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the officer observed resting nystagmus before he administered the HGN test go to the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility. See Hann, 292 Ga.App. at 723(5); Druitt v. State, 225 Ga.App. 150, 153(2) (483 S.E.2d 117) (1997) (evidence relating to error in administering a field sobriety test relates to weight rather than admissibility).” Accord, Parker v. State , 307 Ga.App. 61, 704 S.E.2d 438 (November 23, 2010) (“performing one of the three evaluative components ‘a little quick[ly]’ did not render the entire test inadmissible,” as long as defendant was properly medically qualified to take the test). Bravo v. State, 304 Ga.App. 243, 696 S.E.2d 79 (May 28, 2010). Defendant’s DUI conviction reversed; trial court erred in allowing officer to testify to a specific blood alcohol content based on HGN testing without sufficient scientific evidence that HGN is reliable for use in that manner. While prior case law has settled that HGN is admissible “ as a basis upon which an officer can determine that a driver was impaired by alcohol ,” no case law supports admitting it as a basis for a specific BAC, nor does the evidence here support it. Officer here referenced certain NHTSA studies, but the studies themselves weren’t tendered; and officer’s “testimony that ‘to his knowledge’ the method was reliable in approximating BAC is simply insufficient.” Distinguishing Webb (February 24, 2010), below, which determined only the relevance of the evidence, specifically noting that the issue of the scientific validity of using HGN to assign a specific BAC level was not before the court. Still approves, however, past holdings “that field sobriety tests, including the HGN, are admissible to show that a detainee's BAC exceeds a particular impairing level. See, e.g., Kirkland v. State, 253 Ga.App. 414, 416, 559 S.E.2d 161 (2002) (trial court did not err in admitting the arresting officer's opinion testimony that six of six clues on defendant's HGN test indicated a BAC of 0.10 grams or greater).” See Kirkland (January 24, 2002), below, and cases cited thereunder. Harris v. State, 301 Ga.App. 775, 689 S.E.2d 91 (December 21, 2009). Defendant’s DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s performance on HGN test. “Harris … argues that the officer incorrectly performed the HGN test on him given his medical condition [cerebral palsy] and that the results are therefore unreliable. While we are sympathetic to Harris' condition, Harris, as the objecting party, had the burden of showing error in the administration of the HGN test. See Hawkins v. State, 223 Ga.App. 34, 38(1) (476 S.E.2d 803) (1996). He has failed to meet this burden. Harris has presented no scientific evidence or testimony to establish the unreliability and thus the inadmissibility of HGN test results when the HGN test is given to an individual with cerebral palsy.” Sultan v. State, 289 Ga.App. 405, 657 S.E.2d 311 (January 30, 2008). Trial court’s failure to suppress HGN results was error, but harmless, where officer admittedly “substantially departed from the principles and procedures that were the basis for the HGN test’s reliability” by failing to test equal tracking, which, according to the officer’s testimony, “was necessary for the remainder of the HGN test to be valid.” Harmless, however, where trial court expressly did not rely on the HGN results in finding defendant guilty of DUI. Compare Johnson (July 3, 2013), above. Stewart v. State, 280 Ga.App. 366, 634 S.E.2d 141 (July 10, 2006). HGN results were admissible although officer failed to ask defendant “whether he had any head injuries before performing the test, a question [defendant’s] expert identified as a standard screening procedure.” State established “that the administrator substantially performed the test in an acceptable manner. State v. Tousley, 271 Ga.App. 874, 879(1)(b)(ii) (611 S.E.2d 139) (2005).” Webb v. State, 277 Ga.App. 355, 626 S.E.2d 545 (January 24, 2006). Defendant refused state testing and thus was charged only with DUI – less safe. She moved in limine to prevent State from eliciting testimony from officer that, based upon her HGN results, she probably had a blood alcohol content above .10. Defendant contends that the numerical measurement is irrelevant, given that she was only charged with less safe DUI. Held, trial court properly denied motion in limine; “the evidence directly addressed whether Webb was ‘under the influence,’ and her blood alcohol level shed light on whether she was less safe to drive.” Although statute no longer contains a presumption of impairment for any level of alcohol, “ the numerical evidence of Webb’s blood alcohol level was one factor which could be considered by the jury in determining if Webb was less safe to drive. ” Expressly does not determine “whether the HGN test has reached a state of verifiable certainty in the scientific community as a basis for determining the numerical level of a driver’s blood alcohol level” or thus whether “a trial court must always admit numerical evidence of a defendant’s blood alcohol content adduced by an HGN test,” as the only objection raised here by defendant was relevancy. See Bravo (May 28, 2010), above. State v. Tousley, 271 Ga.App. 874, 611 S.E.2d 139 (March 3, 2005). Trial court abused its discretion in finding HGN results inadmissible where officer substantially complied with NHTSA standards for administration. “In ruling on whether an HGN test was administered properly under law enforcement guidelines, our courts have considered whether