 796(9)(a), 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983) (in murder case, request for statistical information on any and all homicides within city limits overbroad). And we decline to create a rule requiring a trial court or an appellate court to cull an overly broad and oppressive request in order to tease out any portions that might be relevant and discoverable, particularly when the appealing party has not made such a request.” Accord, Jacobson v. State , 306 Ga.App. 815, 703 S.E.2d 376 (November 16, 2010) (trial court properly refused “to admit maintenance logs showing when the Intoxilyzer 5000 used to conduct his breath test was taken out of service.”) Rosandich v. State, 289 Ga.App. 170, 657 S.E.2d 255 (January 11, 2008). Defendant requested “full information” regarding his breath test, but did not demand it after trial court suppressed the test results. At trial, however, the court admitted the test results to impeach defendant’s testimony about the amount he’d had to drink and its effect on him. Held, defendant was not entitled to exclusion of the evidence on discovery grounds when he never brought it to the trial court’s attention before trial. “Rosandich produced no evidence of bad faith. Moreover, he did not allege a discovery violation prior to trial or seek a discovery ruling, and the trial court never entered an order requiring production of the materials. Rosandich commenced trial without any reference to the discovery issue, and he did not request a trial continuance to pursue further discovery relating to the test results, which only became admissible after he opened the door to impeachment. He also presented no argument below that this purported discovery violation prejudiced his defense. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the results, despite the State’s failure to produce the requested information. [fn: We need not decide, and thus do not consider, whether the extensive materials requested by Rosandich properly fell within the scope of OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(4). ] Id. It follows that the trial court properly denied Rosandich’s motion for mistrial and motion for new trial on this same ground. See Thrasher v. State, 261 Ga.App. 650, 652(2) (583 S.E.2d 504) (2003) (where evidence properly admitted, trial court does not err in denying motion for mistrial based on admission of that evidence).” Cottrell v. State, 287 Ga.App. 89, 651 S.E.2d 444 (August 1, 2007). No discovery violation: defendant agreed to implied consent testing, but Intox 5000 attempts were unsuccessful because the machine detected an interferent. Defendant then agreed to a blood test. In discovery, defendant sought information about the interferents that obstructed the breath test, on the theory that they might have affected the blood test results. However, “Golz, the toxicologist who performed the blood test, testified at the motion hearing that to the best of his knowledge no compound could be confused for ethyl alcohol by the blood gas chromotogram. Golz was also unable to confirm that any interferent detected on the Intoxilyzer 5000 could also have an effect on a blood test using a gas chromatograph machine. Thus, Cottrell did not demonstrate any relationship between the interferents detected by the Intoxilyzer 5000 and the blood test. Cottrell was not entitled to discovery of material beyond the data relied on by the crime laboratory chemist to pursue a ‘fishing expedition’ to establish such a relationship. See Eason v. State, 260 Ga. 445, 447 n. 2 (396 S.E.2d 492) (1990), overruled in part, State v. Lucious, 271 Ga. 361, 365(4)(b) (518 S.E.2d 677) (1999); Bazemore v. State, 233 Ga.App. 892, 893(2) (506 S.E.2d 177) (1998) (defendant not entitled to unlimited access to chemist’s work product or to embark on unlimited fishing expedition as part of document subpoena).” Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Cottrell’s request for full information to the material conceded by the state to be discoverable.” Braswell v. State, 281 Ga.App. 500, 636 S.E.2d 689 (September 7, 2006). No error where trial court refused “to exclude evidence of his breath test results because the State failed to comply with the discovery provisions of OCGA § 17-16- 23(b).” Evidence of scientific tests was not formally tendered as part of discovery, but was previously tendered at motion to suppress hearing, and counsel was able to thoroughly cross-examine the officer on the documents and present argument thereon. Yet counsel made no effort to obtain formal discovery, opting instead to wait until the trial jury was impaneled,