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the arresting officer was sufficiently trained to give the test, whether the officer was experienced in administering the test, whether the officer administered the test according to the standardized techniques, and whether the officer scored or interpreted the test properly. Tuttle v. State, 232 Ga.App. 530, 533(3) (502 S.E.2d 355) (1998); Sieveking v. State, 220 Ga.App. 218, 219-220(1) (469 S.E.2d 235) (1996). To show that the officer substantially performed the HGN test in an acceptable manner, the State may have the arresting officer testify both as a fact witness, regarding how he or she administered and interpreted the test, and as an expert witness, giving an opinion that he or she administered and interpreted the test properly under law enforcement guidelines. Waits v. State, 232 Ga.App. 357, 358(1) (501 S.E.2d 870) (1998); Sieveking v. State, 220 Ga.App. at 219-220(1).” Here, only two of the six clues were called into question; four is sufficient to conclude that a driver is impaired, according to NHTSA standards. Thus, the evidence showed substantial compliance and should have been admitted. “[T]he State, as the party offering the evidence, must show that the officer ‘substantially performed the scientific procedures in an acceptable manner,’ that is, ‘properly under law enforcement guidelines.’ The burden to show error in the administration of the tests shifts to the defendant, as the party raising a foundational objection, only after the State fully satisfies its foundational burden.” “To attack the reliability of HGN testing generally, a defendant may offer evidence to show that in practice HGN testing is prone to human error. As we have observed, ‘[c]learly HGN testing, although far from a complex procedure, may be subject to human error in its administration or interpretation; however, such potential for error does not impact on the validity of the HGN test [generally]; no procedures are infallible. An accused may always introduce evidence of the possibility of error.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hawkins v. State, 223 Ga.App. [34, 38(1), 476 S.E.2d 803 (1996)]. Such evidence of the possibility of error goes only to the weight of the test results, not to their admissibility. Tuttle v. State, 232 Ga.App. at 533(3); Druitt v. State, 225 Ga.App. 150, 153(2) (483 S.E.2d 117) (1997); Hawkins v. State, 223 Ga.App. at 38(1). In addition, a ruling that a particular HGN test was administered well enough to meet the threshold for admissibility does not preclude a defendant from arguing that the factfinder should, because of errors in the administration or interpretation of the test, assign less weight to the results. See Dougherty v. State, 259 Ga.App. 618, 621-622(1)(c) (578 S.E.2d 256) (2003) (when breathalyzer results are properly admitted, ‘[a] defendant remains free to challenge the weight and credibility of that evidence before the [factfinder]’) (footnote omitted).” Accord, Hann v. State , 292 Ga.App. 719, 665 S.E.2d 731 (July 15, 2008); Laseter v. State , 294 Ga.App. 12, 668 S.E.2d 495 (October 9, 2008); Harris v. State , 301 Ga.App. 775, 689 S.E.2d 91 (December 21, 2009). State v. Pierce, 266 Ga.App. 233, 596 S.E.2d 725 (March 12, 2004). HGN results were admissible even though officer acknowledged certain errors in conducting the test: failure to ask “certain qualifying questions” before administering; failure “to make the requisite number of passes;” and failure “to hold his observation for the recommended time period.” “[T]his evidence does not mandate the exclusion of the HGN test results,” even though the officer “agreed that he had not performed the test properly” and “further acknowledged that the training manual provides that if any element of the standardized field sobriety test is changed, the validity of the test is compromised.” This evidence “goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the test.” Trial court’s suppression of HGN results reversed. See Tousley (March 3, 2005), above, for a better explanation of the rules for admissibility of HGN, or other scientific evidence. James v. State, 260 Ga.App. 536, 580 S.E.2d 334 (March 26, 2003). Trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine officer on NHTSA standards for HGN, given officer’s detailed direct examination on the results of the test. Unlike the one-leg stand or walk-and-turn tests, “[w]hether an HGN test demonstrates impairment is not as obvious to the layperson as to the expert.” Muir v. State, 256 Ga.App. 381, 568 S.E.2d 515 (June 17, 2002). Trial court did not err in refusing to allow a witness certified as an expert chemist to testify about the alleged unreliability of the HGN, where the witness (Dr. James Woodford) admitted he was not a physiologist. His claim to expertise was based on alleged certification to perform field sobriety evaluations (evidence is unclear whether he was certified specifically in HGN) and reviewing one study on HGN’s alleged unreliability. Kirkland v. State, 253 Ga.App. 414, 559 S.E.2d 161 (January 24, 2002). Officer who conducted HGN test on Defendant testified at trial that Defendant exhibited all six clues indicating that he was intoxicated and that it was his opinion that generally when a person exhibits all six clues, that person’s blood alcohol concentration would likely be .10 grams or greater. Held, the officer’s testimony is admissible evidence because police officers may give opinion testimony regarding the state of sobriety of a DUI suspect. The officer here possessed the requisite learning and experience to testify as an expert as he was specially trained in the area of DUI detection, had conducted over 1,000 field sobriety evaluations, and had conducted approximately 700 breath tests using the Intoxilyzer 5000. Cited with approval, Bravo (May 28, 2010), above. Accord, Scott v. State , 332 Ga.App. 559, 774 S.E.2d 137 (June 18, 2015).