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then moving to exclude the evidence. “‘The law does not favor exclusionary rules; they hinder the search for truth.’ Mowery [ v. State, 234 Ga.App. 801, 802 (507 S.E.2d 821) (1998)]. As in Mowery, Braswell’s ‘counsel was not seeking to avoid surprise or prepare for trial. The timing of his motion, which was made after the jury was sworn, demonstrates it was made as part of a strategy to ambush or trap the State.’ Id. In view of the conduct of Braswell’s counsel, the earlier availability of the documents, and his failure to request a continuance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude the test results. Id. at 803.” Birdsall v. State, 254 Ga.App. 555, 562 S.E.2d 841 (March 28, 2002). “Does a trial court commit reversible error when it permits an expert to testify, over objection, to the results of a defendant’s chemical test, when the state has failed to furnish the test data underlying those results, and the data were properly requested pursuant to OCGA §§ 40-6-392(a)? The answer is: not always.” Because the data sought are not “scientific reports” within the meaning of OCGA §§ 17-16- 23, the penalties imposed under that code section don’t apply. OCGA §§ 40-6-392(a)(4) entitles a defendant to “full information concerning the test,” but “specifies no deadline for requesting ‘full information,’ no timetable for supplying the information, and no penalty for the state’s failure to produce it.” In appropriate circumstances, exclusion of the test results might be an appropriate penalty, e.g., upon a showing of bad faith, diligent effort by the defendant to obtain it, or willful refusal to produce the information despite court order to do so. Here, none of those apply, and the trial court’s refusal to exclude the evidence is not an abuse of discretion. Sillman v. State, 247 Ga.App. 681, 545 S.E.2d 85 (January 24, 2001). The Defendant demanded a jury for his charge of DUI, and requested from the State copies of any custodial statements and scientific reports. When the case was called for trial, the Defendant asserted that he had not received the State’s response to his discovery request until the preceding day. The Defendant on appeal objects, stating that because he did not receive a copy of the breath test results at least ten days before trial, the trial court erred in admitting it into evidence. The officer who administered the breath test testified that he gave the defendant a copy of the test printout at the time of his arrest and advised him to keep it just in case he decided to hire a lawyer. Held, as defendant has already been provided with a copy of the test results, he was not harmed by any failure by the State to provide the same pursuant to discovery. Bazemore v. State, 244 Ga.App. 460, 535 S.E.2d 830 (June 13, 2000). In DUI prosecution, trial court erred by quashing defense subpoena to GBI Crime Lab; certain requested documents were relevant, while others weren’t. 1. Matters regarding testing and training manuals and “written techniques, methods, or procedures” were deemed relevant in prior appearance of this case, and thus not revisited here. 2. Permits and other records relating to the specific person and specific machine employed to test defendant’s blood, weren’t shown to be relevant. While the State must prove the drawer’s qualifications at trial, “the State may prove the qualifications in ways other than introducing permits or certifications of the person who drew the blood. [ Bazemore v. State , 225 Ga.App. 741, 741-742(1), 484 S.E.2d 673 (1997)]. The same applies to certification that the machine was fully configured and operating properly. Id. at 744(2), 484 S.E.2d 673. Given that the State need not introduce the various permits and certifications that Bazemore sought, Bazemore has not shown that these documents are sufficiently relevant to be discovered.” Prindle v. State, 240 Ga.App. 461, 523 S.E.2d 44 (September 28, 1999). Breath test results were properly admitted in defendant’s DUI prosecution. 1. “[Intoximeter] [c]ertificates of inspection are not discoverable as scientific reports under OCGA § 17-16-23. Renschen v. State, 225 Ga.App. 678, 679(3), 484 S.E.2d 753 (1997).” 2. “HGN test results are discoverable as scientific reports. Rayburn v. State, 234 Ga.App. 482, 484(2), 506 S.E.2d 876 (1998). Because Prindle requested but was not provided a copy of the report, the officer's testimony regarding the report should have been excluded. Id. at 485, 506 S.E.2d 876; OCGA § 17-16-23(c). Harmless error, however, because defendant was charged and convicted on per se DUI, not less safe DUI. Townsend v. State, 236 Ga.App. 530, 511 S.E.2d 587 (February 4, 1999). Trial court erred (but harmless error) in quashing defendant’s subpoena for records relating to his implied consent blood test. “In pertinent part, OCGA § 40-6- 392(a)(4) provides that ‘[u]pon the request of the person who shall submit to a chemical test or tests at the request of a law enforcement officer, full information concerning the test or tests shall be made available to him or his attorney.’ This discovery rule, which is consistent with the broad right of cross-examination provided in OCGA § 24-9-64, grants broader discovery rights than did earlier criminal discovery procedures which allowed discovery of only written scientific reports. See Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222, 224(2), 498 S.E.2d 262 (1998). Thus, as a general rule, a defendant now has the right to subpoena memos, notes, graphs, computer printouts, and other data relied upon by a state crime lab chemist in obtaining gas chromatography test results. Id. However, a trial court has discretion to quash an unreasonable and oppressive subpoena, and abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard of review in such situations. OCGA § 24-10-