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marijuana consisted of Trooper Jones’ testimony that Bowen had red, glassy eyes and red eyelids at the time he was stopped and that he admitted to having smoked marijuana earlier that evening. Trooper Jones did not testify that Bowen’s speech was slurred, that he was staggering, that he failed any field sobriety tests or that there was anything unusual or erratic about his driving. Thus, this evidence alone is insufficient to sustain a less safe driver conviction. See Clay, supra .” Conviction reversed. H. EVIDENCE, GENERALLY See also WITNESSES – EXPERTS, below, and other subheadings under DUI: DRIVING/PHYSICAL CONTROL; LESS SAFE; PER SE, etc. Collins v. State, 327 Ga.App. 590, 760 S.E.2d 606 (June 17, 2014). DUI conviction affirmed; defendant’s contentions that Intoxilyzer test results were improperly admitted were moot where trial court merged per se conviction into less safe conviction and “specifically held that the breath-alcohol concentration evidence did not affect the court's finding of guilt on the count of DUI less safe. … Compare Kitchens v. State, 258 Ga.App. 411, 415(1), 574 S.E.2d 451 (2002) (possible harm shown where ‘trial court, sitting without a jury, specifically relied on the [blood alcohol] test results in reaching its conclusion that [defendant] was a less safe driver’).” Smith v. State, 324 Ga.App. 100, 749 S.E.2d 395 (October 3, 2013). DUI conviction reversed on other grounds, but, given that defendant was only charged with DUI-alcohol at trial, trial court properly granted State’s motion in limine as to defendant’s blood test showing absence of marijuana in her system shortly after arrest. Although defendant was previously charged with driving under the combined influence of alcohol and drugs, that charge was nolle prossed before trial; she only faced a less safe-alcohol charge at trial. “While Smith elicited testimony from the officers establishing that some of her manifestations of impairment indicated drugs instead of alcohol and some indicated impairment from either substance, the issue before the fact-finder was only whether she was under the influence of alcohol to the extent she was a less safe driver, not whether she might have also ingested drugs. The blood test she obtained after she was released from jail shed no light on her alcohol impairment, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it.” Defendant sought to admit the evidence “to cast doubt upon the reliability of the officers' field sobriety evaluations and ability to detect whether a driver was impaired.” Jacobson v. State, 306 Ga.App. 815, 703 S.E.2d 376 (November 16, 2010). Defendant’s DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly refused “to admit maintenance logs showing when the Intoxilyzer 5000 used to conduct his breath test was taken out of service. … Intoxilyzer 5000 maintenance logs are not even relevant enough to be discoverable pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(4). Stetz v. State , 301 Ga.App. 458, 687 S.E.2d 839 (2009).” Brogdon v. State, 287 Ga. 528, 697 S.E.2d 211 (July 12, 2010). Affirms 299 Ga.App. 547, 550-551 (683 S.E.2d 99) (2009), holding that hospital records are not “private papers” exempt from subpoena by the State in a criminal prosecution (such as defendant’s prosecution for DUI and related offenses). Announces new rule for determining whether documents are private papers, replacing test enunciated in Sears v. State, 262 Ga. 805 (426 S.E.2d 553) (1993) (holding that “private papers” are those covered by a privilege such as the attorney-client privilege). New interpretation: OCGA § 17-5-21(a)(5) “exempted from a search warrant’s coverage … those papers that belonged to the accused or were, at the least, in his possession” and which “constituted tangible evidence of the crime for which probable cause had been shown” but not those which were “instrumentalities of a crime” under OCGA § 17-5-21(a)(1). When the statute was enacted in 1966, “the use of a person's private papers to convict the person of a crime was seen as the equivalent of ‘forcible and compulsory extortion of a [person]'s own testimony’ and was forbidden by the Fifth Amendment's right against compulsory self-incrimination. Boyd v. United States, [116 U.S. 616, 630 (68 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746) (1886)]. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was ‘designed to prevent the use of legal process to force ... the accused individual ... to produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might incriminate him.’ United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542) (1944).” “Since the medical records that were the subject of the search warrant in the case at bar were neither the personal property of appellant nor were they seized from his possession, they did not constitute the ‘private papers’ that are exempt from coverage of a search warrant in Georgia under OCGA § 17-5-21(a)(5).” Simmons v. State, 281 Ga.App. 252, 635 S.E.2d 849 (August 23, 2006). Defendant could be convicted of DUI while driving a golf cart. “[T]he DUI statute by its plain language applies to ‘any moving vehicle,’” motorized or non- motorized. “A ‘vehicle’ is defined in OCGA § 40-1-1(75) to mean ‘every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.’ This Court has already determined that a golf cart is a ‘vehicle’ within the meaning of OCGA § 40-1-1(75), citing Coker v. State , 261 Ga.App. 646, 583 S.E.2d 498 (2003).” Defendant contends the golf cart is an “off-road vehicle” as