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Gantt v. State, 263 Ga.App. 102, 587 S.E.2d 255 (September 8, 2003). Accusation charging defendant with violating OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(2), DUI-drug, was not subject to demurrer for failing to specify the drug. “‘OCGA § 17-7-71(c) provides that every accusation which states the offense in the terms and language of the law ... shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Broski v. State, 196 Ga.App. 116, 395 S.E.2d 317 (1990). We have held that simply reciting the statute violated, although not desirable, is sufficient to meet the requirements of OCGA § 17-7-71(c).” Even if error, it was harmless: “Gantt herself was in the best position to know which drug or drugs she had ingested, and she was therefore not prejudiced or misled.” Accord, Buchanan v. State , 264 Ga.App. 148, 589 S.E.2d 876 (November 14, 2003). Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398, 517 S.E.2d 53 (June 1, 1999). 1. OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6), making it per se illegal to operate a moving vehicle with any amount of marijuana metabolite in one’s system, does not violate equal protection “because the statute singles out for punishment unimpaired drivers with low levels of marijuana metabolites in their body fluids, despite the fact that these drivers pose no threat to traffic safety, the purpose of the DUI statute. [Defendant] contends that there is no rational basis for treating unimpaired drivers with marijuana metabolites differently from other unimpaired drivers.” Supreme Court disagrees, based on evidence presented in trial court about the length of time metabolites stay in a user’s system, and the length of time a user remains impaired after use; evidence supports finding that the statute bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. “ Through the enactment of a per se prohibition against driving after using marijuana, the General Assembly has acted to shield the public from the potential dangers presented by persons who drive while experiencing the effects of marijuana. In effect, the General Assembly has determined that ‘there is no level of illicit drug use which can be acceptably combined with driving a vehicle; the established potential for lethal consequences is too great.’ State v. Phillips, 178 Ariz. 368, 873 P.2d 706, 710 (App. 1994). See also People v. Fate, 159 Ill.2d 267, 201 Ill.Dec. 117, 636 N.E.2d 549 (1994) (the flat prohibition against driving with any amount of controlled substance in one's system was a valid exercise of the police power since it bore a rational relationship to the interests sought to be protected and the means adopted were a reasonable method to accomplish the objective). By enacting OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6), the legislature has made it easier for persons to ‘understand and accept that they are legally unable to drive if they consume virtually any amount of [marijuana]....’ Barnett v. State, [270 Ga. 472, 472-473, 510 S.E.2d 527 (1999)]. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no merit to [defendant’s] first equal protection challenge.” 2. OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6) violates equal protection to the extent that it differently classifies legal and illegal users of marijuana. If driver has used marijuana illegally, State must prove only that he had metabolites in his system; but if use was legal, State must show impairment. Cites to legal use in foreign countries such as the Netherlands, and uses permitted under Georgia law such as medical treatment and research. “In light of … the fact that the effects of legally-used marijuana are indistinguishable from the effects of illegally-used marijuana, we are unable to hold that the legislative distinction between users of legal and illegal marijuana is directly related to the public safety purpose of the legislation. … Accordingly, we conclude that the distinction is arbitrarily drawn, and the statute is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.” Accord as to alprazolam (Xanax), Sandlin v. State , 307 Ga.App. 573, 707 S.E.2d 378 (January 19, 2011). Doesn’t apply to reckless driving, however, see Ayers v. State , 272 Ga. 733, 534 S.E.2d 76 (September 11, 2000). Cronan v. State, 236 Ga.App. 374, 511 S.E.2d 899 (February 9, 1999). According to the language of OCGA § 40-6- 391(a)(6), “marijuana” includes “the metabolites and derivatives thereof,” which would include THC. “Indeed, since THC in the blood or urine is the method by which the presence of marijuana is detected for purposes of determining whether one is driving under the influence thereof, THC must be considered ‘marijuana’ in order for OCGA § 40-6- 391(a)(6) to even be actionable.” Thus, the definition of marijuana for purposes of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6) is different from the definition under OCGA § 16-13-21(16), which expressly excludes “tetrahydrocannabinol samples which do not contain plant material exhibiting the external morphological features of the plant cannabis.” “Obviously, the ‘morphological features’ of the plant, itself, will never be present in the blood or urine.” Bowen v. State, 235 Ga.App. 900, 510 S.E.2d 873 (January 7, 1999). “‘[T]he mere fact that a defendant has ingested marijuana is not sufficient to support a conviction under OCGA § 40-6- 391(a)(2), because that statute does not prohibit driving after ingesting any quantity of drugs.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) [ Webb v. State, 223 Ga.App. 9, 476 S.E.2d 781 (1996).] In that regard, evidence which only shows that a defendant’s eyes were ‘red and glassy, and he had an odor of [marijuana] about his breath’ is insufficient to support a conviction for driving under the influence to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive. Clay v. State, 193 Ga.App. 377, 379(2), 387 S.E.2d 644 (1989). Compare Gilbert v. State, 262 Ga. 840, 841(1), 426 S.E.2d 155 (1993) (evidence reflected more than defendant’s intoxicated state, including the fact that his car ‘left the roadway at a curve, knocked down several mailboxes, and crossed a private drive before landing nose first in [a] ditch’). In this case, the State’s evidence that Bowen was impaired as a result of ingesting