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defined in OCGA § 40-7-4; without deciding whether this is correct, Court of Appeals notes that “nothing in the off-road vehicle statutes exempts the drivers of such from the scope of OCGA § 40-6-391(a),” especially since “[u]nder OCGA § 40-6-3(a)(3), the provisions of OCGA § 40-6-391 apply anywhere in Georgia, whether on a street, highway, or private property. See, e.g., Madden v. State, 252 Ga.App. 164, 166(2) (555 S.E.2d 832) (2001) (the DUI statute ‘draws no distinction between driving on public roads versus private thoroughfares’; further, the fact that the act was committed on private property does not give immunity from prosecution for this crime); Jones [ v. State, 206 Ga.App. 604, 605(2) (426 S.E.2d 179) (1992)] (‘the scope of the [DUI statute] is not limited to highways, ... but applies elsewhere throughout the state’) (citation omitted).” Drogan v. State , 272 Ga.App. 645, 613 S.E.2d 195 (April 6, 2005). No abuse of discretion where trial court cut off defense cross-examination of officer on “other DUI arrests he had made of other defendants and whether certain manifestations, such as glassy or bloodshot eyes, were present in a large percentage of them.” “Although a defendant is entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, OCGA § 24-9-64, ‘[w]ithin carefully protected legal parameters, the scope of cross-examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court; this discretion will not be disturbed by an appellate court absent manifest abuse. Basically, the confrontation clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way and to whatever extent [ ] the defense might wish.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Battaglia, 221 Ga.App. 283, 284-285(1), 470 S.E.2d 755 (1996).” Accord, Schlanger v. State , 290 Ga.App. 407, 659 S.E.2d 823 (March 21, 2008) (Physical precedent only; trial court properly curtailed defendant’s cross-examination of arresting officer on a different DUI charge against a different, unrelated driver, intended to show “that the officer was overzealous in prosecuting those individuals whom he stopped for driving under the influence.”). Horne v. State, 237 Ga.App. 844, 517 S.E.2d 74 (April 29, 1999). DUI conviction affirmed. Trial court properly admitted evidence of “both of the sequential test results from the Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test into evidence. OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(1)(B) provides, in pertinent part: ‘In all cases where the arrest is made on or after January 1, 1995, and the state selects breath testing, two sequential breath samples shall be requested for the testing of alcohol concentration. For either or both of these sequential samples to be admissible in the state's ... case-in-chief, the readings shall not differ from each other by an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.020 grams and the lower of the two results shall be determinative for accusation and indictment purposes and administrative license suspension purposes.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the statute, itself, clearly contemplates the admission of both sequential test results, and the trial court did not err.” Accord, State v. Kruzel , 261 Ga.App. 90, 581 S.E.2d 711 (May 1, 2003). I. FIELD SOBRIETY EVALUATIONS See also subheadings HGN and MIRANDA , below 1. GENERALLY Partridge v. State, 266 Ga.App. 305, 596 S.E.2d 778 (March 17, 2004). Where defendant convicted and sentenced on per se DUI (after merging less-safe conviction), erroneous failure to suppress field sobriety results was harmless error. “A conviction under OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(5) does not require the state to prove impaired driving ability. [Cit.] Thus, even if the results of the field sobriety tests should have been excluded, it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.” 2. PERFORMANCE Rowell v. State, 312 Ga.App. 559, 718 S.E.2d 890 (November 15, 2011). DUI and weaving convictions affirmed; no error in admission of HGN and one-leg stand tests in motion hearing. “Rowell's conclusory argument regarding the HGN test does not support the exclusion of the test results. She makes no attempt to show that the flaws she alleges in the administration of the HGN test go to anything other than the weight to be accorded the results. Similarly, Rowell's arguments concerning the proper administration of the one-leg-stand test when she was in high heels goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. See Stewart v. State, 280 Ga.App. 366, 368–369(2) (634 S.E.2d 141) (2006). Thus, the trial court was entitled to consider the results of these tests in ruling upon the motion to suppress.” Stewart v. State, 280 Ga.App. 366, 634 S.E.2d 141 (July 10, 2006). Officer’s lack of NHTSA certification did not make field sobriety results inadmissible under Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982). “Stewart failed to cite any authority requiring that an officer be NHTSA-certified before administering field sobriety evaluations. Because Officer Adair’s testimony demonstrates that he had NHTSA-specific training and extensive experience in performing these tests, we conclude that his lack of NHTSA certification is not a ground for excluding the field sobriety evidence in this case. Moreover, this Court has held that the walk-and-turn test and the one-leg stand test are not subject to the