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requirements of Harper to determine their admissibility . Hawkins v. State, 223 Ga.App. 34, 36(1) (476 S.E.2d 803) (1996). Accordingly, Stewart’s arguments regarding the proper administration of these tests go to the weight of the evidence from these tests and not to its admissibility. See Keller v. State, 271 Ga.App. 79, 81(2) (608 S.E.2d 697) (2004); Hawkins, 223 Ga.App. at 36(1).” Accord, State v. Smith , 329 Ga.App. 646, 765 S.E.2d 787 (November 14, 2014) (physical precedent only). Keller v. State, 271 Ga.App. 79, 608 S.E.2d 697 (December 1, 2004). “At the hearing on Keller’s motion to suppress, Trooper Hales testified that he had been trained in field evaluation standards. While he testified that he deviated from these standards in evaluating Keller, he also stated that the tests he used and the standardized evaluations are ‘[e]ssentially the same thing.’ Therefore, contrary to Keller’s argument, evidence of Hales’ failure to fully comply with guidelines does not destroy the probative value of the tests and render them inadmissible; instead, it affects only the weight and credibility of the behavioral observations made by the officer. [Cit.] And here, in conformity with Hawkins [ v. State , 223 Ga.App. 34, 476 S.E.2d 803 (1996)], the court expressly found that the tests administered by Hales, ‘even though [ ] administered in a slightly different form,’ appeared to substantially comply with the requirements.” Mullady v. State, 270 Ga.App. 444, 606 S.E.2d 645 (November 15, 2004). “[T]he ‘walk and turn test’ is a ‘physical dexterity exercise[ ] that common sense, common experience, and the “laws of nature” show [is] performed less well after drinking alcohol,’ and that evidence of the physical manifestations of impairment determined by the ‘walk and turn’ test would not be held to the standard of admissibility enunciated in Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 524 (292 S.E.2d 389) (1982),’” quoting Hawkins v. State , 223 Ga.App. 34, 36, 476 S.E.2d 803 (1996). Cantwell v. State , 230 Ga.App. 892, 497 S.E.2d 609 (March 5, 1998). Trial court properly refused to allow cross- examination of officer on NHTSA standards for field sobriety evaluations where the state did not rely on those standards or tenders the officer as an expert witness. “[I]f the State chooses to have the officer testify as a lay witness and describe the actions of the defendant in performing simple exercises such as the ‘leg lift’ and ‘walk and turn’ without referring to any ‘points’ system or using the words ‘pass’ or ‘fail,’ cross-examination on NHTSA procedures is irrelevant, regardless of whether the officer is trained in them or not.” Same holds true for failure to follow instructions on HGN, but not for results of HGN – see James v. State, 260 Ga.App. 536, 580 S.E.2d 334 (March 26, 2003). Hawkins v. State , 223 Ga.App. 34, 476 S.E.2d 803 (October 1, 1996). DUI and related convictions affirmed; contrary to defendant’s assertion, basic sobriety tests such as the walk and turn, leg left, and reciting alphabet are not scientific tests subject to Harper analysis, but rather “are physical dexterity exercises that common sense, common experience, and the ‘laws of nature’ show are performed less well after drinking alcohol. The screening of these gross motor skills is hardly the type of ‘scientific principle or technique’ to which Harper referred , and this Court will not hold these physical manifestations of impairment, which could be as obvious to the layperson as to the expert, to such a standard of admissibility. Harper, supra at 524, 292 S.E.2d 389; State v. Pastorini, 222 Ga.App. 316, 474 S.E.2d 122 (1996); Crawford v. City of Forest Park, 215 Ga.App. 234, 450 S.E.2d 237 (1994); accord Mendoza v. State, 196 Ga.App. 627, 630, 396 S.E.2d 576 (1990) (Deen, P. J., concurring specially). Appellant's contentions regarding the subjective nature of the evaluation of these tests would be fodder for cross-examination, but would not impact on the validity of the tests, themselves, in detecting impairment. Pastorini, supra. Thus, the trial court in the case sub judice did not err in allowing the officer to testify regarding these field sobriety tests without first requiring expert testimony as a foundation for admission.” State v. Leviner, 213 Ga.App. 99, 443 S.E.2d 688 (April 19, 1994). Officer was not required to advise driver that participation in field sobriety evaluations is voluntary. “The trial court granted [defendant’s] motion to exclude the field sobriety tests holding that his rights under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI were violated when he was compelled to give self-incriminating testimony when directed to perform certain field sobriety tests without being informed that the taking of such tests was voluntary. This state constitutional right is embodied in OCGA § 24-9-20. Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718, 728(7), 230 S.E.2d 1 (1976). The factual determination that [defendant] was directed to perform these tests is supported by evidence. However, we further find that [defendant] was not in custody at the time he was required to take the field sobriety tests. ‘[T]here was no violation of [defendant’s] right not to incriminate himself under the fifth amendment, the Georgia Constitution [Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI, Ga. Const. of 1983], or OCGA § 24-9-20, because he was not in custody at the time the field sobriety test was administered.’ Lankford v. State, 204 Ga.App. 405, 406(2), 419 S.E.2d 498 [(1992)], cert. denied 506 U.S. 1051, 113 S.Ct. 972, 122 L.Ed.2d 127 [(1993)]; compare Keenan [ v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571(2), 436 S.E.2d 475 (1993)]. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the motion to exclude field sobriety test evidence.”